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KOREA
STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT OF A
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
1. TRANSPORT SECTOR
General
1.01 The rapid economic growth of Korea in the past decade, coupled
with industrialization, has res 'ted in major developments and changes in
the transport sector: freight and passenger traffic tripled between 1966
and 1976. This rapid growth in transport demand was accompanied by a greater
diversification among modes, as railways lost their predominant position and
road transport and coastal shipping increased their share.
1.02 Traffic statistics, in Tables 1.1 /1 and 1.2, illustrate these
changes over the 1966-76 decade. The rail transport share of freight traffic
fell from 78% of total ton-km to 46%, while road and coastal shipping shares
increased respectively from 12% to 27% and from 10% to 27%. For passenger
traffic, the rail share of total passenger-km fell from 43% to 25% over the
decade, while the road share increased correspondingly from 56% to 74%. These
changes very much reflect the economic advantages of the various modes, as
rail and coastal shipping increasingly concentrate on long distances and bulk
commodities, while road transport handles short distance and more diffuse
traffic.
1.03 As Korea's economy continues to grow and diversify, transport
demand will continue to experience a parallel expansion. Internally, the
transport system will have to cope with larger movements of bulk commodi-
ties, such as coal, cement, ores and oil. The industrial complexes being
developed along Korea's south and southeast coast will necessitate the import
of large amounts of raw materials and the shipment of intermediate products
between plants. A more diffuse demand for nonbulk freight and passenger
transport will follow the general increase in GNP.
1.04 Recognizing the necessity for the transport sector to keep up
with the growing economy, the Government's basic policy in the Fourth Five
Year Plan 1977-81 (FFYP) is to develop the transport system to meet increases
in traffic demand. Among the other objectives stated in the FFYP documents
the most important are: (a) to increase transport efficiency and ensure
economic allocation among modes; (b) rate increases and improvements in
operations to reduce the fiscal burden imposed on government by the railway;
and (c) to favor maintenance expenditures over new investment. Other lesser
objectives are described in detail in the Bank's latest Basic Economic Report
dated February 23, 1977 (Reference Al)./2
1.05 The FFYP investment allocation for the transport sector is
Won 2,780 billion (US$5.7 billion), or 14.6% of total investment. It is
expected that 45% (Won 1,258 billion) will be invested by the public sector
in infrastructure and equipment. The remaining 55% (Won 1,526 billion) will
/1 Tables referred to in main text will be found following the annexes.
/2 Refers to material in the project file and listed in Annex 1.
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be invested by the private sector, primarily for road transport vehicles and
ships. The allocation for transport investment in the Fourth Plan is about
50% higher in real terms than in the Third Plan (Table 1.3). Forecast trans-
port demand indicates that the proposed investment should provide for
increases of about 34 billion passenger-km and 12 billion ton-km, respectively
30% and 180% more than during the Third Plan, thereby justifying the substan-
tially larger capital allocation. The allocation among modes reflects the
increasing importance of road transport and coastal as well as international
shipping; proposed investments in these modes are, respectively, 47% and 80%
above the Third Plan, while railways are allocated only 25% more than in the
previous plan.
The Transport System
(Map 13133)
Highways
1.06 The present highway system is still inadequate to cope with the
rapid growth of road transport, despite the Government's effort since 1968
to develop a modern road network. Only about half of the national highways
and less than 20% of local roads are paved, and a high level of investment
will continue to be required. The Bank Group has financed three highway
projects, totalling US$191.5 million: Loan 769-KO in 1971 (US$54.5 million),
Loan 956-KO in 1974 (US$47 million) and Loan 1203-KO in 1976 (US$90 million).
Performance on these projects generally has been satisfactory.
1.07 Road transport of freight and passengers grew rapidly over the
last decade and, as mentioned above, the share of road transport increased
dramatically at the expense of the railways. This rapid development of
road transport occurred despite the Government's restrictive licensing
policy for commercial vehicles and heavy taxes which limit private auto-
mobile ownership (para. 4.02). Because of restrictive licensing, the number
of common carrier trucks is about 34,000, while the private truck fleet, which
is subject to less restrictive licensing, has grown to 55,000. In 1966, the
number of common carrier trucks was double the number of private trucks.
Private trucks can carry only the owner's goods. This limitation, together
with the increasing proportion of private trucks, is lowering the efficiency
of the truck fleet as a whole. The Bank therefore has been pressing the
Government to relax its truck licensing system, and some relaxation was
introduced in early 1977. Urban passenger traffic in Seoul moved entirely by
road (mainly bus and taxis) until the subway and the railway's electrified
suburban lines began operation in 1974 (para. 4.13). As congestion increases
in Seoul, the share of the suburban lines will rise, although road transport
will remain the dominant mode in the urban area.
Railways
1.08 As mentioned above, major structural changes occurred in the trans-
port sector over the last decade: the transport system is now evolving
into a more balanced multi-modal system in which different traffic modes
complement each other according to their technical and economic character-
istics. Cost comparisons indicate that rail transport is still the most
economic means of moving bulk traffic over medium and long distances, and
also has an important role to play in long distance passenger traffic. In
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1976, about 81% of rail freight traffic consisted of six bulk commodities,
as against 69% in 1966. In addition to its long distance hauling of bulk
freight and passengers, KNR will play a growing role in providing rapid
transit service for Seoul and its suburbs. Details are given in Chapter 2.
1.09 Since 1962, Bank Group assistance to KNR through five projects
amounted to US$220 million. The first three lending operations have been
satisfactorily completed. Disbursements of the Fourth Railway Project (Loan
863-KO) are 96% completed, but the Closing Date has been extended to March
31, 1979, to allow for disbursements for equipment with long delivery times.
The Fifth Railway Loan (1101-KO) made in 1975 for US$100 million is over 80%
disbursed and will be completed before the end of 1978. The major require-
ments of the Loan/Credit Agreements covering these first five railway
projects fall into fGur main areas: (a) KNR's status and financial autonomy;
(b) KNR's financial situation; (c) railway operational and technical matters;
and (d) transport coordination.
1.10 Considerable progress has been made in providing KNR with more
autonomy, although it has not yet been reorganized as a public corporation
or other autonomous agency, as agreed under the Second Railway Project.
However, the Government has agreed to enable KNR to operate with autonomous
powers by 1979. KNR earned positive returns until 1971; since then its
financial situation deteriorated due to increased highway competition, which
eroded profitable passenger services, sharp inflation which increased costs
substantially, and tariffs, maintained at low levels by the Government, and
which did not fully compensate for inflation. The requirements of covenants
covering operational and technical matters have, in general, been met satis-
factorily, with a consequent improvement in KNR's level of performance.
Progress has been made in building up an organization in the Ministry of
Transportation to coordinate transport investment, and the Economic Planning
Board (EPB) is exercising a greater measure of control (para. 1.14 and 1.15).
Further details on compliance with specific covenants are given in Annex 2.
Ports and Shipping
1.11 Freight traffic through the ports has increased from about 13 mil-
lion tons in 1966 to over 80 million tons in 1976. This tremendous increase
resulted in serious port capacity problems, particularly at Busan, the largest
port, which handles 20% of the country's external trade and is chronically
congested. The Bank has assisted development in Busan through two port
projects-and ADB is financing the expansion of Incheon, the port nearest
to Seoul. The Saudi Fund for Development participated in the financing
of the first Busan Port Project. The Government has also proceeded to
develop a number of specialized ports in connection with industrial develop-
ment. The latter is largely concentrated on the coast: i.e. Bugpyeong for
cement, Pohang for the inputs and output of the steelmill, Onsan for a refinery
and nonferrous metal industry, and Samil for fertilizer and petrochemicals.
1.12 The role of coastal shipping has greatly increased in the last
decade, from 10% of the ton-km moved in Korea in 1966 to 27% in 1976. This is
mainly due to the construction of industrial complexes on coastal locations,
and, to a lesser extent, to shortages in rail and road capacity. Korea's
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share in the merchant shipping of its external trade has been increasing and
reached about 38% of total tonnage in 1976.
Aviation
1.13 Although domestic air passenger traffic grew rapidly until 1973,
it still amounts to less than 1% of total passenger-km; air-freight is also
negligible. Domestic routes are served by the privately-owned Korean Airlines
(KAL), which also operates internationally. Most international traffic is
handled at the Seoul-Kimpo International Airport; other international airports
are at Busan and at Jeju Island, a major tourist center.
Transport Policy Planning and Coordination
1.14 Over the past two years, the Government has taken steps to improve
transport coordination. In 1975, this function was reorganized by the estab-
lishment of a Transport Coordination Committee (TCC) consisting of nine
directors, representing ministries most directly concerned with transport
matters, and a Transport Coordination Office (TCO) in the Ministry of Trans-
portation (MOT Chart 18023). The TCO is headed by a director general, who
also acts as Chairman of the TCC. Its main functions are to collect data
and assist in the formulation and review of transport policies, especially
those related to pricing and regulation.
1.15 While the charter of the TCC includes intermodal coordination of
transport sector investments, the TCC has not in fact exercised this function.
The Economic Planning Board (EPB), which exercises budgetary control and
plays a senior role with regard to all other ministries, has the dominant
role in decision on investment projects. EPB intends to make much more
intensive reviews of investment projects and has established a separate
Bureau of Project Evaluation to this end. Sector studies covering major
aspects of transport coordination have been identified by the sector mission
and are included in the Project (para. 3.07). They will be carried out
under the supervision of EPB.
1.16 This approach appears much more satisfactory and workable than the
one where investment coordination was to come under one of the ministries,
namely MOT. The role of the TCO should remain one of collecting basic data
in the sector and assisting in the formulation and review of transport
policies, especially those related to pricing and regulation, since MOT is
responsible for licensing and rates and fares setting.
1.17 The Bank should continue to assist the Government in increasing
the capacity of its transport system to cope with the demand resulting from
the continuous rapid development of the country. Since transport infra-
structure is capital-intensive, the Bank can ensure through careful project
preparation that capacity increases are provided at the least cost to the
economy, and that efficient use is made of existing capacity prior to
increasing it.
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2. RAILWAY SUBSECTOR
KNR Organization
2.01 KNR is a semi-autonomous agency within the Ministry of Transporta-
tion, with its own management, accounts, and section of the national budget.
The legal basis for KNR's administration and operation is set out in:
(a) Law for Government Organizations No. 2907, revised December 31, 1976;
and (b) INR Organization - Presidential Decree No. 7310, dated November 4,
1974. The Government, largely through the EPB, exercises control over
staff, financial, budgetary and tariff matters. The Director General of KNR
is appointed (often from outside the railway) by the Government /1, while
the Deputy Director General comes from within KNR and is in charge of the
day-to-day operations. Chart 18024 shows KNR's organization.
Management, Staff, Training
2.02 Management is generally satisfactory, but there remains a need
to strengthen certain aspects, especially the capability for development
of technical, financial and economic policies and investment planning. The
Government has recognized the situation and proposed that a management
study be carried out by consultants (to be mostly Korean with support from
some overseas specialists). The Bank has agreed to finance this study
(which will take about six months) from Loan 1101-KO, in accordance with
terms of reference prepared by the Bank (Reference B-1) and presently being
reviewed by the Government and KNR. Agreement on the terms of reference was
reached during loan negotiations.
2.03 Pending the results of the above management study, KNR has prepared
and is now carrying out a Management Rationalization Plan (MRP). The main
items of this plan are:
(a) Cost savings due mainly to manpower reductions arising
from such measures as mechanization, improved operations,
closing or rationalizing of lines and stations, and reor-
ganization of administrative functions; and
(b) Revenue increases due to improving and upgrading passenger
services and baggage handling, expansion of container
services, provision of private sidings, reclassification
of freight rates (para. 2.30), and improvements to the
passenger fare structure.
The expected cost savings and additional revenues are incorporated in the
financial projections discussed in Chapter 5.
2.04 The number of permanent employees with Government civil service
status was about 33,500 at the end of 1976, a figure which has remained
almost constant for about five years. The financial forecasts assume that
there will be no major increase over the project period (to end of 1979).
In addition, KNR employs about 6,000 semipermanent and temporary personnel,
/1 The present Director General was appointed from the railway staff.
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some on a seasonal basis, in workshops and on track works. Staff productivity
in terms of traffic units (pass-km plus net ton-km) per employee is high
(1976 - 600,000) compared with other railways; this is due in part to the
dense urban and inter-city passenger travel and heavy bulk mineral and
commodity traffic. In general, the staff continues to display excellent
discipline and productivity.
2.05 Basic salaries per employee (excluding management), which were
raised by about 20% on January 1, 1978, range from about W 33,000 to about
W 198,000 per month and are in line with Government pay scales. Allowances,
which increase with length of service and range from W 20,000 to W 120,000 per
month, were also raised on January 1, 1978, by about 10-40%. Staff remunera-
tion is lower than in comparable private industrial and commercial enterprises
in Korea, and this causes some difficulties in retaining qualified and experi-
enced personnel.
2.06 KNR's training programs were reviewed by the Bank during the
Fifth Railway Project and were found to be fundamentally sound and generating
considerable interest among the staff. The main problem lies with a lack
of equipment and material for practical training; agreement has been reached
on required items and their purchase is being financed from the Fifth
Railway Project.
Railway Facilities
Tracks
2.07 The system consists of 3,097 route-km of standard guage (1.435 m)
and 47 km of narrow gauge (0.76 m) lines; 567 km are double track and the
remainder single track (Table 2.1 and Map 13134). There are many lines in
mountainous areas, with some sections having gradients up to 2.5% and 3%,
along with numerous sharp curves. There are about 140 km of tunnels and 97 km
of bridges. The main lines are laid with 50 kg/m rail, while secondary branch
lines have mostly 50 kg/m and 37 kg/m rail (see Table 2.2); all new rail
renewals are carried out with 50 kg/m rail. Sleepers are predominantly
timber, but locally manufactured pre-stressed concrete sleepers are being
used as replacements on the higher speed lines. Rail joint welding is also
being carried out on a limited basis on such lines, with about 190 km
completed to end 1976 and another 90 km planned for 1977-81. The mission
recommended that KNR consider a larger program of rail joint welding because
of the economies in maintenance that can be obtained. All lines have crushed
stone ballast.
2.08 During the proposed project period (1978-79), KNR plans to carry
out renewal of about 330 track km of worn out rails, of which about 70
km are in connection with complete track renewal. KNR will also increase
the use of concrete sleepers and continue its ballast renewal program.
Equipment for partial mechanization of track renewal and maintenance work has
been provided under the Fifth Project. Under the new project, KNR intends to
set up a workshop for the manufacture of points and crossing components, the
preparation of timber sleepers and the rehabilitation of used track material.
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2.09 Existing double track lines are the Gyeong Bu and Gyeong In lines
and the section Bongyang-Jecheon of the Jung Ang line. The double tracking
of the Ho Nam line between Iri and Daejon (89 km) is being completed, and
work has started on quadrupling part of the Yeongdeungpo-Suweon section in
the densely trafficked Seoul urban area. Works to increase the capacity of
the Chung Bug line (to give an additional access between the T!dustrial
northeast and the Seoul-Busan main line), by upgrading and partial doubling,
are included in the present project.
2.10 In step with the increasing traffic and train size requirements,
additional and lengthened crossing loops and enlarged marshalling yards have
been - and more are to be - provided.
2.11 The single track industrial lines between the northeast and
Seoul are electrified; an extension of electrification on the Jung Ang line
from Jecheon to Yeongju has been proposed for consideration in the 1980/81
period (para. 3.03). Most of the Seoul urban tracks are also electrified, in
association with the Seoul Metropolitan Electrified Suburban Railway System
(SMESRS); extension of electrification to the Seoul-Susaeg urban line is
proposed under the new project.
Signalling
2.12 Centralized traffic control (CTC) has been installed in the Seoul
urban area and on the heavily trafficked electrified single line Seoul-Jecheon.
Under the new project, CTC is to be installed on the Dae Gu line (about 35 km)
and between Yeongju and Gyeongju on the Jung Ang line (about 164 km).
Automatic block operation is provided on the Seoul-Busan double line. Most
of the other main lines are equipped with tokenless block signalling and
interlocking systems. For safety, an automatic train stopping system is
being installed under successive projects.
Motive Power and Rolling Stock
2.13 KNR's motive power and rolling stock fleet at the end of 1976 are
given in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The fleet consists of 386 diesel and 69 elec-
tric locomotives (with about 20 steam locomotives still in service on
shunting duties), 120 diesel rail cars, 128 electric rail cars (on the Seoul
urban electrified lines), about 1,800 passenger cars, and about 16,000
freight cars (with another 1,400, mostly tank cars, privately owned).
Another 20 electric locomotives, 90 electric rail cars and 750 freight cars,
not included in the project, are ordered or being ordered for delivery during
1977 and 1978. An additional 30 diesel locomotives, 211 passenger cars and
1,420 freight cars are included in the project. Fifty-two of the diesel
locomotives have recently been re-powered; another 59 are to be re-powered
under the proposed project.
2.14 Under the Fifth Railway Project KNR agreed:
(a) to submit a firm plan acceptable to the Bank to ensure:
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(i) the satisfactory maintenance of KNR's fleet of
locomotives and rolling stock; and
(ii) rehabilitation of out-of-service diesel locomotives;
and
(b) to appoint for a period of not less than two years a technical
adviser to assist KNR in the implementation of the aforesaid plan.
After some delay, a technical adviser from Canadian Pacific Consulting
Services (CPCS) has been provided for a two-year period from September 1976,
and the implementation of the maintenance and rehabilitation plans are now
under way. The adviser's first reports (Reference B2), however, indicate
that much needs to be done to clean up the workshops and to organize rational
programs for inspection and maintenance; all of which will require consider-
able effort by KNR over the next few years. The transfer of all passenger
and freight car maintenance operations to the new workshop at Daejeon (para.
2.15) should facilitate the new improved maintenance methods being adopted.
Improved training facilities now being provided (para. 2.06) should also
help in the longer term. Sufficient spare parts to carry on the improved
maintenance program have been or are being procured under the Fifth Railway
Project. Further measures to be taken will be included in the action plan
to be prepared by KNR (para. 3.20).
Workshops
2.15 KNR has at present four main workshops: at Seoul (electric loco-
motives, passenger cars, freight cars, diesel-rail cars and electric rail
cars), Yeongdeungpo (steam locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars),
Busan (diesel locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars), and Incheon
(passenger cars and freight cars). Steam locomotives are expected to be
completely phased out by 1979. A new freight car workshop is being con-
structed at Daejeon and will be completed in 1978; a new adjacent passenger
car shop is proposed under the project (paras. 3.14 and 4.14). KNR is plan-
ning to transfer all passenger and freight car maintenance to the new work-
shops at Daejeon and, by about 1980, to close the existing workshops at
Yeongdeungpo and Incheon after transferring usable equipment to other work-
shops. Provision is also made in the project for necessary improvements to
remaining running sheds for locomotives, rail cars and passenger and freight
cars.
Telecommunications
2.16 A microwave system has recently been installed between Seoul and
Busan, and a start has been made on providing improved station-to-station
and station-to-train communications. The latter is to be continued under
the project.
Other Property
2.17. In general, the buildings, stations, offices and general plant of
the railways are reasonably maintained. A considerable program of bridge
strengthening, carried out under the Fourth and Fifth Railway Projects, is
to be continued under this project.
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Traffic
Freight Traffic
2.18 KNR's freight traffic statistics from 1966 to 1976 are given in
Tables 2.5 through 2.7. During this period, freight traffic grew 6.2% p.a. in
tons and 6% p.a. in ton-km. Major commodities which contributed to these
increases were cement and coal. Cement transportation increased from 1.7
million tons in 1966 to 10.2 million tons in 1976, and coal rose from 10.5
to 16.1 million tons during the same period. In 1976, freight traffic was
43.8 million tons and 9.7 billion ton-km, the average transport distance was
222 km. Freight net ton per route km averaged 3.1 million in 1976. Preliminary
results for 1977 indicate that ton-km are in line with the forecast given in
Table 2.7 and 8% above 1976. Freight densities (see Char 18070) are higher
on KNR industrial lines between Seoul and the northeast region of coal mines
and cement plants, exceeding 13 million tons on the heaviest section. The
next highest freight densities are on the Jung Ang line south of Jecheon and
on the Seoul-Busan line, with the busiest sections carrying around 4 million
tons annually.
2.19 Bulk commodities best suited for rail transport - such as coal,
cement, ore, oil, fertilizer, and grain-accounted for 81% of KNR's total
freight ton-km in 1976, up from 69% in 1966. Apart from some military and
KNR's own transport, the remainder consists mainly of general cargo. Tonnage
of this carried by KNR since 1966 has fluctuated between 4.5 and 6 million
tons per annum, reacting to factors such as the opening of the Seoul-Busan
expressway in 1970 (much of the general cargo originally carried by KNR was
suitable for highway transport),and the econoniic slowdown in 1975.
2.20 Freight traffic forecasts from 1977 to 1981 are given in Tables 2.5
through 2.7. They take into account the expected increases in production
of bulk commodities during the FFYP, and prospective competition from other
modes, namely coastal shipping and road transport (Reference Cl). The
forecast for coal transport is based on the targeted national production of
24 million tons in 1981. While the government will do its utmost to reach
it, this target is ambitious and a delay of about one year is not unlikely.
Nevertheless, the target has been accepted for coal car acquisition in
1978-79 to avoid creating a bottleneck should the production indeed be on
target. The acquisition program for the last two years of the FFYP could
then be adjusted if necessary. General cargo has also been assumed to grow
over the plan period, as the heavy metal and machinery industry develops and
generates inputs and outputs suitable for rail transport. The development of
container services between Seoul and Busan will also contribute to the growth
of general cargo suitable for rail transport. In 1977 general cargo tonnage
was 43% above the same period of 1976.
2.21 Overall, the average freight traffic growth rate has been estimated
at 7% p.a. in tons and 7.5% p.a. in ton-km; it is projected to reach 62 mil-
lion tons and 14 billion ton-km by 1981, with the basic composition of
traffic remaining unchanged. These forecasts were discussed and agreed with
KNR, and appear realistic (with the above reservation on coal). However, in
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view of past experience where freight forecasts generally have been proven
over optimistic, traffic development should be closely monitored and reviewed
by KNR and the Bank before finalizing investments in the last two years of
the FFYP (para. 3.03).
Passenger Traffic
2.22 Tables 2.8 through 2.10 show KNR's passenger traffic statistics
from 1966 to 1976, as well as forecasts to 1981. Significant changes occurred
during this period which greatly affected passenger traffic. They were the
opening of expressways in 1970-71, followed by the development of long
distance bus transport; the rise in personal incomes, which increased mobility
and the demand for greater comfort, resulting in a shift to the higher class
trains; and, finally, the opening in 1974 of the first Seoul subway line
connected to KNR's electrified suburban lines.
2.23 Regarding long distance travel, passenger traffic grew regularly
until 1969, when it reached 115 million passengers and 9.7 billion pass-km.
Due to sharp bus competition, particularly following the opening of the
Seoul-Busan and the Daejon-Gwangju expressways, the number of long distance
passengers fell to 85 million in 1971. By 1973, however, passengers and
pass-km were back to their 1969 levels, and both have been growing steadily
since then, despite the 1974-75 economic slowdown. In 1976, the number of
long distance passengers was about 7% above 1975 and, according to preliminary
results, the growth in 1977 was 11%.
2.24 As mentioned above, the growth in long distance passenger traffic
has been paralleled by a shift from lower class (ordinary) trains to limited
express and special express. The number of passengers on express trains
quadrupled in the last five years, while the number of ordinary passengers
remained almost constant (Table 2.9).
2.25 Regarding the Seoul urban system, SMESRS (Seoul subway plus the
KNR electrified suburban lines), passenger traffic grew rapidly from the
start of service in 1974 ad reached 134 million passengers in 1976; of
these, 100 million were KNR passengers and 34 million Seoul city subway
passengers. In 1977 urban passenger traffic was 40% above 1976.
2.26 In view of these recent and major changes in passenger traffic
patterns - both for long distance and urban services - and the resulting
absence of well-established trends, it is difficult to forecast future
traffic. To illustrate this point: in 1977, special express passengers were
up 23% and limited express passengers up 84% from the same period in 1976.
The best possible forecast agreed with KNR is for a 3.7% p.a. overall growth
in long distance passengers and a 6% p.a. growth in pass-km. This would
result in 156 million passengers and 15.6 billion pass-km by 1981, with most
of the growth occurring in the special and limited express categories. For
Seoul (SMESRS), a doubling of the number of passengers, to 209 million by
1981, has been assumed until the results of a comprehensive urban transport
study are available (para. 4.13). Even more than for freight traffic,
further developments in passenger traffic should be closely monitored to
ensure that investments are compatible with demand - not only in terms of
quantities, but also in terms of the quality of service demanded by KNR's
customers.
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Operations
2.27 Table 2.11 gives a summary of KNR's operating statistics for
1971-76. Operating efficiency and utilization of available equipment remain
high and, in some aspects, continue to improve: for example, annual pass-km
per available passenger car (from 5.7 to 8.1 million) and freight net ton-km
per available freight car (from 600 to 680 thousand). On the other hand,
availability of equipment remains lower than expected and, in the case of
cars, is not likely to reach the targets set for the end of 1977 in the Plan
of Action for improved availability under the Fifth Project (Annex 5, Appraisal
Report No. 610a-KO). In 1976, availability of passenger cars was 88.7%, com-
pared with the target for this year of 90%; for freight cars, availability
was 89.3% against the target of 93%. There were delays, however, in the
appointment of the technical advisor on equipment maintenance (para. 2.14), in
the supply of spares and components, and in the provision of new centralised
freight and passenger workshops (para. 2.15). With varying progress now being
made on all three aspects, it should be feasible to improve the situation
during the 1977-81 investment plan period. Operational forecasts are defined
in para. 3.19.
Tariffs and Costs
2.28 Tariffs are uniform throughout the system, and are regulated by the
Government; the latter, in exercising controls on the prices of essential
commodities, has held railway freight rates at low levels. For many years,
freight revenues have not covered the fully distributed costs of moving the
traffic, although passenger traffic had been profitable until 1976. The
following table gives average cost and revenue comparisons for the years
1973-76:
Freight Passenger
Cost per Revenue per Cost per Revenue
ton-km ton km (Won) pass-km pass-km
1973 2.27 .1.84 1.76 2.14
1974 3.14 2.31 2.44 2.97
1975 4.05 3.34 2.93 3.53
1976 5.76 4.64 3.69 3.67
2.29 Action on tariff increases over the last ten years is detailed in
Tables 2.12 through 2.14. These show that, since 1973, the Government has
permitted KNR to increase freight tariffs at a rate faster than passenger
fares, thereby reducing KNR's dependence on passenger traffic revenues.
However, coal, which constitutes 38% of total railway freight traffic, is
carried at the lowest class rate (class 4); grains, fertilizers, limestone
and ores (18% of total freight traffic) are rated at class 3.
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2.30 The last tariff increase was in January 1977, when the five existing
freight class rates were restructured to four classes by combining classes 1
and 2 (at existing class 1 rate) and moving up the remaining classes, with
some additional increases in the rates for the new classes 2, 3 and 4. This
raised average revenues per ton-km by about 19%. The spread between the
lowest and highest class rates, which used to be as much as 110%, has now been
reduced to 32%. This is good, and in fact, the spread could be further
reduced by merging class 4 with class 3. Passenger fares have not been
increased since July 1975.
2.31 KNR's operating costs are low, due to a high degree of utilization
of rail facilities and rolling stock, low salaries and wages, and high staff
productivity. Cost analysis indicates that in 1976 the average fully distri-
buted costs were about W 3.69 (USi0.76) per pass-km and W 5.75 (USdI.19) per
freight ton-km; these costs are somewhat understated, since KNR's expenditure
on maintenance was below the minimum level. However, these average costs
should rise in 1977, with a better supply of maintenance spares becoming
available.
2.32 The cost data given for 1976 in Table 2.15 indicates that high
class, express passenger services earn a good profit margin, but that lower
class, ordinary passengers and commuters and baggage service lose money. All
freight classes except cement lose money, particularly grain, fertilizer, ores
and coal. However, all passenger services (except commuters) and all major
freight traffic revenues (except for grain and military) covered variable
costs and made full or partial contributions to overheads.
2.33 For KNR to reach a satisfactory financial position, the level of
tariffs must be raised. Prompt action should be taken in the future to
maintain a satisfactory level in the face of inflation. Future increases
should be selective rather than across the board. For instance, ordinary and
commuter passenger fares should be raised to a greater extent than the
higher class fares. KNR is already proposing a considerable increase in
baggage charges. Regarding freight traffic rates, where the need is greater,
more emphasis is needed on raising the charges on grains, fertilizers, ores
and coal (para. 5.08). Agreement was reached during loan negotiation on
increases in both passenger fares and freight rates (para. 5.22).
Budget, Accounting, and Audit
Budgets
2.34 KNR prepares detailed annual operating and investment budgets.
Through the Government Office of Audit, expenditures are rigidly controlled
against the very detailed budget provisions. KNR management has very little
flexibility in reallocating budget funds and, when other than minor revisions
are needed, approval must be sought from the House of Representatives. Agree-
ment was reached at loan negotiations on measures to allow KNR to submit its
budgets in a commercial form, to give KNR more flexibility in reallocating
budget funds and to allow KNR fix the emoluments of its staff.
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Accounting
2.35 A requirement of the Fifth Project was that KNR would, within 12
months, complete the installation of a commercial accounting system devised
by consultants /1, and would install a traffic costing system. Implementa-
tion of the computerized, commercial accounting system has been subject to
considerable delay, largely due to KNR's inability to provide sufficient
qualified and experienced accounting staff - particularly staff with computer
experience - to work with the consultants. Actual implementation commenced
during 1977, and should be completed in 1978.
2.36 KNR has been using a manual traffic costing system introduced by
the consultants in 1970. A new, computerized system has been devised by the
Present team, and will be introduced when the accounting system is working
satisfactorily.
Audit
2.37 In accordance with loan requirements that KNR retain auditors satis-
factory to the Bank, international firms (latterly with local affiliation),
have been auditing KNR's commercial accounts since 1967. To date: (a) the
auditors have not been able to give a clear audit certificate, due to defi-
ciencies in operating the accounting system; and (b) KNR has not been able to
comply with the requirement that the Bank receive a copy of the audit report
not later than five months after the end of fiscal year, largely due to delays
in appointing the auditors. However, accounting has been improving with the
aid of consultants, and the audit report for 1976 was received within six
months. At negotiations it was reaffirmed that-audited accounts for 1977 and
thereafter will be submitted to the Bank within five months of the end of the
fiscal year.
Uneconomic Lines and Stations
2.38 Data from KNR's 1975 costing study has indicated seven branch lines,
totalling 164 km, on which the operating ratio was over 400% (Table 2.16). A
decision to close the An Seong line will be made in 1978, while the Korea
Electric Co. has agreed to bear the costs of the Yong San line as from 1977.
KNR is negotiating with the Korea Coal Corporation to bear the costs of the
Hwa Sun line. The Jin Sam, Og Gu and Kim Po lines are all used exclusively by
military authorities, who do not wish the lines to be closed. KNR is discus-
sing with the Ministry of National Defense the possibility of the latter
bearing the costs of operating these lines. Regarding the Su In line, the
Government is studying the future traffic demand arising from the construction
of an industrial estate near Suweon, and will make a decision on the future
of this line, and on other uneconomic lines, by mid-1979.
2.39 KNR has identified 145 stations where revenues from passenger
services fail to cover 30% of the personnel costs involved, 97 stations
were freight revenues fail to cover 30% of personnel costs, and 230 stations
where baggage revenues fail to cover 100% of labor costs involved. Action
/j Touche, Ross and Co., Canada.
- 14 -
is proposed over the years 1977-79 to close 36 of these stations, change 56
into crossing stations only (i.e. used to arrange train meets, but without
either passenger or freight services), aLJ to s'r -y ,-- -0
stations for passengers and 49 stations for freight services. This would
eliminate about 166 employees and save about W 320 million in 1979. T'he
proposed measures appear to be satisfactory. Action as above was actually
taken on 132 stations in 1977.
3. INVESTMENT PLAN AND PROJECT
KNR's Investment Plan (1977-81)
3.01 As a result of discussions during appraisal, KNR's Investment
Plan, which forms part of the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan of
Korea, 1977-81, was substantially revised, both in regard to its size and to
the phasing of expenditures. The revised plan, as agreed between the Govern-
ment and the Bank, comprises investments totalling W 503 billion (US$1037
million), with a foreign exchange component of W 211 billion (US$436 million).
This includes items carried over from the 1972-76 Investment Plan, such as
the new Daejeon freight car shop, completion of double tracking of the Honam
line and the purchase of electric locomotives. It also includes items which
are being financed under Loan 1101-KO: for example, rails and freight cars.
3.02 The composition and cost of the plan are shown in detail in Table 3.1,
a summary of which is given below.
KNR 1977-81 INVESTMENT PLAN
% of
total
W billion US$ million expen-
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total diture
New line construction 10.97 - 10.97 22.62 - 22.62 2.2
Electrification .4.69 3.96 8.65 9.67 8.16 17.83 1.7
Increase in station and
line capacity 86.24 9.65 95.89 177.80 19.90 197.70 19.0
Way and structures 41.96 18.22 60.18 86.52 37.57 124.09 12.0
Motive power and rolling
stock 46.21 133.06 179.27 95.28 274.36 369.64 35.7
Motive power and rolling
stock repair facilities 15.68 8.87 24.55 32.34 18.28 50.62 4.9
Miscellaneous 17.70 1.58 19.28 36.51 3.25 39.76 3.8
Subtotal 223.45 175.34 398.79 460.74 361.52 822.26 79.3
Contingencies 68.15 35.99 104.14 140.52 74.21 214.73 20.7
Total 291.60 211.33 502.93 601.26 435.73 1036.99 100.0
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3.03 Items started before or during 1977 total about W 119 billion,
of which about W 77 billion is expected to be spent in 1977 (Table 3.2).
They include: (a) ongoing works, such as the completion of double tracking
of the sections Yeongdeungpo-Anyang on the Gyeong Bu line and Daejeon-Iri on
the Ho Nam line, by-pass lines, station extensions and improvements, rail
and track renewal, and the new Daejeon freight car shop; and (b) material
and equipment already ordered or being ordered, such as new electric locomo-
tives and rail cars, new passenger and freight cars, and rails. Investments
starting in the 1980/81 period of the plan, totalling about W 187 billion
(Table 3.3), will be subject to further adjustments on the basis of actual
traffic developments in the next two years. Also, detailed technical,
financial and economic analyses should be performed during the intervening
two years for some of the major fixed capacity investments proposed for
1980/81: that is, double tracking, electrification and signalling. Assurances
were obtained during negotiation that KNR will submit these studies and
justification, for agreed items and in agreed format, to the Bank by the
mid-1979.
3.04 The plan as now drawn up assumes continued high operational effi-
ciency and improving availability of motive power and rolling stock.
The Project and the Proposed Loan
3.05 The project to be financed under the proposed loan consists of the
plan investments, intended to start in 1978 and 1979 (Table 3.4). Total
cost of the project is estimated at W 197 billion (US$406 million equivalent),
with a foreign exchange component of about US$190 million, of which US$120 mil-
lion would be covered by the proposed loan. A summary of the estimated project
expenditure and items to be financed by the proposed loan is given in the
following table.
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Total project cost Proposed
Local Foreign Total loan
--------- (US$ million) ---------
New line construction (industrial sidings) 4.74 - 4.74
Electrification 1.65 1.73 3.38
Increase in station and line capacity
(including double tracking, bypass
lines, additional crossing loops, yard
extensions, freight handling facilities,
lengthening of crossing loops, station
installations and signalling) 60.81 7.26 68.07
Way and structures (including rail and
track renewal concrete sleepers, points
and crossings, bridge and tunnel
strengthening, ballast, road crossings,
track material, workshop and
right-of-way improvements) 43.13 14.76 57.89 14.76
Motive power and rolling stock (including
new diesel locomotives, breakdown cranes,
passenger cars and freight cars and
remodelling of locomotives, railcars,
breakdown cranes, passenger cars and
freight cars 24.11 126.34 150.45 84.65
Rolling stock repair facilities 18.68 11.14 29.82 3.31
Miscellaneous (including telecommuni-
cations, power facilities, housing,
training and technical assistance) 13.73 0.72 14.45 0.62
Contingencies 49.88 27.73 77.61 16.16
Subtotal 216.73 189.68 406.41 119.50
Transport sector studies (para. 3.07) 0.50
Total 216.73 189.68 406.41 120.00
3.06 The proposed loan would cover acquisition of rails, passenger
and freight cars, breakdown cranes, workshop machinery, and provision of
training equipment and technical assistance (Table 3.5). The remaining
foreign currency items, including electrification, increase of line capa-
city, diesel locomotives, re-engining of diesel locomotives and diesel
railcars and workshop equipment, would be financed by other agencies
(para. 3.17).
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3.07 Transport Sector Studies. The Government is strengthening its
transport sector analysis capability, but has requested Bank assistance to
do so. As a first step, EPB intends to have studies done in the following
areas: (a) distribution of major bulk commodities, such as coal, cement and
oil; (b) costs and tariffs of various modes, to ensure economic allocation
of traffic; and (c) passenger transport demand by various modes. The
Government intends to have these studies carried out by local consulting
firms with the assistance of fo:eign experts in specialized fields, such as
the bulk handling of major commodities in the case of (a) above. This was
confirmed during negotiations. The proposed loan would include US$500,000
to finance about 70 man-months of such foreign experts assistance. Local
costs of the various studies would be determined when the terms of reference
are prepared and agreed with the Bank. This procedure and iming of the
various studies was agreed during negotiations, together with terms of
reference for the study in (a) above. The findings of the studies would be
valuable in a variety of feasibility studies of transport investment projects,
and will provide useful experience for local consulting firms in the transport
field. In particular, it is expected that the bulk commodity study would
lead to a project for Bank financing.
Description of Main Project Items
3.08 The main project items are described in the following paragraphs.
New Line Construction
3.09 New line construction comprises only-two new industrial sidings.
Electrification
3.10 Electrification is limited to the Seoul-Susaeg suburban line in the
Seoul City area, subject to justification under the Seoul Urban Transport
Study to be carried out by Korean consultants (para. 4.13).
Increase in Station and Line Capacity
3.11 The main items under this category are:
(a) Double tracking of the section Gongjeon-Bongyang (8.6 km)
of the Chung Bug line, to increase its capacity as an alterna-
tive route between Seoul and coal mines and cement plants of the
northeast region;
(b) Double tracking and electrification of the Yongsan-Susaeg
and Seongbug-Euijeongbu suburban lines (Seoul), to carry
increasing suburban traffic. As for the electrification
of Seoul-Susaeg (para. 3.10), the Seoul Urban Transport Study
will review and check the justification;
(c) Additional crossing loops at seventeen places on eight
lines throughout the system, to increase train capacities;
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(d) Marshalling yard extensions at Jecheon (from 1000 to 1440
cars per day) and at Deogha, south of Ulsan, (from 30 to
350 cars per day), to deal with industrial expansion;
(e) Extensions to station yards at seven stations on three
lines of the system;
(f) Expansion of Susaeg, as the principal West Seoul Terminal
for improved coal and cement handling, and Bugog, similarly
to serve South Seoul;
(g) Lengthening crossing loops at three stations on the single track
section of the Ho Nam line, to take longer trains and give
increased capacity;
(h) Additional passenger platforms at Seoul central station, new
station buildings at 30 stations, underground passages at eight
stations, new passenger sheds at twelve stations and new freight
sheds at 30 stations; also included are about 100 sets of
automatic ticketing machines; and
(i) Installation of centralized traffic control system (CTC) on
the Dae Gu Line between Dongdaegu and Yeongcheon (35 km), and on
the Jung Ang Line between Yeongju and Gyeongju (about 163 km);
extensions of automatic train stopping systems, interlocking
signals, and level crossing warning devices.
Way and Structures
3.12 The main components are:
(a) Rail renewal on about 260 km of track (see Table 3.6,
Reference C-2);
(b) Complete track renewal over about 70 km (see Table 3.7,
Reference C-2);
(c) Provision of concrete sleepers (about 150,000);
(d) Provision of ballast (about 320,000 cu m);
(e) Provision and equipping of a workshop for permanent way material
manufacturing and rehabilitation (list of equipment is shown in
Table 3.8);
(f) Separation of road and rail at level crossings when road/rail
traffic densities reach levels set by Government (50% of total
costs carried by road authorities);
(g) Right-of-way improvements, stabilization of soils, drainage works,
anti-erosion measures, security fencing, etc.; and
(h) Track maintenance equipment.
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Motive Power and Rolling Stock
3.13 The main project items are:
(a) Provision of 30 main line diesel locomotives (calculated according
to traffic forecasts, Reference C-3); provision of two breakdown
cranes; repowering of about 59 diesel shunters and about 14 diesel
railcars; and remodelling of about 40 heating cars;
(b) Provision of 34 special express cars and 145 limited express air-
conditioned cars (as calculated, according to traffic forecasts,
Reference C-4); provision of 19 power source cars for use with the
special and limited express trains; provision of 13 dining cars
(partly as renewals); remodelling of older existing cars for use
as ordinary passenger and baggage cars; and
(c) Provision of 550 box cars and 870 gondola cars (calculated accord-
ing to traffic forecasts, Reference C-5); remodeling of about 230
older box cars for use as cabooses, of about 130 flat cars for use
as container cars, and improvement of about 1000 freight cars of
different types.
Motive Power and Rolling Stock Repair Facilities
3.14 This part of the project comprises the following items:
(a) Provision of a new passenger car shop at Daejeon, to
replace old and congested existing shops at Incheon and
Yeongdeungpo; and
(b) Improvements to existing locomotive and car workshops
and running sheds.
Telecommunications, Power Facilities and Miscellaneous
3.15 Items included are:
(a) Provision of telecommunication lines on the Yeong Dong Line (50 kin)
and Jong San Line (40 km), train radio equipment (about 310 sets at
-wayside stations and about 50 sets on trains), and about 10 train
dispatcher units;
(b) Provision of power supplies (10 stations), lighting facilities
(about 30 stations), emergency power line (Seoul electrified
services), and power line improvements (about 400 km);
(c) Construction of housing for train crews and other employees (about
680 units);
(d) Provision of training equipment for KNR's training
center and vocational training institutes; and
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(e) Provision of continued technical assistance (estimated at
about 70 man-months) in specific areas, such as technical and
economic feasibility studies of major projects envisaged for
1980-81, accounting, and mechanical equipment maintenance.
Cost Estimates
3.16 Project costs are based on estimated prices at the end of 1976
(Reference C-6), adjusted for price escalation and physical contingencies
over the project period. The foreign currency cost of technical assistance,
not including airfares and subsistence, is estimated at US$6,000-7,000 per
man month. Physical contingencies of 10% have been included in the project
for all items except motive power and rolling stock, rail and track renewal,
track material workshop and track maintenance equipment. Price contingencies
have been included for all items; assumed price increases for local currency
items are 8% annually in 1977-1978, 7.5% in 1979 and 7% in 1980-1981; and for
foreign currency items 8% annually in 1977, 7% in 1978, 6.5% in 1979 and 6%
in 1980-1981. Contingencies, physical and price, on all items taken together
represent about 19% of project cost.
Financing Plan
3.17 Proposed financing of the foreign currency part of the project
is given in Table 3.9 and summarized as follows:
Amount including contingencies
(US$ million)
IBRD loan 120.0 /a
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(O.E.C.F.) Japan 3.2
European consortium (50-cycle group) 8.6
U.S. Export-Import Bank plus US
commercial banks 39.7
Suppliers' credits 10.8
Korean Foreign Exchange (KFX) - purchase by KNR 7.9
Total 190.2
/a Includes US$0.50 million for financing transport sector studies (see
para. 3.07).
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Project Implementation
3.18 KNR will be responsible for implementation of the project, with
the exception of the transport sector studies, which will be directed by
EPB. A project execution schedule and a procurement schedule for Bank
financed items are given in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. Monitoring of progress
based on these schedules will be further discussed during supervision.
KNR's performance in executing the five previous projects has been in
general satisfactory.
Action Plans
3.19 The calculation of motive power and rolling stock requirements
during the Investment Plan period is based on traffic forecasts given in
Tables 2.5 through 2.7 and the following operational forecast:
Actual Forecast
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Availability of rolling stock (%)
Main line locomotives, diesel 86.4 87.0 87.5 88.0 88.5 89.0
Main line locomotives, electric 84.6 85.0 85.5 86.0 87.0 88.0
Passenger cars 88.7 89.0 89.5 90.0 90.5 91.0
Freight cars 89.3 90.0 91.0 92.0 93.0 93.0
Locomotive-km per available main
line locomotive ('000)
Diesel 152 173 174 174 175 175
Electric 118 120 122 124 127 130
Passenger car-km per available
passenger car ('000)
Special express coaches 187 237 256 267 277 285
Limited express coaches 196 204 215 226 237 248
Turnaround time for freight
cars (days)
Box cars 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.1 4.9
Gondolas 4.4 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.7
Flat cars 6.4 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.8
Container cars 3.8 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3
Average car load per loaded car (tons)
Coal 45.0 45.3 45.4 45.5 45.6 45.7
Cement 45.4 45.6 45.7 45.9 46.0 46.1
Ore 43.9 44.3 44.5 44.7 44.9 45.1
Oil 42.0 42.2 42.4 42.6 42.8 43.0
General cargo 42.3 42.5 42.5 42.5 42.5 42.5
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3.20 During negotiations agreement was reached that KNR will prepare, by
December 31, 1978 a plan for achieving the operational forecasts indicated in
para. 3.19, provided forecast traffic is offering. The measures to be
included in such a plan are mainly:
(a) improvement of maintenance of locomotives and rolling stock through:
(i) implementation of the recommendations given by the technical
advisor presently assisting KNR in establishing improved
maintenance and rehabilitation schedules, including further
reduction of the number of major running sheds;
(ii) provision of funds for spare parts, in accordance with the
action plan agreed to under the Fifth Project (from 1978
on not less than W 2.2 billion annually for diesel locomo-
tives, W 1.0 billion for passenger cars and W 1.5 billion
for freight cars);
(iii) complete phasing out of steam locomotives;
(iv) concentration of passenger and freight car maintenance at
the new workshops at Daejeon, and closing the existing
workshops in Yeongdeungpo and Incheon; and
(v) improved training;
(b) continued attention to utilization of rolling stock in order to
maintain the present trend of improvement.
3.21 The operational forecast given in para. 3.19, particularly for 1981,
may be revised as a result of the management study to be carried out under
Loan liOl-KO (para. 2.02).
Procurement
3.22 All items to be procured under the proposed loan will be subject
to international competitive bidding, in accordance with Bank guidelines.
In bid evaluation, Korean manufacturers of equipment will be allowed a
preferential margin of 15% of the c.i.f. cost of competing imports, or the
relevant prevailing level of customs duties, whichever is lower.
Disbursements
3.23 Disbursements would be made as follows:
(a) 100% of the c.i.f. cost of imported equipment and materials;
and/or
(b) 100% of the ex-factory cost of locally manufactured equipment and
materials if local bidders are successful;
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(c) 100% of the foreign exchange cost of specialized technical
assistance (para. 3.07);
(d) 100% of total cost for training and technical assistance
(para. 3.15 (d) and (e)).
Any savings under the loan would be used for financing additional, but
similar, project items, subject to review and agreement with the Bank.
3.24 An estimated schedule of disbursement is given in Table 3.12.
Disbursements are based on the assumption that the proposed loan would
become effective by June 15, 1978.
4. ECONOMIC EVALUATION
General
4.01 KNR continues to play a vital role in the economy of Korea.
While road transport and coastal shipping have increased their share of total
transport demand over the last decade (para. 1.02), the railway remains
the most economic mode of moving bulk commodities to inland destinations.
The line haul costs are only a fraction of road costs and, while the costs
of coastal-shipping are competitive with rail costs on a ton-km basis, the
circuitous sea routes around the peninsula often give rail the advantage.
The traffic forecasts given in Chapter 2 have taken into consideration
competition from other modes, particularly from coastal shipping for bulk
movements of cement, oil and fertilizer from plants located on the coast.
However, for coal and most cement, which account for over 50% of railway
ton-km, the major production areas are inland. It is imperative that rail
capacity be at all times sufficient to handle this traffic, which is vital
for the country's continuous development (para. 4.07).
4.02 Regarding passenger traffic, the combination of increasing incomes
and the government policy of restricting the use of private automobiles has
led to a sharply increasing demand for the more comfortable and faster train
services. Korea is indeed far behind most other countries in terms of
private automobile ownership, despite its relatively high per capita income.
The 70,000 private cars presently in Korea amount to only 2 per 1,000 persons.
The ratios are 2.6 in Indonesia, 7.7 in Thailand, 10.6 in the Philippines
and 37.4 in Malaysia. Only the latter has a higher per capita income than
Korea. For long distances in the 300-400 km range, such as Seoul-Busan (445
km), Seoul-Gwangju (371 km) and others, express trains offer more comfortable,
safer and slightly faster trips than highway buses. Special express trains
also compete favorably with air travel on the Seoul-Busan route. The
price is about half and the time is comparable when terminal transport between
airports and city centers is taken into account. In view of the above, it
appears well justified to develop express train services to satisfy the fast
increasing demand, particularly since these are the most profitable services
of KNR. Operating ratios for the special and limited express services were,
respectively, 63 and 66% in 1977. Traffic forecasts are given in Chapter 2.
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Benefits and Economic Returns
4.03 The investment analysis has focused on the last four years of the
1977-8i FFYP. Investments starting in 1978 and 1979, which form the proposed
project, are analyzed in detail below. Investments starting in 1980-81
are presently indicative of the order of magnitude of the need. Detailed
technical and economic justifications for the major investment items will be
prepared before the end of 1979 (para. 3.03).
4.04 The economic evaluation focuses on project investments globally,
and on particular items whenever possible. Table 4.1 shows project invest-
ments classified for the purpose of economic analysis. The larger group,
about 62% of all project costs, consists of investments which are primarily
geared to increase the capacity of the railway to carry traffic for which
rail transport is the most economic way of satisfying transport demand. The
remaining project items consist of: (a) way and structures renewals 10%;
(b) investments in the Seoul suburban rail system (SMESRS) 7%; (c) a new
central passenger car workshop at Daejon 5%; and (d) miscellaneous invest-
ments 16%. Items in (b) and (c) above are subject to further review follow-
ing completion of studies now in progress. No economic return has been
calculated on these items because of lack of appropriate cost benefit data,
although there is enough evidence to support their tentative inclusion in the
project.
Capacity Increasing Investments
4.05 These investments are basically of two types: fixed installations
on the lines, and motive power and rolling stock. The latter can, of course,
be used more flexibly throughout the network than the former, and thus have a
lower risk factor than line installations. Consequently, line capacity invest-
ments have been very carefully analyzed on a line-by-line basis. Existing
capacity has been estimated, and ways to increase it through improved opera-
tions discussed extensively with KNR. The Bank also retained consultants Rapp
A.G. (Switzerland) to apply a line capacity model on two of the lines for which
KNR planned sizeable fixed investment: namely, a section of the Jung Ang line
(64 km from Jecheon to Yeongju) which was proposed for electrification, and
the Donghae-Nambu line (Busan-Pohang), on which KNR proposed to install CTC,
new crossing loops, stations, and marshalling yards. Application of the model,
which uses an "interactive graphic" approach, indicated that in both cases it
would be possible to reach a practical capacity at least 10% above the level of
the present timetable without major investments (Reference B3). The consultants
also identi-fied some low cost measures which would further increase practical
capac ty, without yet engaging the larger proposed investments. As a conse-
que-ce, electrification of a section of the Jung Ang line and CTC on the
Donghae-Nambu line was postponed for a few years, and KNR was asked to further
review its justification (para. 3.03). Where traffic demand forecasts still
exceeded possible line capacity, the analysis focused on the least cost invest-
ments to increase it. For instance, by adding as many crossing stations as
possible on a single track line, instead of installing either expensive
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signalling systems or double tracking. As a result, line capacity investments
in the project period were reduced by about US$40 million from the original
investment plan proposal, and now represent only 15% of total project costs.
4.06 Capacity in motive power and rolling stock has been analyzed
on a network-wide basis. Careful consideration was given to possibilities
for increasing operating performance, such as train-km for locomotives and
turnaround times, loadings, and distances traveled for wagons. For the
purpose of rate of return calculations, capacity-increasing investments have
been allocated to freight and passenger services. This was done directly in
the case of freight and passenger cars, and for some fixed investments. In
the case of locomotives and joint fixed investments on lines - such as
crossing loops, bypass lines and signalling - allocation was in proportion to
the relative capacity provided for each service (Table 4.2).
4.07 Freight - The benefits of investments to increase the railway's
capacity in carrying freight traffic are measured in terms of transport cost
savings for the economy of the country. They are calculated as the difference
between the economic cost of rail transport and the economic cost of the
next best alternative mode. The major variables involved in the calculation
of benefits are: (a) the amount of traffic that would be diverted to other
modes based on the capacity of the railway with and without the project; and
(b) the economic costs of tansport by various alternative modes (Table 4.3).
Alternative modes could be road, or a combination of either rail or road and
coastal shipping. As mentioned in para. 4.01, rail traffic forecasts
already reflect the share of coastal shipping when it is the most economic
mode; i.e. for traffic having origins and destinations at, or very near, the
coast. For the remaining traffic, for which rail capacity is provided by
the proposed project, coastal shipping is no longer a valid alternative, as
it would involve long terminal transport at either end, which would require
either rail capacity or the higher cost road transport. Consequently, in
this analysis, rail costs are compared to road costs, as the costs of an
alternative using coastal shipping for part of the way are even greater than
the all road alternative. The economic benefits in terms of transport cost
savings would yield an economic rate of return (ERR) of over 40% (Table
4.4). This is a conservative estimate, since the amount ot traffic that
would divert to other modes without the project has been assumed at only 60%
of the traffic increase forecast for 1978 and 1979; i.e. equivalent to the
capacity provided by new cars acquired under the project. The remaining 40%
of anticipated traffic growth will be handled by conversion and improved
utilization of existing cars. No benefits have been attributed to this
traffic, since the costs are small and most of the benefits should accrue
even without the project.
4.08 Passengers. The proposed capacity increases are for the better
quality services provided by KNR: the special and limited express trains.
No capacity increase is provided for ordinary trains. The economic cost
of these better services is comparable to that of the air-conditioned
expressway buses. Rail fares for these services, however, are substantially
higher than either rail costs or bus fares; 91% higher than costs for
special express and 72% higher than limited express (Table 4.5). The fact
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that people are ready to pay twice as much as the bus fare to travel on the
special express trains reflects the benefits they derive from such service:
e.g. comfort, speed, lesser accident risk, etc. Consequently, benefits of
increasing the capacity of the better passenger services are measured in
terms of willingness to pay for the service over and above their costs. They
are calculated as the difference between the cost of the services and their
revenues, and give a return of 17% on the investment (Table 4.6).
Way and Structures Renewals
4.09 The main items in this category are rail and track renewal, includ-
ing sleepers replacement and new ballast. The remainder of the cost is
for strengthening of bridges and tunnels. While it is a general practice of
railways to show way and structure renewal costs in their investment programs,
the nature of these costs is more periodic maintenance than investment. Rail
and sleepers have to be periodically replaced, and ballast has to be added
in order to keep the trains operating safely at normal speeds. The program
submitted by KNR for implementation during the plan and project period
was examined on the basis of the age and characteristics of rail, track,
and traffic on a particular line.
4.10 KNR's network consists of 4,100 km of track. Some 930 km or 23%
of the network, have rails over 20 years old; another 880 km have rails
between 10 and 20 years old. In terms of traffic, rail renewal timing can
be related to the number of gross tons which have passed over a given line
section. This is only broadly indicative, as conditions will vary widely
from one line to the other as a function of topography, alignment, and
train types. Assuming, however, that the useful rail life is on average
around 300 million gross tons, there would be some 1,000 km (24% of the
network) on which rail life would be between 10 and 20 years, and another
250 km with a 20-30 year life (based on 1976 traffic volumes). For the rest
of the network, rails would last up to 40 and 50 years. On the basis
of the above assumed rail life for various sections of the network, renewal
should average about 140-150 km/year. This figure would increase over time,
as traffic growth shortens rail life.
4.11 The rail and track renewal program discussed with KNR, and
confirmed during negotiations, would cover the recurrent need and also some
of the urgently needed rail replacement in curves on the industrial lines.
If this program was not carried out, the quality of the track would deterio-
rate, with the risk of increased accidents. Speed restrictions needed to
ensure safety would gradually reduce capacity, particularly on single track
lines which account for most of KNR's network. In calculating line capacity
as described in para. 4.05, it was assumed that track conditions would not
be allowed to deteriorate and that speeds would be maintained at least at
their present levels. To prevent track deterioration without the proposed
rail and track renewal program would require increased maintenance. On the
basis of maintenance costs savings, rail renewal on the 8 lines included in
the project would yield ERRs ranging from 20% on the line with the lowest
traffic (6 million gross tons p.a.) to 32% on the line with the highest
traffic (25 million gross tons p.a.), with a weighted average of 27%
(Reference C-7).
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Seoul Suburban Lines
4.12 The city of Seoul now has over 7 million inhabitants. Further-
more, urban development has spread beyond the city boundaries along the
transport lines. Cities such as Incheon (800,000), Anyang (135,000) and
Suweon (225,000) to mention only the larger ones on the rail lines, are
growing rapidly; thus creating with Seoul an interconnected urban system
of some 9 million people. Until 1974, urban transport consisted almost
exclusively of buses and taxis. Because of the configuration of the center
of Seoul, which includes large blocks penetrated by narrow streets suitable
only for pedestrians and small delivery vehicles, traffic congestion on the
major arteries is acute despite the very low rate of private car ownership
(para. 4.02).
4.13 In 1974, the first sections of a mass rail transit system were
put into service, consisting of a 9.5 km underground line (Seoul City
Subway) and 86 km of electrified existing KNR lines (MAP). The system
met with immediate success and acceptance by the public, carrying over 130
million passengers in 1976. For the first half of 1977, traffic was 40%
above that in 1976. The city of Seoul is considering further extensions of
the subway but, because of the high cost of subway lines no final decision
has been made. Meanwhile, KNR proposes to upgrade about 63 km of existing
lines with electrification and some double tracking, in order to expand
suburban services. There is no doubt that, given the densities of urban-
ization in Seoul, there is a good case for making the maximum use of existing
rail infrastructure and right of way. Costs of upgrading existing rail
lines are small compared to subway construction. However, to derive maximum
benefit from the investment, it is necessary to analyze in detail potential
transport demand in the corridors in which KNR proposes to expand service, to
forecast traffic in relation to other modes, ensure the optimum location of
stations, and confirm the order of priority and timing of construction of the
various sections. A comprehensive urban transport study of the larger Seoul
Metropolitan Area was, started in July 1977 by the Transportation Economic
Group of the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST). It is expected
to take about one year to complete and would answer the above questions. It was
agreed during negotiations that KNR would postpone investment on the suburban
lines until the results of the study become available. Meanwhile, the
proposed investments are included in the project, although none of the loan
funds will be applied to them.
Daejon Passenger Car Workshop
4.14 KNR has decided to consolidate its passenger car maintenance
at Daejon, a central location on the two most heavily traveled lines:
from Seoul to the Southeast (Busan) and to the Southwest (Gwangju-Mogpo).
Existing workshops, particularly those at Seoul and Incheon, are old and
crowded. Urban development prevents their extension and access is diffi-
cult in view of the intensive use of the Seoul area lines for frequent
urban services.. Studies for the proposed Daejon workshop have recently
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been completed and will be reviewed by the Bank prior to the start of
construction.
Miscellaneous
4.1 This category, comprising some 16% of the project cost, almost
all in local currency, includes numerous small investments dispersed over
the entire network. The largest amount, about a third of the total, is for
improving safety at rail and road intersections. This ranges from simple
signalling, to level crossing barriers and grade separation where justified
by higher traffic volumes. The cost of these safety measures is shared
equally between KNR and the Ministry of Construction (MOC). The locations
of these improvements are selected jointly by KNR and MOC, according to
established rules, based on respective levels of traffic on rail and'on the
intersecting road. Other items include improvement of existing backshops
and sheds, relocation of lines to accomodate new industrial and urban
developments, and general improvements to right of way, buildings, housing
and training facilities.
Overall Economic Evaluation
4.16 The average economic return on the capacity increasing investments
and on way and structure renewals, which account for 72% of total project
costs, is 30%. This rate of return excludes the investments in: (a) the
SMESRS lines and Daejon Workshop, for which studies are still underway
(para. 4.12 to 4.14), totalling 12% of project costs; and (b) miscellaneous
small investments dispersed over the entire network (para. 4.15), totalling
16% of project costs.
Sensitivity and Risks
4.17 As previously mentioned (para. 2.21), traffic forecasts for railway
projects have often been over-optimistic. This is the main area of risk.
However, in an economy growing as rapidly as Korea's it is only a matter of
time for the forecasts to be achieved. Thus, full project benefits are
realized at most one or two years later than expected. For the purpose of
sensitivity analysis, the ERR's of the capacity increasing investments have
been recalculated assuming that both freight and passenger traffic would
increase at 50% of the forecast between 1977 and 1981. This same assumption
is used for the sensitivity analysis in the financial evaluation (para.
5.27).
4.18 Estimated costs for Korea railway projects have typically been
realistic, and slightly on the high side, as illustrated by the funds remaining
in previous loans after the projects have been fully executed. For the
sensitivity analysis, the ERRs of the capacity increasing investments have
been recalculated with cost variations of + 10%. The results of sensitivity
analysis are given in the table below:
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ERR IN PERCENT
Sensitivity
Best Traffic growth Cost Cost
estimate 50% +10% -10%
Capacity increasing investments
Freight 42 30 37 49
Passenger 17 15 15 19
4.19 As expected, the impact of even substantially slower traffic
growth on the rate of return is not very large, since benefits are postponed
but not cancelled. Another risk which is, however, impossible to quantify
and time, relates to passenger services. As mentioned in para. 4.02, the
high demand for better quality trains is related to low private car owner-
ship. Should government policy change, passenger traffic would certainly be
negatively affected. However, the effect of increased car ownership would
spread over a period of years and may be tempered by overall growth in
transport demand. Since railway equipment has a long life (assumed at 25
years for the ERR calculation), it is important to closely monitor shifts in
demand for rail services in order not to be saddled with excess capacity.
5. FINANCIAL EVALUATION
General
5.01 With heavy passenger and freight traffic, generally efficient
operations and low unit costs, KNR has the potential to become a financially
viable enterprise. Revenues could be sufficient to cover operating expenses,
debt service and a reasonable proportion of its capital investment needs.
KNR earned annual profits through 1969, although the amounts were relatively
modest and, due to inadequate depreciation provision and maintenance expendi-
tures, its profits were overstated.
5.02 As explained in para. 2.28, tariffs are strictly regulated by
the Government, which has held freight rates at low levels. As a result
after 1970 - with rising cost levels inflating KNR's operating expenses,
and the Government reluctant to permit adequate railway tariff increases
(para. 5.06) - the situation changed. KNR has since sustained regular
annual net deficits.
5.03 Reduced earnings, together with Government refusal to provide
equity capital (other than operating subsidies commencing in 1972), have
forced KNR to finance most of its investment requirements by borrowing.
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This has increased its debt service burden, further reducing available funds,
and even causing KNR to borrow from the Korean Development Bank funds needed
to cover debt service.
5.04 Rates could be substantially raised on most of KNR's major freight
traffic (coal, cement, fertilizer, ores, grains and oil) with little fear of
significant diversion to other transport modes. In view of KNR's continual
efforts to improve passenger services (introducing new equipment and providing
more frequent services), passenger fares could also be raised (para. 2.33).
Thus, it should be possible for KNR to achieve financial viability, provided
the Government takes the needed action on tariffs.
Past Financial Performance
5.05 Income statements for the years 1971 through 1977 are given in
Table 5.1 and are summarized below:
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1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 /b
------------------------ (W billion) ---------------------
Total operating
revenues 31.2 36.5 41.6 53.0 75.6 102.6 135.1
Less: Total cash
expenses 27.8 29.8 34.0 48.9 68.2 97.6 118.0
Depreciation 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.2 6.5 15.0 17.4
Total operating
expenses 31.8 34.3 38.9 54.1 74.7 112.6 135.4
Net operating
revenue (loss) (0.6) 2.2 2.7 (1.1) 0.9 (10.0) (0.3)
Less: Interest
charges 3.3 5.5 6.5 7.4 10.4 15.1 20.3
Net railway revenue
(loss) (3.9) (3.3) (3.8) (8.5) (9.5) (25.1) (20.6)
Add: Other revenue
(expense) net /a (0.7) (7.6) (3.3) (23.2) 5.4 1.7 0.5
Net revenue (loss) (4.6) (10.9) (7.1) (31.7) (4.1) (23.4) (20.1)
Add: Government
Subsidy (cash) - 0.7 1.5 5.7 14.4 13.7 21.7
Net income (adjusted) (4.6) (10.2) (5.6) (26.0) 10.3 (9.7) 1.6
Operating ratio (%) 102.0 94.0 93.5 102.0 99.0 110.0 100.0
Interest charge
coverage (times) - 0.3 0.4 - 0.1 - -
Debt service coverage
(times) 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.5
Return on net fixed
assets (actual) - 0.9% 1.1% - 0.1% - -
Return on net fixed
assets (required)
(a) Under Loan 669-KO 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% - - -
(b) Under Loan 663-KO - - - _ 2.0% 3.0% 3.0%
(c) Under Loan 1101-KO - - - - - 2.0% 3.5%
/a Includes losses or gains on foreign currency fluctuations.
/b Tentative figures, based on 11 months actual results.
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5.06 This table shows that because tariff increases generally have been
inadequate and too late, KNR has been unable to generate sufficient revenues to
cover debt service requirements (which have risen from W 8.8 billion in 1971
to W 23.2 billion in 1976), or to earn agreed rates of return. The Government
recognizes this, but has maintained it would be inflationary to raise railway
freight tariffs to a level sufficient to cover fully distributed costs. Con-
sequently, to compensate for the loss in revenues due to delayed or inadequate
freight rate increases, the Government commenced, in 1973, to pay a subsidy
to KNR. This subsidy rose from W 1.5 billion in 1973 to W 14.4 billion in
1975, declined slightly to W 13.7 billion in 1976, and increased to W 21.7 bil-
lion in 1977.
5.07 Confronted with this Government policy regarding freight tariffs,
KNR has tended to rely on passenger service profits to offset losses on
freight services. Until recently, average revenue per passenger-km has been
higher than revenue per freight ton-km (Table 2.14). However, this has
tended to make railway passenger service more vulnerable to highway compe-
tition; in fact, KNR's passenger-traffic declined by 17% from 1969 to 1971.
Since 1973, as seen in Table 2.14 the Government has allowed freight tariffs
to increase more rapidly than passenger fares. The result has been that, by
1976, average revenue per ton-km exceeded that per passenger-km. The slower
increase in passenger fares, and improvements to passenger services, have
resulted in a reversal of the downward trend in passenger-km, which have
increased by 68% since 1971.
5.08 Table 5.2 illustrates the effects of inflation on revenues and
costs. Average revenues per passenger-km increased in current won from
W 1.976 in 1970 to W 3.673 in 1976, but declined in real terms to W 1.313.
Average revenues per ton-km increased in current won from W 1.44 in 1970
to W 4.636 in 1976, but declined in real terms to W 1.107 in 1974 (this has
since improved to W 1.657 in 1976).
5.09 Costs rose significantly in 1976, due largely to a mandatory wage
award, and for KNR to have covered its debt service obligations, operating
revenues would have needed to be increased by about 15%; i.e. the increase in
freight tariffs granted in January 1976 should have been matched by a similar
increase in passenger fares. As noted in Table 2.12, freight rates were
raised in January 1977 by the restructuring of the freight tariff, but there
was no increase in passenger fares. The freight rate increases ranged from
16% for the previous class 2 to 27% for the lowest class (mainly coal).
Tentative results for 1977 indicate that KNR almost broke even on operations.
Freight revenues, aided by the tariff increases noted above, rose from
W 43.5 billion in 1976 to W 59.5 billion in 1977, and passenger revenues, due
to increased traffic rose from W 52.5 billion in 1976 to W 66.7 billion. The
net deficit, after interest charges, of W 20.1 billion was more than covered
by the government subsidy of W 21.7 billion.
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5.10 KNR's balance sheets for the years 1971-76, given in Table 5.3, are
summarized below:
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
-…---------------- (W billions) -----------------
Current assets 11.7 7.7 9.9 11.3 20.3 29.4
Less: Current
liabilities 16.4 19.6 18.3 22.1 13.9 15.3
Net working capital
(deficiency) (4.7) (11.9) (8.4) (10.8) 6.4 14.1
Net fixed assets /a 196.5 229.8 340.6 370.7 410.4 790.9
Other assets 46.3 4.5 6.5 6.0 0.1 0.1
Total assets 238.1 222.4 338.7 365.9 416.9 805.1
Long term liabilities 75.3 80.5 100.5 154.6 194.5 245.1
Other liabilities - 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.9 3.3
Net equity /a 162.8 140.9 236.9 209.6 220.5 556.7
Total debt and equity 238.1 222.4 338.7 365.9 416.9 805.1
/a Include effect of revaluation of assets in 1973, (land only),
and in 1976 (all assets including land).
5.11 As shown by the above table, KNR's working capital position,
which had steadily deteriorated until 1974, has improved. This is largely
because the Government paid considerable operating subsidies to KNR in 1975
and 1976. However, the long-term debt has risen sharply over the period,
from W 100 billion in 1973 to W 245 billion at the end of 1976.
5.12 The Fifth Railway Loan Agreement reaffirmed the debt limitation
covenant of the Fourth Railway Loan Agreement, which required the Bank's
agreement before KNR incurred any debt should KNR's net cash revenues be less
than 1.2 times the maximum debt service requirements. KNR's net cash revenues
have not been sufficient to achieve this ratio, and the outstanding debt has
continued to grow, with a consequent rise in debt service requirements. The
increase in the outstanding long-term debt referred to in para. 5.11 was
largely due to: (a) the drawing down of loans already negotiated, such as IBRD
loans 863 and 1101-KO, O.E.C.F, KFW, Eximbank and 50 c/s group /1 loans,
/1 European manufacturer's consortium.
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which rose by W 84 billion; and (b) the increase in borrowing from the
KDB, for capital investment and to help finance KNR's growing annual debt
service (para. 5.03). The debt limitation covenant was re-affirmed at
negotiations.
5.13 The total debt outstanding at the end of 1976 is given in detail
in Table 5.4, and is summarized below:
Amount
outstanding
Type of loan or finance (US$ million) Equipment financed
50 c/s Group (European Consortium) 51.1 Electrification (locomo-
tives and fixed equipment)
US Exim Bank and Commercial Banks 35.1 Diesel locomotives and
engines
IDA credits and IBRD loans 161.6 Miscellaneous equipment
O.E.C.F. (Japan) 67.1 Miscellaneous equipment
U.S.A.I.D. 15.0 Miscellaneous equipment
Suppliers credits and foreign loans 15.3 Miscellaneous equipment
Total Foreign Finance 345.2
Korean Development Bank (KDB) 158.1 US$ equivalent of local
expenditures in Won
Total 503.3 (Equivalent to W 244.1 bil-
lion)
5.14 In a side letter to the Fifth Railway Loan Agreement dated April
10, 1975, the Government undertook to provide KNR with the funds needed to
service debt, until such time as KNR's cash generation became sufficient for
this purpose (which should not be later than Fiscal 1980). During 1975 and
1976, such funds were provided by the Government in the form of further
borrowing from the KDB. In the same letter, the Government also undertook
to formulate a financial recovery plan designed to enable KNR to generate
revenues sufficient to cover its operating expenses, meet its debt service
obligations in full and make a contribution towards its capital investments.
The elements, and effects, of such a plan are discussed in paras. 5.16 - 5.21.
5.15 As agreed under the Fifth Railway Loan, KNR carried out a revalua-
tion of fixed assets in 1975/76, the results of which are reflected in the
balance sheet of December 31, 1976. This revaluation added W 470 billion to
the gross value of fixed assets (including W 97 billion for land), and
resulted in a rise in annual depreciation provision from 14 6.5 billion in
1975 to W 15.0 billion in 1976. A further revaluation done in 1977, using
cost indices, added W 25.7 billion to the gross value of fixed assets. KNR
has agreed to revalue its fixed assets on an annual basis.
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Forecast Financial Performance (1978-81)
5.16 KNR has prepared financial forecasts, based on assumptions and
data detailed in Table 5.5. These forecasts have been adjusted to take
into account tariff increases proposed by the Government, and are given in
Tables 5.1, 5.3 and 5.6. The proposed increases, which would enable KNR,
after 1978, to generate funds sufficient to cover debt service requirements,
and make some provision towards capital investment needs are listed below:
Proposed tariff increases Passenger Freight
1978 10% 15%
1979 10% 15%
1980 10% 15%
1981 10% 10%
The Government has proposed the tariff increases listed above in the light of
its policy to restrict inflation within a limit of 10% annually. Thus
passenger fares would keep pace with inflation, and KNR's freight revenues
would improve by about 5% annually in real terms. The proposed tariff
increases are lower than those suggested by the Bank; to compensate for the
reduced revenues the Government also proposes to grant subsidies to KNR of
W 14.6 billion (1978), W 12 billion (1979) and W 7.5 billion (1980).
5.17 The methodology and principal assumptions are summarized below:
(a) Income accounts
(i) Revenues: Based on agreed traffic forecasts, converted
to revenues by applying average 1977 revenues per pass-km
or ton-km. The effect of tariff increases is shown sepa-
rately. Other minor increases are due to a Management
Rationalization Plan (MRP) KNR is carrying out.
(ii) Operating Expenses
a. Labor costs take into account some minor increases
in staff, plus forecast 11-12% average annual cost
increases.
b. Fuel costs are based on estimated engine-km (derived
from traffic forecasts), plus forecast 7.5-8% average
annual cost increases.
c. Maintenance costs include labor costs calculated as
in (a) above, materials costs adjusted for traffic
increases and for cost increases as in (b) above.
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d. Other costs are based on the 1977 level, inflated as in
(b) above.
(iii) Depreciation is calculated at 2.4% of the annual value of
gross fixed assets, excluding land. Calculations include the
effect of proposed annual revaluations.
(iv) Interest charges: Forecast on the basis of: existing debt,
plus new foreign debt at 8% p.a. (largely repayable over
17 years, including 4 years grace); and new local borrowing
at 6% p.a. (repayable over 20 years with 5 years grace, as
presently obtained from the KDB).
(b) Balance sheets
- Receivables vary largely with freight traffic;
- Inventories vary with total operating costs;
- Accounts payable vary with cash operating costs; and
- Fixed Assets take into account (i) investment proposed under
the Investment Plan; (ii) annual retirements or disposal of
assets at about 10% of annual investment, (iii) annual revalua-
tions at 8% for the years 1977-79, and 7.5% for 1980 and 1981.
(c) Detailed calculations are available in the Project File
(Reference C-8).
5.18 Overall, the projections show an improved financial performance.
The actions proposed would enable KNR to maintain a satisfactory working
capital position. However, it would be unable to contribute anything toward
capital investment requirements of W 202 billion needed over the project
period (1978/79) but would be able to contribute W 33 billion towards overall
investment plan requirements of W 503 billion; the Government is expected to
provide about W 76 billion in subsidies and grants, and about 78% (W 394 bil-
lion) of the investment plan would have to be borrowed (para. 5.20). Long-
term debt would thus rise from W 245 billion at the end of 1976 to W 533 bil-
lion by the end of 1981 (Table 5.3).
5.19 The 1978-81 income account forecast, given in Table 5.1 is sum-
marized below.
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1978 1979 1980 1981
--------- (W billion) -- -
Operating revenues 158.8 196.6 235.7 273.2
Operating expenses 155.8 174.6 192.9 213.8
Net operating revenue (loss) 3.0 22.0 42.8 59.4
Interest charges 22.0 28.5 33.5 37.7
Other revenues/expenses (net) 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
Net revenue (deficit) (18.0) (5.2) 10.8 23.5
Operating ratio-(%) 98 89 82 78
Interest charge coverage 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.6
Debt service coverage 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.6
Return on net fixed assets 0.3% 2.1% 3.5% 4.2%
The operating ratio would improve from 110-in 1976 to 78 by 1981; the
interest charge coverage would rise from negative in 1976 to 1.6; the debt
service coverage would improve from 0.4 in 1976 to 1.6, and KNR would earn a
rate of return of 0.3% in 1978, improving to 4.2% in 1981. While the latter
is relatively modest, further improvement would require raising tariffs
higher than as proposed, which would conflict with the Government's policy of
inflation restraint (para. 5.16).
5.20 The cash flow forecast for the project period (1978/79),/1 and for
the investment period (1977-81) (detailed in Table 5.6), is summarized
below:
/1 Some project investment will spread over into the years 1980-81.
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Project period Investment plan
1978/79 period 1977-81
----------- (W billion) -----------
(i) From KNR
Cash generated by KNR /a 73.7 260.7
Less: Debt service 80.5 229.9
(6.8) 30.8
KNR's working capital - add (0.5) -
- from 1.9
Net cash available from
KNR for investment (7.3) 32.7
(ii) Equity
Funds from Government for
operations and investment 34.1 76.1
(iii) Borrowing - IBRD loan 52.1 57.9
- Other foreign 37.0 153.4
- Local (KDB) 86.5 182.8
Subtotal borrowing 175.6 394.1
Funds needed for investment 202.4 502.9
Funds provided by KNR (3.6%) 6.5Z
Funds provided by Government 16.8% 15.1%
Funds needed from borrowing 86.8% 78.4%
/a Includes non-operating and other revenues.
KNR will not be able to contribute to the project cost, and with the
Government providing equity funds of about 17%, KNR will have to borrow
the remaining funds needed. KNR's earning power will improve in later
years, and its dependence on the Government and on the need to borrow
for investment will decline. Thus over the whole investment plan period
(1977-81) KNR would be able to contribute about 7% of the total cost, the
Government share would deline to 15% and borrowing would account for 78%.
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5.21 Forecast balance sheets for the years. 1977-1981 are summarized
below:
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Current assets 29.1 32.5 36.9 43.7 48.6
Less: current liabilities 20.2 23.6 27.5 29.9 33.0
Net working capital 8.9 8.9 9.4 13.8 15.6
Net fixed assets 842.0 982.7 1,160.2 1,341.5 1,528.2
Other assets 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4
Total assets 858.3 999.0 1,177.0 1,362.7 1,551.2
Long-term debt 275.0 340.3 420.6 482.8 533.0
Provision for severance pay 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Net equity 580.0 655.4 753.1 876.6 1,014.9
Total liabilities and equity 858.3 999.0 1,177.0 1,362.7 1,551.2
Current and liquid ratios should be about 1.4 and 0.8, respectively, after
1977. The debt/equity ratio should rise from 29/71 in 1976 to 36/64 in 1979,
then fall to 35/65 by 1981. These ratios would be satisfactory.
5.22 A financial recovery plan, agreed on at negotiations included the
following points:
(a) the aggregate of tariff increases in any fiscal year will be
not less than the increase in the wholesale price index in Korea
for that year;
(b) the earning by KNR of a rate of return of not less than 2% in
fiscal year 1979, 3.2% in fiscal 1980 and 4% annually thereafter;
(c) the funds needed to finance debt service (para. 5.14) will be
provided by way of grants or equity contributions;
(d) -tariff increases acceptable to the Bank will be made before loan
effectiveness.
Sensitivity Analysis
5.23 Experience with most railway projects has shown that forecasting
traffic presents the greatest difficulty. With few exceptions, project
appraisal forecasts have been overly optimistic, particularly for freight.
5.24 In Table 5.7, 1972-76 freight and passenger traffic, forecast
in appraisal reports for Loans 863-KO and 1101-KO, are compared with actual
results. As the forecasting periods of the two reports overlap, there is
some duplication. In general, the forecasts for Loan 1101-KO were more
optimistic than those for 863-KO.
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5.25 For Loan 1101-K0, actual freight ton-km rose at 50% of the rate
forecast; actual passenger traffic (in pass-km) rose at 73% of the rate
forecast. For the purposes of a sensitivity analysis, it is assumed that both
freight and passenger traffic will increase over the years 1977-81, at 50% of
the rate forecast.
5.26 Another risk relates to the adequacy of tariff increases granted by
the Government. As discussed in para. 5.06, tariff increases, due to the
Government's reluctance to take such action, have been generally granted too
late and too small. The financial forecasts given in this chapter have
assumed tariff increases as now proposed by the Government. Should the
actual tariff increases fall short of these, then the effect of such action
is shown in Table 5.8.
5.27 Table 5.8 presents the effects of three alternatives:
(a) Page 1. 50% reduction in traffic growth, with the Government's
proposed tariff increases;
(b) Page 2. No reduction in traffic growth, with 50% of the
Government's proposed tariff increases after 1978; and
(c) Page 3. 50% reduction in traffic growth, with 50% of the
Government's proposed tariff increases after 1978.
5.28 Only in alternative (a) would KNR's cash generation be sufficient
to cover debt service and make some contribution to investment. In all other
cases, unless the Government continued to pay increasingly large annual
operating subsidies, KNR would have to incur a much higher debt. This is
illustrated by the table below:
Total
Additional Government subsidies 1978 1979 1980 1981 1978-81
needed (or additional borrowing) -------------- (W billion) --------------
Alternative (a) 16.5 8.8 - - 25.3
Alternative (b) 12.6 15.8 14.3 15.4 58.1
Alternative (c) 14.5 17.9 19.4 27.2 79.0
The rate of return under alternative (a) would be negative in 1978, rising to
2.6% by 1981; under (b) it would be 0.3% in 1978 rising to 1.0% in 1981, and
under (c) it would be negative in 1978 rising to 0.5% in 1980 and falling to
0.2% in 1981.
5.29 The foregoing analysis emphasizes the importance of adequate tariff
action. Slower traffic growth by itself would reduce cash generation, but
KNR would still be able to finance debt service after 1979. Inadequate
tariffs would only worsen the present unsatisfactory financial position of
KNR.
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5.30 The project's sensitivity to changes in (a) cost of the project and
(b) level of operating costs was examined. Relatively generous price contin-
gencies have been built into the estimated project costs (para. 3.16) and as
further increases are not expected to be substantial, their effect is likely
to be minimal, and has been disregarded. Regarding (b), as labor cost is the
most significant, and has risen more sharply than other cost increases over
recent years (Table 5.2, Item 3), the effect of annual increases of (i) 20%
and (ii) 25% (as against annual increases of 12% assumed in the forcasts)
was examined. The additional costs and the further annual tariff increases
needed to generate the equivalent additional revenues are given below:
1978 1979 1980 1981
Additional labor costs (W billion)
(i) 4.9 11.6 20.2 32.3
(ii) 8.0 19.2 34.3 55.5
Additional annual tariff increases needed (M)
(i) 3.0 2.9 2.4 3.0
(ii) 4.9 4.7 4.3 5.0
6. AGREEMENTS REACHED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.01 During loan negotiations satisfactory assurances were obtained
from the Government on the following principal points:
(a) a management study of KNR will be carried out by June 1979
(para. 2.02);
(b) KNR will submit to the Bank, by mid-1979, detailed technical,
financial and economic analyses of major fixed capacity investments
proposed for 1980/81, such as double tracking, electrification and
signaling (para. 3.03);
(c) transport sector studies will be carried out under the supervision
of EPB, mainly by local consulting firms, with some specialized
expatriate technical assistance (para. 3.07);
(d) KNR will establish a plan by end 1978 including measures necessary
to achieve specific operational forecasts in 1979, 1980 and 1981
(para. 3.20);
(e) investment to upgrade Seoul suburban lines will be postponed until
the results of the urban transport study of the larger Seoul
metropolitan area become available (para. 4.13);
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(f) construction of the proposed Daejeon passenger car workshop will
not commence until the Bank has reviewed studies recently completed
(para. 4.14);
(g) a financial recovery plan for KNR, (para. 5.22).
6.02 A condition for loan effectiveness is that KNR's freight and passenger
tariffs have been increased to levels acceptable to the Bank (para. 5.22).
6.03 The proposed project is suitable for a Bank loan of US$120 million
for a period of 17 years including 4 years of grace to the Government of the
Republic of Korea, for onlending to the KNR.
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Related Documents and Data Available in the Project File
A. General Reports and Studies on the Transport Sector
A-i World Bank "Growth and Prospects of the Korean Economy" Annex F:
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B-1 Terms of Reference for Management Study (para. 2.02)
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(a) Quarterly Report No. 1 dated January 3, 1977
(b) Quarterly Report No. 2 dated April 15, 1977
(c) Interim Report on Busan Shop dated April 30, 1977 (para. 2.14)
B-3 Consultants W.J. Rapp A.G. Basel, Switzerland. Application of the
RAILNET Model to Elements of Korean Railroad Projects, Final
Report and Appendices, Basel, September 20, 1977 (para 4.05).
C. Working Papers
C-1 Notes on the Forecast of Freight Traffic by Commodities (para. 2.20)
C-2 Review of KNR Rail and Track Renewal Program (para. 3.12)
C-3 KNR Locomotive Requirements 1977-81 (para. 3.13)
C-4 KNR Passenger Car Requirements 1977-81 (para. 3.13)
C-5 KNR Freight Car Requirements 1977-81 (para. 3.13)
C-6 Unit Prices for Project Items (para. 3.16)
C-7 Rail Renewal Program, Economic Evaluation (para. 4.11)
C-8 Detailed Calculations for Financial Projections (para. 5.17)
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KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Major Covenants of Past Loan and Credit
Agreements - Degree of Compliance
1. The major covenants in the Loan/Credit Agreements relating to the
five railway projects for which the Bank Group has provided financing fall
into four main areas:
A. KNR's Status and Financial Autonomy
B. KNR's Financial Situation
C. Operational and Technical Matters
D. Transport Coordination
2. The specific covenants and the degree of compliance with them are
detailed in the following paragraphs.
A. KNR's Status and Financial Autonomy
I. First Project - Credit 25-KO (August 17, 1962)
Requirement Degree of Compliance
Section 4.07 - The Borrower shall maintain, Separate accounts are being
or cause to be maintained, separate accounts maintained.
for the National Railroad adequate to ref-
lect the expenditures and capital transact-
ions of the National Railroad or attributable
thereto.
Section 4.08 - The Borrower shall employ Consultants (Booz, Allen
competent and experienced consultants, and Hamilton Inc. - U.S.)
satisfactory to the Association, upon terms were employed (Contract of
and conditions satisfactory to the Borrower April 8, 1963). In this
and the Association, to assist in carrying connection see V on page 4.
out the part of the Project described in
paragraph (iii) of the Schedule hereto
(installation of a statistical and account-
ing system in accordance with generally
accepted commercial accounting practices).
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Section 4.09 - Promptly after the establish- KNR was established in 1963
ment of the accounting and statistical as a separate entity, with
system included in the Project, but in any an independent manager and its
case not later than December 31, 1964, the own budget and accounting
Borrower shall establish and thereafter system.
maintain the National Railroad as a separate
entity which, as an agency of the Borrower,
will be responsible for the management,
operation and development of the railroad
facilities of the Borrower and will have
such organization, financial resources and
procedures and legal status and powers as are
required to enable it to carry out its
responsibilities efficiently and in
accordance with sound business, financial
and railroad practices.
1I. Second Project - Credit 110-KO (December 18, 1967)
(i) Letter of December 18. 1967
re Organizational and Operational
Policies
Organization and Budget
KNR will be reorganized as a public KNR created as a
corporation or other autonomous agency by semi-autonomous agency.
the end of 1969. Its powers were regarded
as generally satisfactory
by the Bank.
Management will exercise full Not given, although as
authority over reallocations within noted in the Appraisal
budget, and Report on the Fourth Project,
KNR had been given greater
financial autonomy in financial
matters since 1970/71.
in the meantime, Government will Such actions were taken.
take immediate action on any request
by DG of KNR regarding reallocation
from one item to another in the Budget.
Budget System
KNR will adopt the performance Not done. Not practically
budget system as recommended by the possible while KNR operates
consultants appointed under Cr. 25-KO. existing Government form of
Budget.
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Staff
Limitation of numbers, and of Done
converting temporary staff to permanent
status.
(ii) Letter of December 18, 1967 regarding Consultants
Consultants
KNR to employ consultants to Consultants employed
provide assistance on statistics, Ross and Co., Canada
traffic costs and tariffs, rolling August 1969, and studies
*stock maintenance, marshalling yard completed.
requirements and review of uneconomic
lines.
III. Third Project - Credit 183-KO (May 14. 1970)
Section 4.06 (b) (i) KNR to maintain ac- Not done, adequate trained account-
counts solely in accordance with the ing staff for the implementation
commercial accounting system, and to cease to of the commercial accounting syster
maintain them as hitherto, not later than was not available (see IV and V
January 1, 1976. on pages 3 and 4).
Section 4.06 (b) (ii) Installation of Not done, see item II above.
performance budgeting system by December
31, 1973.
Section 4.21 Director-General of KNR to be Increased powers were delegated
given, not later than June 1, 1970, power to KNR's Director-General in
to reallocate funds within the budget. mid-1970.
IV. Fourth Project - Loan 863-KO (November 22. 1972)
Section 3.03 - In order to assist KNR in KNR engaged Touche, Ross and
the implementation of a commercial account- Co. (Canada), contract dated
ing system for the KNR's accounts, the October 16, 1974.
Borrower shall cause the KNR to employ
consultants acceptable to the Bank upon
terms and conditions satisfactory to the Bank.
Section 4.02(c) - Except as the Bank shall Program prepared and furnished
otherwise agree, the Borrower shall cause the to the Bank.
KNR (i) to prepare, with the assistance of
the consultants referred to in Section 3.03
of this Agreement, a time-phased program for
implementing, not later than January 1, 1975,
the commercial accounting system for the
KNR's accounts adopted from 1971; and (ii) to
promptly furnish the said program to the Bank
for its comments.
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V. Fifth Prolect - Loan 1101-KO (April 10, 1975)
Section 4.04 - The Borrower shall cause The contract with consultants
KNR within 12 months of the date of this (section 3.03 above) was ex-
Agreement, or such other date as the tended in phases until early
Borrower and the Bank shall agree, to 1977. The consultants revised
implement a time-phased program for the the manual system prepared by
installation of a commercial accounting the original consultants (under
and traffic costing system acceptable to Cr. 25-KO) and computerized it.
the Bank. there have been considerable
delays in installing the revised
system due to KNR's lack of
suitably qualified and ex-
perienced accounting and
computer staff needed to work
with the consultants. Work on
installing the system commenced
in 1977 and is expected to be
completed early this year
(para 2.35 of Staff Appraisal
Report on Sixth Project).
3. When the first Credit was made in 1962, the Ministry of Transportation was
responsible for the operation of the railway and had four bureaus dealing almost
exclusively with the matters relating to it. Since then considerable progress has
been made in providing KNR with a greater degree of autonomy, both operationally and
financially. Progress on commercial accounting, developed by consultants, has been
slow, due to difficulties in KNR supplying sufficient qualified and experienced staff
to work with the consultants and in developing and implementing a commercial account-
ing system in parallel with the traditional budgetary accounts required by the Govern-
ment. However, as indicated above, installation should be completed by the end of
this year (para. 2.35 of Staff Appraisal Report and para. 4.03 of the draft Loan
Agreement sets a deadline of December 31, 1978 for such completion).
4. Because of the importance that the Government attaches to the railway, not
only as an important transport mode but also for security reasons, it is understandable
that it wants to keep substantial control on KNR. As shown by the very high operating
performance of KNR this has not been detrimental. However, there are measures which
can be taken within the Government accounting and budgetary framework, while giving
KNR as much autonomy as possible. We intend to include in the proposed Loan Agreement
a covenant similar to the one agreed to for the Korea Maritime and Port Authority
(KMPA) in Loan 1401-KO, which would achieve this objective.
B. KNR'S Financial Situation
1. Tariffs and Financial Performance. All the five Loan/Credit Agreements have
covenants stipulating that the Borrower shall cause KNR to have its tariffs reflect
costs and also that KNR shall take all measures, not limited to tariffs, to enable KNR
to cover its working expenses, meet debt service requirements, maintain adequate
working capital, establish reserves for contingencies, and finance a reasonable
proportion of its capital.
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2. The requirements, and degree of compliance, under each agreement are as
follows:
I. Second Froject - Credit 110-KO (December 18, 1967)
Section 4.03 - The Borrower shall cause
the National Railroad to establish.and
maintain tariffs of rates and fares which
will provide revenues sufficient to meet
all operating expenses, including adequate
maintenance and depreciation, and to earn
an adequate rate of return on the net
fixed assets in use of the National Railroad.
According to the Supplemental Letter entitled Actual Returns Earned:
"Rates and Charges: Cash Position"
(i) the adequate rates of return were to be 1969 4.4%
"not less than 5% for 1969-70 and not less 1970 2.9%
than 6% for 1971 and thereafter. 1971 nil
(ii) tariff increases of 50% passenger Done, October 1, 1967.
fares and 30% freight rates no later than
January 1, 1968.
(iii) and further revisions of tariffs as May 20, 1969 reclassification
needed to bring rates and fares in close - of freight rates corresponding
relation to costs of service provided. to 15% p.a. increase in freight
revenues. December 27, 1969
35% increase in passenger fares.
(iv) adequate cash position to meet debt Not achieved.
interest and amortization, working capital
contingencies, a material part of the costs
of capital investment.
II. Third Project - Credit 183-KO/Loan 669-KO (May 14, 1970)
Section 4.15 - Revise tariffs as necessary Recommendations of study not
to bring rates and fares into close relation- yet implemented. Apart from
ship to the costs of services provided, no some action in revising the
later than 12 months from the date of freight tariff structure (i.e.
receipt ol ongoing consultant's study increasing from 3 classes to
(i.e. about July/August 1971). 5 classes in May 1969 and reducing
to 4 classes in January, 1977) the
Government has almost always ad-
justed tariffs across the board.
For the proposed Sixth Project we
are seeking agreement that tariffs
will, in future, be raised
selectively, with due regard to
costs.
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Section 4.16 - General requirements similar Actual returns earned:
to Supplemental Letter of December 18, 1967
to Second Project. Specifically, KNR was to 1971 - nil
earn annual rates of return of 7% commencing 1972 - 0.9%
1971. 1973 - 1.1%
III. Fourth Project - Loan 863-KO (November 22, 1972)
Section 4.05 - The Borrower shall enable KNR KNR's costing indicates that
to charge fares on the Seoul Metropolitan full costs of the SMESRS are
Electrified Suburban Services (SMESRS) to being covered by revenues.
cover, at least, the variable cost of
operating the services. The Borrower shall
promptly reimburse the KNR for any
uncovered portion of the full cost of operat-
ing the SMESRS.
Section 4.07 - Required KNR to earn KNR actually earned:
return of not less than 2% (1975),
3% (1976) and 5% (by 1978). 1975 - 0-1%
1976 - nil
IV. Supplemental Letter of November 22, 1972
The Government undertook: Regarding:
(i) To increase freight tariffs by at (i) Freight rates were raised
least 20% as soon as possible, but in any 10% in January 1974, and a
case by January 1, 1974; further 5% in February 1974;
passenger fares were raised
(ii) To increase passenger and freight by 25% in February 1974, and
tariffs, but no later than January 1, 1975 KNR was allowed to retain
by such amounts as would secure total the 10% transportation tax
additional revenues equal to the total on passenger fares, in force
additional revenues which would have since 1963, and previously
been earned had the passenger tariffs paid over to the Government.
only been raised by 20%, by this
date.
(iii) To increase freight tariffs by an ave- Regarding (ii) Freight rates
rage of at least 20% by January 1, 1976. were raised selectively in
December 1974, by amounts of
The above increases were to be made on the between 35% and 40%. Passenger
assumptions that: fares were not increased.
Regarding (iii), freight rates
were raised 10% (excluding
coal) in July 1975 and by
35% in January 1976; passenger
fares were raised by 20% in
July 1975.
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(a) the wholesale price index in Korea Regarding (a), the wholesale
would rise at no more than 3% p.a., and price index in Korea rose by
7% in 1973, 42% in 1974, 26%
(b) KNR's staff wage levels would be in 1975 and 11% in 1976.
subject to general wage revisions of no
more than 10% each year and only in the Regarding (b) KNR's staff wages
years 1974 and 1976. were raised by over 20% in
1974; in early 1976, although
In addition, should the increases the increase in wages granted
assumed in (a) and (b) actually be nationally was 45%, due to
higher, or should any other events arise KNR's salary structure the
which would make it unlikely that the effect was to raise railway
above mentioned tariff increases would wage costs by about 70%.
be sufficient to achieve the required
rates of return, the Government The Government paid to KNR
undertook to review, in October of cash subsidies of W 1.5 billion
each year, KNR's financial situation, in 1973, W 5.7 billion in 1974,
and would consult with the Bank on W 14.4 billion in 1975 and
measures, such as tariff increases or W 13.7 billion in 1976 described
cost reduction, needed to achieve'the as "partial compensation for
required results. revenues foregone due to not
implementing a general rate
increase in 1973."
V. Fifth Project - Loan 1101-KO (April 10, 1975)
Section 4.05 - The Borrower shall cause Revaluation was carried out
KNR, by December 1976 or such other date and the results reflected in
as the Borrower and the Bank shall agree, KNR's balance sheet of
to carry out a revaluation of KNR's fixed December 31, 1976.
assets in accordance with appropriate
and consistently maintained methods of
valuation acceptable to the Bank.
Section 4.06 - The Borrower shall cause In 1975 KNR earned a return of
KNR to take all necessary measures, 0.1%, but no return was earned
including but not limited to adjustments in 1976. Although revenues
of the tariff structure and rates of KNR, were higher than forecast, ex-
as shall be required to enable KNR (a) to penses were much higher,
earn an annual rate of return of not less particularly staff costs, due
than 2% commencing fiscal year 1976, to mandatory wage awards.
3-1/2% by 1977 and 5-1/2% thereafter; and Freight rate increases of
(b) attain a ratio of current assets to 10% (April 1975) and 35%
current liabilities of not less than (January 1976) and a passenger
1.2 by fiscal year 1979. (The rate fare increase of 20% (April 1976)
of return requirement was modified by a were inadequate to compensate
Supplemental Letter of April 10, 1975 for inflation and the wage
which set 1980 as the deadline for awards.
achieving the agreed financial targets).
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VI. Supplemental Letter of April 10, 1975 - "KNR's Financial Situation"
(a) The Government intends, until such (a) Funds were provided in 1975,
time as a financial plan acceptable to the and 1976 in the form of additional
Bank can be formulated and implemented, to borrowings from the Korean
provide the KNR with the funds necessary Development Bank.
to meet the service of all its foreign
and local borrowings.
(b) The Government shall formulate such (b) In a letter dated December 7,
a (financial recovery) plan and discuss 1977, the Government spelled out
it with the Bank within eighteen months its intentions regarding tariff
of the signature of the Loan Agreement increases (see para. 4, page 8).
pertaining to the above-mentioned
Project so that KNR could attain the
agreed financial targets set out in
Section 4.06 of said Loan Agreement and
the objectives set forth in this letter
no later than its fiscal year, 1980.
3. Although in the late 1960s KNR was not able to earn the full required rates
of return, it did earn positive returns until 1971. In that year competition from
improved highways, and in particular, the opening of the Seoul-Busan expressway,
eroded KNR's profitable passenger traffic. The financial performance deteriorated
even further in 1973-75 following the sharp inflation caused by the oil crisis. The
Korean Government, as most other governments have done, has argued for keeping public
sector tariffs low so as not to further contribute to inflation. As a result freight
rates were not increased between March 1972 and Janury 1974, while passenger fares
were not increased between January 1970 and January 1974. In order to alleviate the
effect on KNR's finances the Government has provided annual subsidies of W 0.7 billion
in 1972, W 1.5 billion in 1973, W 5.7 billion in 1974, W 14.4 billion in 1975 and
W 13.7 billion in 1976.
4. With inflation somewhat abated in 1977, the Government is now prepared to
grant reasonable tariff increases as given in the letter of the Deputy Prime Minister
dated December 7, 1977, the receipt of which was made a condition of submitting loan
documents to the Loan Committee. Assuming that the rate of inflation will not exceed
10%, the proposed tariff increases will enable the achievement of the financial
targets by the date specified in the Supplemental Letter to the Loan Agreement for the
Fifth Railway Project. We will seek assurances that the proposed tariff increases
will be adjusted upwards if inflation is greater than anticipated.
C. Operational and Technical Matters
1. Most agreements specify technical and operational studies to be conducted
generally in association with proposed developments and investments. All required
studies have been conducted and the results communicated and discussed with the Bank.
In general recommendations have been implemented. The continuously improving perform-
ance level of KNR shows that the dialogue with the Bank on operational and technical
matters has generally been successful. Further studies are included in the Sixth
Project to continue improvements. A list of the subjects studied under the various
agreements is given below:
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Second Project - Credit 110-K0 (December 18, 1967)
2. Rolling stock maintenance and design, marshalling yard requirements, coal
transport and distribution in Seoul area, uneconomic lines (Supplemental Letter on
consultants). All studies were done and agreements to implement recommendations were
reached during negotiations of the Third and Fourth projects with the major ones being
the object of covenants in those agreements (see paras. 3 and 4 below).
Third Project - Credit 183-K0/Loan 669-K0 (May 14, 1970)
3. Maintenance of diesel locos and rail cars, modernization and expansion of
telecommunication network, evaluation of bids for diesel locos, workshop construction
at Daejon (Section 4.10 to 4.13). All studies have been conducted. Availability of
diesel locos and rail cars has been constantly increasing from 83% in 1971 to 87% in
1976 for diesel locos and from 67% to 80% for diesel rail cars. Detailed schemes for
improving telecommunications were recommended by consultants and financed and implemented
under the Project. Consultants recommended the construction of a new workshop at
Daejon, construction has started for the freight car workshop and will start under the
Sixth Project for the passenger car workshop. Recommendations regarding coal transport
were partially implemented (Section 4.14). A study of bulk commodities including coal
is included in the Sixth Project with a view to preparing a project for Bank financing
to further improve distribution of bulk commodities, mainly coal and cement.
Fourth Project - Loan 863-K0 (November 22, 1972)
4. No new study was specified under this agreement but covenants covered the
completion of construction and improvement of marshalling yards studied under the
Second Project (Section 3.07) and further rationalization of workshops in connection
with the electrification of the industrial line (Section 3.08). Marshalling yards and
workshops continue to be improved and expanded in line with traffic growth.
Fifth Project - Loan 1101-KO (April 10, 1975)
5. No new study was specified under this agreement but covenants covered further
improvements to be made in workshops with a view to further increasing availability of
motive power and rolling stock (Section 3.07). An advisor was appointed and commenced
work late in 1976. Since the availability and utilization of motive power and rolling
stock in Korea is generally high compared to most other railways, improvements, while
always possible, require constant efforts. Results are gradual and long term.
D. Transport Investment and Coordination
1. In 1965, the Bank made a technical assistance grant for a comprehensive
survey of all modes of transport in Korea. The study drew attention to the need to
develop roads in the country as well as provide for transport coordination. In 1968 a
Technical Assistance and Engineering Credit (S4-K0) was made to study the highway
sector as well as review responsibilities of ministries concerned with transportation,
with a view to establishing an organization for the coordination of transport.
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Third Project - Credit 183-KO/Loan 669-KO (MaE 1970)
2. This Credit refers to the study conducted under S4-KO mentioned above as
follows:
Section 4.19 - Upon completion of In early 1970 the Government
the study by consultants of trans- established a three-tiered
port coordination and highway organiza- organization responsible for
tion currently in progress, the Borrower transport planning and co-
shall promptly consult with the ordination:
Association with a view to agreeing,
not later than December 31, 1970, on The Transport Coordination
(i) measures necessary to achieve Ministers Conference (TCMC);
adequate coordination in the field
of transportation, particularly with The Transport Coordination
respect to the establishment of a Working Group (TCWG); and,
body satisfactory to the Borrower and
the Association for overall planning The Transport Planning Office
of the transport sector; and (ii) the (TPO) in the Ministry of
timing for the implementation of said Transport (MOT).
measures. It was intended that TPO would be
responsible for undertaking eco-
nomic analysis and rendering pro-
fessional advice to TCMC on
investment planning and important
policy measures including licensing,
p ricing and taxation within the
subsectors of transport. TCMC
met rarely and the TPO with
limited staff and its location
in one of the concerned Ministries
could hardly be expected to
perform its envisaged role of
investment coordination.
Fourth Project - Loan 863-KO (November 22, 1972)
Section 4.06 - With a view to improving Slow progress was made in
transport planning and coordination, strengthening TPO. In 1973 the
the Borrower shall (i) take all measures first two staff members were sent
necessary on its part to enable the TPO overseas for training as transport
to collect and prepare reliable data economists.
relating to the cost and operations
of all modes of transport; (ii) review
the function and work program of the
TPO; (iii) cause the TPO to furnish to
the Bank quarterly reports relating to
its work; (iv) cause all relevant agencies
of the Borrower, including the Ministry of
Construction of the Borrower, to ensure
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that all major investment proposals
relating to the transport sector are
furnished to the TPO for the purposes
of appraisal and ensuring coordination
in respect thereof; and (v) strengthen
economic expertise in the TPO by making
appointments to, or training the staff
of, TPO.
4. In 1973, EPB was reviewing the functions and work program of TPO with a
view to implementing this agreement (Appraisal report of the Second Highway Project).
This matter was discussed during the negotiations of that project (956-KO, January 25,
1974) and the Government promised to submit a status report on TPO with a view
to discussing appropriate action by mid-1974. Little progress was made as the Govern-
ment could not reach a firm conclusion about TPO's work program.
Fifth Project - Loan 1101-KO (April 10, 1975)
Section 3.13 - Within 12 months of Presidential decrees were issued
the date of submission of the time- in July and August 1975 establishing
phased program referred to in Section a Transport Coordination Office (TCO)
6.01 of this Agreement or other date in the Ministry of Transportation,
as the Borrower and the Bank shall and an inter-ministerial Transport
agree, the Borrower shall take Coordination Committee (TCC), TCO
measures, including the issuance is headed by a Director General,
of appropriate decrees acceptable to. a high ranking civil servant
the Bank, to ensure the effective reporting directly to the Vice
formulation and review of the Minister of Transport; he also
Borrower's policies and investment chairs the TCC. The functions
proposals made by all its agencies of TCO and TCC are given in
and ministries related to the Annexes 4 and 5 of the Korea
transport sector, including, inter Transport Sector Mission full
alia, highways, railways, ports, report of February 11, 1976.
inland water transport, shipping For the preparation of the
and aviation. Fourth Plan an inter-ministerial
working group on transportation
prepared detailed transport
demand forecasts providing a
useful basis for investment
planning.
6. While the charter of the TCC includes intermodal coordination of transport
sector investments, the TCC has in fact not exercised this function. The Economic
Planning Board (EPB), which exercises budgetary control and plays a senior role with
regard to all other ministries, has the dominant role in decision on investment projects.
EPB intends to make much more intensive reviews of investment projects and has estab-
lished a separate Bureau of Project Evaluation to this end. Sector studies covering
major aspects of transport coordination have been identified by the sector mission and
are included in the Sixth Project. They will be carried out under the supervision of
EPB.
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7. This approach appears much more satisfactory and workable than the one where .
investment coordination was to come under one of the ministries, namely MOT. The role
of the TCO should remain one of collecting basic data in the sector and assisting in
the formulation and review of transport policies, especially those related to pricing
and regulation since MOT is the Ministry responsible for licensing and rates and fares
setting.
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Traffic Statistics 1966 to 1976 Actual and 1981 Forecast
Freight
Actual Forecast
AAGR/a AAGR AAGR
1966 1971 66-71 1976 71-76 1981 76-81
x X x p.a. % p.a. X % p.a.
Tons (million)
Railway 24 41 32 22 5.9 44 20 6.6 62 18 7.1
Highway 33 56 102 70 25.0 164 74 10.0 263 75 10.0
Public (25) (74) (24.0) (94) (4.9) (151) (10.0)
Private (8) (28) (29.0) (70) (20.0) (112)/b (10.0)
Coastal 2 3 11 8 40.0 14 6 4.9 25 7 12.3
Total 59 100 145 100 222 100 350 100
Ton-km (billion)
Railway 5.4 78 7.8 47 7.6 9.7 46 4.5 13.9 41 7.0
Highway .8 12 4.0 24 38.0 5.7 27 7.3 9.8 30 11.5
Public (.6) (3.3) (4.4) (5.9) (7.6) (11.5)
Private (.2) (0.7) (1.3) (13.2) (2.2)/b (11.5)
Coastal 0.7 10 4.7 29 46.0 5.5 27 3.2 9.4 29 11.4
Total 6.9 100 16.5 100 20.9 100 33.1 100
/a AAGR: Average Annual Growth Rate.
/b Estimated using the same growth rate as for public transport since no forecasts are available.
Source: Ministry of Transport, Statistics Yearbook of Transportation 1976 (M.O.T.), FFYP 1977-81,
and mission's estimates.
KOREA
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Traffic Statistics 1966 to 1976 Actual and 1981 Forecast
Passengers
Actual Forecast
AAGR/a AAGR AAGR
1966 1971 66-71 1976 71-76 1981 76-81
% % % p.a. % % p.a. % % p.a.
Passengers (million)
Railway 138 8 128 4 288 5 not signif. 433 5 not signif.
Intercity (138) - (128) - -1.5 (149) - 3.1 (178) (2) (3.6)
SMESRS /b - - - - (134) - - (265) (3) (14.6)
Highway 1,512 91 3,024 96 14.9 5,051 95 10.8 7,769 95 9.0
Intercity (272) (16) (333) (11) (4.1) (652) (12) (14.4) (792) (10) (4.0)
Urban (1,240) (75) (2,691) (85) (16.8) (4,399) (83) (10.3) (6,977) (85) (9.7)
Coastal 6 1 6 <1 - 6 <1 - 7 <1 -
Aviation - - 1 <1 - 1 <1 - 2 <1 -
Total 1,656 100 3,159 100 5,341 100 8,221 100
Passenger-km (billion)
Railway 8.7 43 8.8 27 0.0 14.7 25 not signif. 20.4 22 not signif.
Intercity (8.7) - (8.8) - - (12.4) (21) 7.1 (16.5) (18) (5.9)
SMERS /b - - - - - (2.3) (4) - (3.9) (4) (11.1)
Highway 11.5 56 22.9 71 14.8 43.4 74 13.6 71.6 77 10.6
Intercity N.A. (11.6) (36) N.A. (25.0) (43) (16.6) (42.4) (46) (11.1)
Urban N.A. (11.3) (35) N.A. (18.4) (31) (10.2) (29.2) (31) (9.7)
Coastal 0.2 1 0.3 1 - 0.2 <1 - 0.4 <1 -
Aviation 0.1 - 0.3 1 0.3 <1 - 0.6 <1 -
Total 20.5 100 32.3 100 58.6 100 93.0 100
/a AAGR: Average Annual Growth Rate.
/b SMESRS includes Traffic on KNR Seoul Suburban lines as well as Seoul City Subway.
Source: Ministry of Transport, Statistics Yearbook of Transportation 1976 (M.O.T.), and mission's estimates.
The 1981 figures are those included in the Fourth Five-Year Plan 1977-81 except for railway where the
revised KNR/mission estimates are shown. FFYP figures for railway were 458 million passengers and
19 billion pass-km.
Table 1.3
KOREA
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Total Transport Investment - Third Plan
(1972-76) and Fourth Plan (1977-81)
(Billion Won)
1972-76 /a 1977-81 /b
Modes Actual Planned
Highways (Public) (237) 833 (458) 1,226
(Private) (596) (768)
Railways 318 402
Ports and Marine (Public) (130) (251)
(Private) (412.) 522 (745) 996
Air Transport 122 59
Seoul Subway 57 101
Others 5
Total Transport Investment 1,857 2,784
Total Capital Expenditure 11,996 19,028
Transportation as % of Total 15.7% 14.6%
/a and /b Constant 1975 prices.
Source: EPB
KOREA
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KNR Track and Infrastructure - Summary by End 1976
(Standard gauge lines)
Route Maximum Minimum Total Maximum Maximum Permanent Sleeper type
Line length gradient curve radius curve length axle load speed speed restrictions Wood Concrete Remarks
(km) (Z) (m) (km) (tons) (km/hr> (km) (X) (%)
Gyeong Bu 445 1.00 400 330 24.5 110 443 64 36 Double track
Jung Ang 380 2.30 300 162 24.5 80 328 76 24 Double track 11 km
Gyeong In 25 1.00 300 22 24.5 80 27 68 32 Double track
Jang Hang 144 1.53 300 45 22.0 70 64 100 0
Chung Bug 122 1.67 300 56 24.5 70 88 100 0
Gyeong Bug 110 2.50 250 36 24.5 70 65 96 4
Dae Gu 35 1.25 300 12 24.5 80 22 56 44
Gyeong Eui 46 1.00 300 12 24.5 90 25 96 4
Gyeong Weon 89 1.33 300 24 24.5 80 56 87 13
Gyeong Chun 87 2.45 250 41 24.5 70 71 100 0
Gyeong Jeon 320 2.50 250 133 22.0 70 257 99 1
Ho Nam 260 1.33 300 92 24.5 90 152 60 40 Double track 78 km
Jeon Ra 198 2.50 250 87 24.5 80 142 74 26
Donghae Nambu 146 1.40 300 55 24.5 80 85 80 20
Tae Baeg 91 3.03 300 51 24.5 70 95 98 2
Yeong Dong 199 3.00 250 120 24.5 70 196 96 4
Other lines 400 176 274 96 4
Total 3.097 1-454 2.390 81 19
Source: KNR
KOREA
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Rails in KNR Standard Gauge Main Line Tracks at End of 1976
(Quantities in track km)
Rail weight (kg/m) and age (years) Rail length
Less
50 kg/m 37 kg/rm Less than 37 kg/m Grand Long 20-25 than Grand
Line <10 11-20 21-30 >30 Total <10 11-20 21-30 >30 Total <10 11-20 21-30 >30 Total Total Welded m 20 m total
Gyeong Bu 734 162 59 46 1,001 - - - 4 4 - - - - - 1,005 879 874 17 1,005
Jung Ang 313 42 24 29 408 - - - 55 55 - - - - - 463 13 370 80 463
Gyeong In 60 22 - - 82 - - - 1 1 - - - - - 83 6 70 7 83
Jang Hang 146 - 8 - 154 - - - - - - - - - - 154 - 131 23 154
Chung Bug 82 20 16 - 118 - 12 11 - 23 - - - - - 141 4 113 24 141
Gyeong Bug 3 86 - - 89 - 35 2 - 37 - - - - - 126 2 95 29, 126
Dae Gu 15 - 2 23 40 - - - - - - - - - - 40 - 32 8 40
Gyeong Eui 14 19 30 - 63 - - - - - - - - - - 63 10 45 8 63
Gyeong Weon 41 18 1 - 60 - - 13 57 70 - - - - - 130 9 97 24 130
Gyeong Chun 6 4 42 19 71 - - - 22 22 - - - - - 93 - 60 33 93
Gyeong Jeon 107 55 - - 162 - 193 - - 193 - - - - - 355 6 248 101 355
Ho Nam 283 20 25 11 339 - - - 6 6 - - - - - 345 - 265 s0 348
Jeon Ra 146 20 - - 166 - 10 38 - 48 - - - - - 214 15 161 38 214
Donghae Nambu 86 11 11 21 129 - 14 19 - 33 - - - - - 162 12 121 29 162
Tae Baeg 103 13 - - 116 - - -, - - - - - - - 116 - 90 26 116
Yeong Dong 116 36 14 - 166 - 42 15 - 57 - - - - - 223 - 174 49 223
Other lines 20 17 25 19 81 21 28 48 91 188 - - 27 101 128 397 - 218 179 397
Total 2. 375 545 257 168 3,245 21 334 146 236 737 - - 27 101 128 4,110 191 3.164 755 4,110
Source: KNR
Table 2.3
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Inventory of Motive Power and Rolling Stock
(December 31, 1976)
Out of service
Total Under Awaiting Age Condition
In fleet In service repair repair <10 yrs 11-20 yra 21-30 yrs >30 yrs Good Fair Poor
Number Number % Number Number Number Number Number Nomber Number Number Number
1. Steam Locomotives 68 20 29.4 - 48 - _ 25 43 - - 68
2. Diesel Locomotives
Shunter, series 2000 (800 HP) 13 13 100.0 - - - 9 4 - 13
Shunter, series 2100 (1,000 EP) 28 28 100.0 - - 28 - - - 28 -
ShunLers, total 41 41 100.0 - - 28 9 4 - 28 - 13
Mainline locomotives, series 3000 (875 HP) 52 47 90.4 5 - - 52 - - - 30 22
Mainline locomotives, series 3100 (950 HP) 32
Mainline locomoLives, series 3200 (875 HP) 16> 32 66.7 - 16 17 31 - - - 1 31
Mainline locomotives, series 4000 (1,300 HP) 15 13 86.7 2 - - 15 - - - 15 -
Mainline locomotives, series 4100 (1,300 HP) 10 10 100.0 - - - 10 - - - 10 -
MaInline locomoLives, series 4200 (1,300 HP) 22 22 100.0 - - 22 - - - - 22 -
Mainline locomotives, series 5000 (1,750 HP) 29 26 89.7 3 - - 29 - - - 15 14
Mainline locomotives, series 6000 (1,800 HP) 14 13 92.8 1 - - 14 - - - - 14
Mainline locomotives, series 6100 (1,800 HP) 6 6 100.0 - _ - 6 - - - 6 -
Mainline locomoLives, series 6200 (1,800 HP) 16 14 87.5 2 - 16 - - - - 16 -
Mainline locomotives, series 6300 (2,000 HP) 23 20 86.9 3 - 23 - - - - 23 -
Mainline locomotives, series 7000 (3,000 HP) 10 10 100.0 - - 10 - - - - 10 -
Mainline locomotives, series 7100 (3,000 HP) 10 10 100.0 - - 10 - - - 10 - -
Mainline locomotives, series 7500 (3,000 HP) 90 87 96.7 3 - 90 - - - 90 - -
Mainline locomotives, toLal 345 310 89.8 19 16 188 177 - - 100 164 S1
Grand total 386 351 90.9 19 16 216 186 4 _ 128 164 94
3. Electric Locomotives
a. Mainline locomotives 69 59 85.5 6 4 69 - - - 69 - -
b. Shonters - - - - - - - - - -
4. Diesel Railcars (Hauling uoits) 120 99 82.5 11 10 4 116 - - - 4 116
5. Electric Railcars (Hauling units) 128 114 89.1 14 - 128 - - 128 -
6. Heating Cars 140 114 81.4 20 6 _ 103 37 _ _ - 103 37
7. Passenser Cars
a. Airconditioned coaches 71 65 91.5 4 2 71 - - 71 - -
b. Other coaches 1,388 1,297 93.4 67 24 707 538 50 93 707 588 143
c. Sleeping cars 29 27 93.1 2 - 22 - - 7 22 - 7
d. Restaurant cars 21 20 95.2 1 - 18 3 - - 18 3 -
e. 
8
aggage cars 114 107 93.9 4 3 35 26 12 41 35 26 53
f. Railcar trailers 143 138 96.5 5 - 32 111 - - 32 111 -
g. Other 40 38 95.0 2 - 17 - 4 19 17 4 23
Total 1.806 1692 93.7 85 29 902 678 66 160 902 678 226
8. Freight Cars
a. Box cars 5,169 4,680 90.5 233 256 2,967 32 1,665 505 2,967 1,445 757
b. Gondolas 6,655 6,175 92.7 366 114 4,635 982 540 498 4,635 1,409 611
c. Tank cars 2,427 2,280 93.9 72 75 1,662 161 440 164 1,662 508 257
d. Others 1,804 1,679 93.8 81 44 77 1,049 322 356 77 1,381 346
Total 16.055 14.814 92.3 752 489 9.341 2.224 2.967 1,523 9,341 4.743 1.971
9. Privately Owned Freight Wagons
a. Box cars (125) _ _ (125) - - - (125) - -
b. Gondolas (224) _ - (224) - - - (224) - -
c. Tank cars (1,071) - - (844) (54) (173) - (844) (227) -
d. Others (35)
(32) (3) (32) (3) -
Total (1.455) _ - (1,225) (54) (176) - (1.2251 (2305 _
Source: SNR
Table 2.4
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Carrying Capacity of Rolling Stock
(As of December 31, 1976)
Total carrying
Number capacity /a
1. Passenger Cars
(a) Airconditioned sitting cars 71 3,396
(b) Other sitting cars 1,388 97,932
(c) Sleeping cars 29 812
Total 1,488 112,140
2. Freight Cars
(a) Box cars - up to 30 tons 550 15,405
31-40 tons 2,834 113,360
over 40 tons 1,785 5,160 89,250 218,015
(b) Gondolas - up to 30 tons 513 15,030
31-40 tons 2,291 91,640
41-50 tons 3,851 6,655 192,550 299,220
(c) Tank cars- up to 30 tons 391 10,783
31-40 tons 1,044 40,035
over 40 tons 992 2,427 49,565 100,383
(d) Other cars 1,804 1,804 76,358 76,358
Total 16,055 693,976
/a For passenger cars seats, for freight wagons tons.
Source: KNR.
KOREA
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KNR Freight Traffic: 1966-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast
(Million tons)
Years Major Commodities Others
Coal Cement Ore Oil Fertilizer Grain Subtotal General cargo Container Military KNR Total
Actual
1966 10.5 1.7 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.2 16.6 4.4 2.1 0.9 24.0
Second FYP
1967 11.2 2.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 18.7 5.6 2.3 0.8 27.4
1968 9.7 3.2 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.6 19.4 5.9 2.8 1.0 29.1
1969 10.4 4.4 1.7 2.1 1.2 1.4 21.2 5.6 2.7 1.2 30.71970 12.1 4.9 1.8 2.4 1.1 1.3 23.6 5.0 2.1 1.0 31.7
1971 12.2 5.8 1.6 2.5 1.1 1.4 24.6 4.6 1.9 0.9 32.0
Third FYP
1972 11.3 6.0 1.5 2.2 1.3 1.6 23.9 4.6 
- 2.4 0.7 31.6
1973 13.6 7.5 2.3 2.7 1.5 1.6 29.2 5.5 0.2 1.7 1.0 37.6
1974 15.1 7.8 2.9 2.7 1.9 1.3 31.7 5.1 0.2 1.3 1.1 39.4
1975 16.7 9.0 3.0 3.1 2.2 1.0 35.0 5.0 0.2 1.4 1.1 42.7
1976 16.1 10.2 3.4 3.1 1.8 1.3 35.9 4.8 0.3 1.5 1.3 43.8
Forecast
Fourth FYP
-1977 17.1 11.0 3.6 3.4 1.9 1.5 38.6 5.6 0.4 1.5 1.3 47.3
1978 18.7 11.8 4.0 3.7 2.2 1.6 42.0 5.9 0.6 1.5 1.3 51.3
1979 20.2 12.2 4.8 4.0 2.4 1.7 45.3 6.2 0.8 1.5 1.3 55.1
1980 21.5 12.5 5.2 4.0 2.6 1.7 47.5 6.5 1.1 1.5 1.3 57.9
1981 23.0 13.0 5.8 4.5 2.7 1.8 50.8 6.8 1.2 1.5 1.3 61.6
Source: KNR and mission.
KOREA
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KNR Freight Traffic: 1966-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast
(Average distance in km)
Years Major Commodities Others
Coal Cement Ore Oil Fertilizer Grain General cargo Container Military KNR Total
Actual
1966 108 280 244 351 155 265 270 200 104
Second FYP
1967 206 257 239 302 168 260 263 197 104
1968 219 264 216 346 208 254 267 196 97
1969 321 207 236 297 275 274 286 205 104
1970 230 205 252 267 284 309 305 209 148
1971 236 211 272 290 313 288 279 236 113
Third FYP
1972 232 188 231 261 267 251 255 240 110
1973 235 179 247 239 280 238 270 incl. in 264 113
1974 226 171 259 240 2786 257 298 general 275 116
1975 221 160 253 223 268 256 271 cargo 275 118
1976 228 177 261 224 287 270 260 266 125
Fourth FYP (forecast)
1977-81 226 165 260 225 282 270 255 445 270 125
Source: KNR and mission.
KOREA
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KNR Freight Traffic: 1966-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast
(Million ton-km)
Years Major Commodities Others
Coal Cement Ore Oil Fertilizer Grain Subtotal General cargo Container Military KNR Total
Actual
1966 2,185 476 269 316 186 318 3,750 1,186 420 94 5,450
Second FYP
1967 2,306 565 335 423 202 338 4,169 1,472 454 83 6,178
1968 2,125 845 368 589 312 406 4,645 1,577 548 97 6,867
1969 2,397 911 402 624 330 384 5,048 1,602 553 125 7,328
1970 2,785 1,003 453 641 312 402 5,595 1,526 439 148 7,709
1971 2,881 1,222 435 724 344 403 6,009 1,281 449 102 7,841
Third FYP
1972 2,620 1,125 347 574 347 402 5,415 1,174 575 77 7,241
1973 3,201 1,344 568 645 420 381 6,559 1,486 Incl. in 433 113 8,591
1974 3,408 1,336 751 649 525 334 7,003 1,517 general 357 128 9,005
1975 3,688 1,437 760 692 590 256 7,423 1,355 cargo 385 130 9,293
1976 3,662 1,804 889 695 516 352 7,918 1,248 399 163 9,728
Forecast
Fourth FYP
1977 3,865 1,815 939 765 564 405 8,353 1,428 178 405 162 10,526
1978 4,226 1,947 1,040 833 620 432 9,098 1,505 267 405 162 11,437
1979 4,565 2,013 1,238 900 677 459 9,852 1,581 356 405 162 12,356
1980 4,859 2,063 1,349 900 733 459 10,363 1,658 490 405 162 13,078
1981 5,198 2,145 1,578 1,013 761 486 11,121 1,734 534 405 162 13,956
Source:_KNR and mission.
Source: KNR and mission.
KOREA
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KNR Intercity Passenger Traffic: 1966-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast
Number of Passengers (millions) Passenger-km (millions) Average Distance (km)
Long Long Long
Commuter distance /a Military Total Commuter distance /a Military Total Commuter distance /a Military Total
Actual
1966 38.4 98.0 1.9 138.3 830 7,288 546 8,664 21.6 74.4 285.0 62.7
Second FYP
1967 41.6 108.4 1.9 151.9 883 8,150 543 9,576 21.2 75.2 288.9 63.6
1968 38.7 110.6 1.6 150.9 828 9,280 482 10,590 21.3 83.9 301.2 70.1
1969 37.9 114.8 2.0 154.7 799 9,680 598 11,077 20.0 84.0 304.0 71.0
1970 38.2 91.4 1.7 131.3 854 8,425 539 9,818 22.4 92.2 299.4 74.8
1971 41.4 85.2 1.6 128.2 940 7,300 510 8,750 22.7 85.7 320.0 68.3
Third FYP
1972 26.3 109.2 1.6 137.2 629 8,914 519 10,062 23.9 81.6 324.4 73.3
1973 22.5 118.9 1.6 143.0 552 9,681 487 10,720 24.5 81.4 304.4 75.0
1974 20.6 117.6 1.6 139.8 481 9,581 471 10,533 23.4 81.4 294.4 75.3
1975 15.1 122.0 1.4 138.6 326 10,626 434 11,386 21.6 87.1 310.0 82.1
1976 17.2 130.1 1.3 148.6 367 11,678 395 12,440 21.3 89.8 303.8 78.6
Forecast
Fourth FYP
1977 18.2 138.0 1.4 157.6 400 13,175 427 14,002 22.0 96.0 305.0 88.9
1978 19.3 142.0 1.4 162.7 425 13,790 427 14,642 22.0 97.0 305.0 90.2
1979 20.0 146.3 1.4 167.9 440 14,451 427 15,318 22.0 99.0 305.0 91.5
1980 20.0 151.3 1.4 172.7 440 15,034 427 15,900 22.0 99.0 305.0 92.0
1981 20.0 156.1 1.4 177.5 440 15,588 427 16,455 22.0 100.0 305.0 92.7
/a See detail forecast by type of service, Table 2.9.
Source: KNR and mission.
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KNR Long Distance Intercity Passenger Traffic by Type of Service
1971-76 Actual, 1977-81 Forecast
Number of Passengers (millions) Passenger-km (millions) Average Distance (km)
Spec. Ltd. Ord. Spec. Ltd. Ord. Spec. Ltd. Ord.
Exp. Exp. Exp. Ord. Total Exp. Exp. Exp. Ord. Total Exp. Exp. Exp. Ord. Total
Actual
1971 0.3 3.8 - 81.7 85.8 117 1,071 - 6,112 7,300 393 285 - 75 85
Third FYP
1972 0.4 5.9 - 102.9 109.2 147 1,653 -- 7,115 8,915 383 283 - 69 82
1973 0.5 7.6 - 110.8 118.9 183 2,105 - 7,393 9,681 374 277 - 67 81
1974 0.6 8.8 4.4 103.8 117.6 234 2,224 940 6,183 9,581 367 254 213 60 81
1975 0.8 11.5 4.7 104.8 121.8 298 2,862 1,004 6,463 10,627 359 250 203 62 87
1976 1.3 15.0 5.4 108.3 130.1 465 3,673 1,025 6,516 11,679 352 245 190 60 90
Forecast
Fourth FYP
1977 1.7 24.0 7.6 104.7 138.0 569 5,520 1.330 5,756 13,175 345 230 175 55 96
1978 2.0 26.4 7.6 106.0 142.0 690 5,940 1,330 5,830 13,790 345 225 175 55 97
1979 2.4 29.0 7.6 107.5 146.5 828 6,380 1,330 5,913 14,451 345 220 175 55 99
1980 2.9 32.0 7.6 108.8 151.3 1,000 6,720 1,330 5,984 15,034 345 210 175 55 99
1981 3.5 35.0 7.6 110.0 156.1 1,208 7,000 1,330 6,050 15,588 345 200 175 55 100
Source: KNR and mission.
(D
Table 2.10
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KNR Seoul Urban (SMESRS) Passenger Traffic
1974-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast
Number of Passengers (millions) Passenger-km Average distance
Commuter Noncommuter Total (millions) (km)
Actual
1974 5.9 22.7 28.6 545 19.1
1975 17.1 65.3 82.4 1,540 18.7
1976 19.1 80.5 100.2 1,865 18.6
Forecast
Fourth FYP
1977 25.6 112.8 138.4 2,560 18.5
1978 71.8 107.7 179.5 3,231 18.0
1979 80.7 107.0 187.7 3,285 17.5
1980 91.0 107.0 198.0 3,365 17.0
1981 104.5 104.5 209.0 3,448 16.5
Source: KNR
Table 2.11
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Selected Operating Statistics
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Index 1976
(1971 = 100)
A. System (at end of year)
1. Route length (km) 3,199 3,121 3,133 3,143 3,144 3,144 101
(a) Standard gauge (1.435 m) 3,074 3,069 3,086 3,096 3,097 3,097 101
(b) Narrow gauge (1.067 m) 125 52 47 47 47 47 38
(c) Double track 537 537 537 553 561 567 106
(d) Electrified - - 155 340 402 402 -
2. Number of stations 589 573 573 565 566 566 96
3. Average distance between
stations (km) 5.43 5.45 5.47 5.56 5.56 5.56 102
B. Staff (at end of year)
1. Number of employees 43,638 44,344 41,202 39,911 39,560 39,293 90
(a) Permanent 36,067 35,914 33,748 33,594 33,758 33,481 93
(b) Temporary 7,571 8,430 7,454 6,317 5,807 5,812 77
C. Rolling Stock /a
1. Steam locomotives /b
(a) In fleet, number 80 80 60 51 41 25 31
(b) Available, number 56 56 43 38 32 12 21
(c) Available, X 70.0 70.0 71.7 74.5 78.0 48.0 69
2. Diesel locomotives, main line
(a) In fleet, number 296 295 295 295 300 330 111
(b) Available, number 245 259 259 264 260 285 116
(c) Available, % 82.8 87.8 87.8 89.5 86.7 86.4 104
3. Diesel locomotives, shunters
(a) In fleet, number 38 41 41 41 41 41 108
(b) Available, number 34 39 39 39 39 36 106
(c) Available, X 89.5 95.1 95.1 95.1 95.1 87.8 98
4. Electric locomotives, main line
(a) In fleet, number - - 37 49 66 65
(b) Available, number - - 31 42 56 55
(c) Available, X - - 83.8 85.7 84.8 84.6
5. Diesel railcars, powered units
(a) In fleet, number 156 155 152 121 119 123 79
(b) Available number 109 101 79 71 86 98 90
(c) Available, % 69.9 65.2 48.0 58.7 72.3 79.7 114
6. Electric railcars, powered units
(a) In fleet, number - - - 78 126 126
(b) Available, number - - - 72 110 114
(c) Available, % - - - 92.3 87.3 90.5
7. Passenger cars, including railcar
trai lers
(a) In fleet, total number 1,662 1,604 1,581 1,571 1,712 1,760 106
- airconditioned coaches 55 55 55 55 65 71 129
- other coaches 1,272 1,219 1,206 1,180 1,293 1,335 104
- sleeping cars 16 16 16 19 27 29 181
- restaurant cars 26 26 26 26 26 24 92
- baggage cars 110 109 109 116 122 117 106
- railcar trailers 142 145 145 146 146 144 101
- other 34 34 30 29 33 40 118
(b) Available, total number 1,412 1,357 1,387 1,388 1,515 1,559 110
(c) Available, X 85.0 84.6 82.4 88.4 88.5 88.7 104
8. Freight cars
(a) In fleet, total number
(including privately owned
cars) 14,575 15,975 16,491 15,887 15,794 15,964 110
- box cars 4,850 5,391 5,343 5,128 4,993 5,096 105
- gondolas 5,663 6,073 6,546 6,264 6,380 6,548 108
- flat cars 1,252 1,585 1,755 1,656 1,572 1,416 113
- tank cars 2,137 2,289 2,264 2,234 2,266 2,379 ill
- others 673 637 583 605 583 525 78
(b) Available, total number 13,038 13,845 14,543 14,251 14,358 14,259 109
(c) Available, X 89.5 86.6 88.2 89.7 90.9 89.3 100
(d) In fleet, privately owned 1,367 1,389 1,385 1,407 1,422 1,445 106
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D. Traffic
1. Passenger traffic
(a) Number of passengers
total (million) 128.1 137.1 143.0 168.5 221.0 248.7 194
- Seoul suburban (SMESRS) - - - 28.7 82.4 100.1
- Other 128.1 137.1 143.0 139.8 138.6 148.5 116
(b) Passenger-km (million) 8,750 10,062 10,720 11,077 12,926 14,305 163
- Seoul suburban (SMESRS) - - - 545 1,540 1,865 -
- Other 8,750 10,062 10,720 10,532 11,386 12,440 142
(c) Average journey, total 68.3 73.4 75.0 65.7 56.5 57.5 84
- Seoul suburban (SMESRS) 19.0 18.7 18.6
- Other 68.3 73.4 75.0 75.3 82.2 83.7 123
2. Freight traffic
(a) Net tons (000) 31,955 31,541 37,762 39,708 42,758 43,630 137
(b) Net ton-km (million) 7,841 7,241 8,591 9,005 9,293 9,728 124
(c) Average freight haul 245 230 228 227 217 223 91
3. Traffic units (million) 16,591 17,303 19,311 20,082 22,219 24,033 145
4. Traffic density
(a) Passenger-km per route
km (000) 2,735 3,224 3,422 3,524 4,111 4,550 166
(b) Freight net ton-km per
route km (000) 2,451 2,320 2,742 2,865 2,956 3,094 126
(c) Traffic units per route
km (000) 5,186 5,544 6,166 6,389 7,067 7,644 147
E. Operations
1. Train-km (000) 42,226 44,528 46,017 46,790 51,022 55,393 131
(a) According to types of train:
(i) Passenger (incl.
railcars) 24,455 27,602 27,794 27,669 31,123 34,807 142
(ii) Freight 17,771 16,926 18,223 19,121 19,899 20,586 116
(b) According to types of traction:
(i) Steam locomotive 976 257 240 105 69 45 5
(ii) Diesel locomotive 35,426 38,808 39,665 38,015 37,876 41,326 117
(iii) Electric locomotive - - 2,145 4,449 5,336 5,475 -
(iv) Diesel railcar 5,824 5,463 3,967 3,204 4,380 4,662 80
(v) Electric railcar - - - 1,017 3,361 3,885 -
2. Engine-km, excluding shunting 52,887 53,812 53,702 58,457 76,923 84,781 160
(a) Steam locomotives 1,291 365 290 148 - - 0
(b) Diesel locomotives 39,310 41,356 41,812 40,051 39,870 43,324 112
(c) Electric locomotives - - 2,227 4,625 6,242 6,509 -
(d) Diesel railcars 12,286 12,091 9,373 8,221 10,647 11,641 95
(e) Electric railcars - - - 5,412 20,164 23,307 -
3. Rolling stock-km (million)
(a) Passenger cars, total 178 204 208 213 241 265 149
(b) Freight cars, total 332 322 372 374 385 402 121
- loaded 208 180 200 201 208 217 104
- empty /c 124 142 172 173 176 185 149
4. Loanded freight cars
forwarded (000) 847 782 883 888 966 972 117
5. Average freight car turnaround
time (days) 5.6 6.5 6.0 5.9 5.4 5.4 93
6. Average freight car turnaround
distance (m) 392 412 421 421 399 414 105
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F. Performance Indicators
1. Passenger traffic
(a) Average number of passengers
per passenger train 358 364 386 400 415 411 115
(b) Average number of passengers
per passenger car 49.2 49.3 51.5 52.0 53.6 54.0 110
2. Freight traffic
(a) Average number of freight
cars per freight train 18.7 19.0 20.4 19.6 19.3 19.5 104
- loaded 11.7 10.6 11.0 10.5 10.5 10.5 90
- empty 7.0 8.4 9.4 9.1 8.8 9.0 128(b) Average freight train loan
(net tons) 441 428 471 471 467 472 107(c) Average load per loaded
freight car (net tons) 37.7 40.3 42.8 44.8 44.6 44.9 119(d) Net ton-km per available
freight car (000) 601 523 590 632 647 682 113
3. Staff
(a) Traffic units per employee
(000) 379 393 451 495 561 612 161(b) Employees per route-km 13.7 14.1 13.7 12.98 12.6 12.5 91
4. Rolling stock
(a) Availability (%):
(i) Steam locomotives 70.0 70.0 71.7 74.5 78.0 48.0 69(ii) Diesel locomotives,
main line 82.8 87.8 87.8 89.5 86.7 86.4 104
(iii) Electric locomotives 
- - 83.8 85.7 84.8 84.6
(iv) Diesel railcars,
powered units 69.9 65.2 48.0 58.7 72.3 79.7 114
(v) Electric railcars,
powered units 
- - - 92.3 87.3 90.5
(vi) Passenger cars 85.0 84.6 87.4 88.4 88.5 88.7 104
(vii) Freight cars 89.5 86.6 88.2 89.7 90.9 89.3 100
(b) Yearly distance covered per
available unit: (km 000)
(i) Diesel main line
locomotives 160 160 161 152 153 152 95(ii) Electric main line
locomotives 
- - 72 110 111 118
(iii) Diesel railcars 113 120 119 116 123 119 105
(iv) Electric railcars 
- - - 75 183 204
(v) Passenger cars 126 150 150 153 159 170 135
(vi) Freight cars 25.4 23.2 25.6 26.2 26.8 28.2 111
(c) Passenger-km per available
passenger car, including
rail cars (000) 5,722 6,901 7,312 7,235 7,528 8,077 141
(d) Net ton-km per available
freight car (000) 601 523 591 632 647 682 113
/a Number in fleet is average of number at beginning and end of year. Available number is average number
during year.
/b Excluding locomotives kept in reserve.
Ic Including cabooses.
Source: KNR.
Table 2.12
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Freight Tariffs
(Effective January 1, 1977)
Car-load rates
in Won per ton for each 50 km
Prior to From
Class Commodities Jan. 1, 1977 Jan. 1, 1977
1 Gasoline, cattle, textiles, clothing,
furniture, meat and dangerous goods /a, 312 312
plus sugar, cotton, plywood, hardboard,
tobacco /b 270 312
2 Cement, diesel and bunker oils, fruits
and vegetables /c 237 283
3 Lumber, rice, grains, salt, fertilizer,
limestone, ores, pulp, asphalt, bricks /d 207 258
4 Coal /e 187 237
/a In addition, dangerous goods have a 10g surcharge.
/b These commodities previously rated as Class 2.
/c Previously Class 3.
/d Previously Class 4.
/e Previously Class 5.
(a) Tariffs are straight line, in direct proportion to distance travelled
(i.e. no taper for distance) and rates are quoted in increments for
each block of 50 kilometers. Intermediate distances are charged at
the next highest 50 km level (i.e. 227 km charged at 250 km rate).
(b) There is a Won 14,220 minimum charge, to help cover basic non-
distance related charges (i.e. terminal costs); it also introduces
a slight distance taper on a rate per ton-km basis.
(c) Car-load charges are billed at a minimum car-load weight which is
usually equivalent to the practical capacity of the car for the
particular commodity density. In addition, these minimum charges
effectively penalize the use of smaller freight cars (under 30 tons)
for hauls up to 100 km.
(d) Miscellaneous charges include:
(i) Switching - W 1,877 per km per movement.
(ii) Demurrage - W 120 per ton for each 6 hours (after first
6 hours free use).
(iii) Storage - W 476 per ton (car-load basis) each 24 hours.
Source: KNR
Table 2.13
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Passenger Tariffs
(Effective January 6, 1977)
Basic fare Minimum charge
Ordinary W 2.51 per pass/km W 4'0 (up to 17 km)
Ordinary express W 3.76 " " " W 200 (up to 54 km)
Limited express W 4.87 " " " W 500 (up to 103 km)
Special express W 9.41 " " " W 1,040 (up to 111 km)
In addition there are:
Up to 201 to Over
200 km 400 km 400 km
(a) Seat charges
Limited express - W 300 W 500 - W 700
Special express - W 500 W 750 W 1,000
(b) Sleeper charges - upper berth - W 2,000
lower berth - W 2,700
(c) For commuters:
(i) Students can buy one month, or three monthly tickets (can
be used 50 times in one month), with minimum charges of
W 1,090 (one month), or W 3,270 (three months), for journeys
up to 18 km. Thereafter, the charge is on a straight line
kilometrage basis at W 1.21 per pass-km.
(ii) Nonstudents can buy monthly or three monthly tickets (but
which can be used 60 times in one month) with minimum charges
of W 1,880 or W 5,640, respectively, also for journeys up to
18 km. Thereafter, the straight line kilometrage charge is
at W 1.74 per pass-km, i.e. a 30% discount over the ordinary
basic fare.
Source: KNR
Table 2.14
KOREA
SIXTH BQILWAY PROJECT
Tariff Increases Granted During 1967-77 Period
Average revenue Passenger fares Average revenue
Year Freight rates increase per ton-km increase per pass-km
(Won) (Won)
1967 30% (October) l.19 50% (October) 1.12
1968 - 1.42 1.46
1969 - /a 1.52 30% (December) 1.64
1970 - 145 - 1.97
1971 - 1.48 - 1.98
1972 207-(February) 1A84 - /b 2.06
1973 1.84 - 2.14
1974 10% (January) 25% (February) /c
5% (February
35-40% (December) /d 2.17 2.68
1975 10% (July) /e 3.22 20% (July) 3.22
1976 35% (January) /f 4.64 3.67
1977 (January) Ig r5.2(
/a Changes were made in commodity classification only.
lb There were reductions in commuter ticket discounts.
/c In addition, KNR allowed to retain :Ee 10% transportation tax on passenger
fares, in force since 1963.
/d Selective increases, including coal.
/e Excluding-coal.
/f Excluding coal but on April 1, coa-l raised to Class 5.
/g Existing five classes compressed to For (see Table 2.12).
Source: KNR
Table 2.15
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Traffic Revenues and Costs - 1976
(Won million)
Operating Costs
Operating Fully Net revenue Contributions Operating
revenues distributed Variable (loss)(1-2) to overheads ratio (Z)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1-3) (6)
Passengers
Saemaul Express 3,734 2,361 1,611 1,373 2,123 63.2
Limited Express 18,519 12,279 8,521 6,240 9,998 66.3
Ordinary Express 4,834 5,427 4,109 (593) 725 112.3
Ordinary 22,941 28,702 19,432 (5,761) 3,509 125.1
Military 1,085 1,083 788 2 297 99.8
Commuters 1,431 2,871 1,815 (1,440) (384) 200.6
Baggage 2,923 3,941 2,759 (1,018) 164 134.8
Total 55,467 56,664 39,035 (1,197) 16,432 102.2
Average per pass-km 3.67 3.69 2.54
Freight
Coal 14,143 18,722 12,049 (4,579) 2,094 132.4
Cement 9,815 9,309 5,872 506 3,943 94.8
Ores 3,904 4,718 3,071 (814) 833 120.9
Oil 3,482 3,781 2,455 (299) 1,027 108.6
Fertilizer 2,368 3,504 2,317 (1,136) 51 148.0
Grain 1,660 2,667 1,769 (1,007) (109) 160.7
Miscellaneous 6,597 8,267 5,152 (1,670) 1,445 125.3
Military 1,517 3,338 2,221 (1,821) (704) 220.0
KNR 1,609 1,647 1,332 (38) 277 102.5
Total 45,095 55,953 36,238 (10,858) 8,857 124.1
Average per ton-km 4.64 5.76 3.73
Source: KNR.
Table 2.16
KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT
Uneconomic Lines and Stations
A. Uneconomic Lines
1975 Cost saving
Operating if closed
Line Length ratio % (W million) Remarks
Su In 65.1 km 603 490 Narrow gauge line, adequate
highway available.
Jin Sam 34.8 km 642 171 Line to military port.
An Seong 29.8 km 458 74 Adequate highway available.
Og Gu 11.8 km 814 42 Line to military airport.
Hwa Sun 11.1 km 590 52 Used by Korea Coal Corpo-
ration.
Kim Po 9.2 km n.a. 29 Used by U.S. military forces.
Yong San 2.4 km 436 34 Used by Korea Electric Co.
164.2 km 862
B. Uneconomic Stations
1. Passengers and freight. The following stations where passengers and
freight services earn revenues covering less than 30% of personnel
costs involved are regarded as operating uneconomic services. KNR
proposes action to discontinue services, simplify operations, or
close stations, as under:
(i) Passenger services
1977 30 stations - ratio of revenues to personnel costs: 12% /a
1978 60 " - " " " : 18%
1979 55 - " " " : 26%
145 stations
(ii) Freight services
1977 25 stations - ratio of revenues to personnel costs: 4% /b
1978 21 " - " " " " " : 5%
1979 51 - " " " " : 14%
97 stations
2. Baggage services. At the following stations, where the revenues
fail to cover 100% of the personnel costs involved, KNR proposes
action similar to (1) above, as under:
1977 110 stations - ratio of revenues to personnel costs: 72% /c
1978 81 "i -0 " "" : 66%
1979 39 " - " " " " " : 84%
230 stations
/a Actual performance in 1977 - 14 closed
/b " " " - 26 closed
/c "' " - 92 discontinued
Source: KNR
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Table 3.3
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
KNR Investment Plan 1977-81. Items Starting in 1980/81
1980 1981 Total expenditure 1980/81
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
- …------- - ___---- _------ Won million ---- …----------------------- ------- US$'000 --------
1 New Line Construction
1.1 Industrial sidings (2 places) 3,420 - 3,420 2,949 - 2,949 6,369 - 6,369 13,132 - 13,132
Subtotal Category 1 3.420 - 3.420 2.949 - 4.949 6.369 - 6,369 13,132 - 13,132
2 Electrification
2.1 Jecheon-Yeongju (64 ki) 1,695 1,510 3,205 1,973 1,606 3,579 3,668 3,116 6,784 7,563 6,425 13,988
Subtotal Category 2 1.695 1,510 3,205 1.973 1,606 3.579 3,668 3.116 6.784 7.563 6,425 13,988
3 Increase in Station and Line Capacity
3.1 Double tracking (about 20 kn) 5,280 745 6,025 7,210 1,420 8,630 12,490 2,165 14,655 25,753 4,464 30,217
3.2 Bypass lines (1 place) 600 - 600 1,216 286 1,502 1,816 286 2,102 3,744 590 4,334
3.3 Additional crossing loops (14 places) 574 126 700 574 126 700 1,148 252 1,400 2,367 519 2,886
3.4 Station yard extensions (5 places) 251 64 315 296 60 356 547 124 671 1,128 256 1,384
3.5 Freight handling facilities 450 - 450 450 - 450 900 - 900 1,855 - 1,855
3.6 Lengthening of crossing loops (11 places) 616 105 721 352 60 412 968 165 1,133 1,996 340 2,336
3.7 Station installations 774 - 774 974 - 974 1,748 - 1,748 3,604 - 3,604
3.8 Signaling 2,785 - 2,785 4,303 - 4,303 7,088 - 7,088 14,615 - 14,615
3.9 ousan area improvement 360 30 390 - - - 360 30 390 742 62 804
Subtotal Category 3 11.690 1,070 12,760 15,375 1,952 17,327 27.065 3,022 30,087 55,804 6,231 62,035
4 Way and Structures
4.1 Rail renewal, 50 kg rails (180 ki) 440 1,360 1,800 550 1,700 2,250 990 3,060 4,050 2,041 6,309 8,350
4.2 Rail renewal, 60 kg rails (30 km) 165 612 777 - - - 165 612 777 340 1,262 1,602
4.3 Track renewal, 50 kg rails (50 kin) 650 340 990 975 510 1,485 1,625 850 2,475 3,351 1,753 5,104
4.4 Track renewal, 60 kg rails (60 km) 975 612 1,587 975 612 1,587 1,950 1,224 3,174 4,021 2,524 6,545
4.5 Concrete sleepers (200,000) 1,350 - 1,350 1,350 - 1,350 2,700 - 2,700 5,567 - 5,567
4.6 Points and crossings (480) 300 120 420 300 120 420 600 240 840 1,237 495 1,732
4.7 Bridge strengthening (7 spans) 30 - 30 - - - 30 - 30 62 - 62
4.B Tunnel strengthening 150 - 150 200 - 200 350 - 350 722 - 722
4.9 Ballast (320,000 cue) 640 - 640 640 - 640 1,280 - 1,280 2,639 - 2,639
4.10 Level crossings 2,660 - 2,660 2,660 - 2,660 5,320 - 5,320 10,969 - 10,969
4.11 Miscellaneous 210 - 210 320 - 320 530 - 530 1,093 - 1,093
Subtotal Category 4 7.570 3,044 10,614 7,970 2,942 10,912 15,540 5,986 21,526 32.042 12,343 44,385
5 Motive Power and Rolling Stock
5.1 New diesel main line locomotives (12) 25 1,825 1,850 35 2,555 2,590 60 4,380 4,440 124 9,031 9,155
5.2 New diesel shunting locomotives (13) 30 1,020 1,050 35 1,190 1,225 65 2,210 2,275 134 4,556 4,690
5.3 New breakdown cranes (2) - - - 26 700 726 26 700 726 54 1,443 1,497
5.4 Motive power remodeling/repairing (140 units) 1,745 4,500 6,245 1,168 3,840 5,008 2,913 8,340 11,253 6,006 17,196 23,202
5.5 New passenger cars (189) 1,844 9,220 11,064 1,624 8,120 9,744 3,468 17,340 20,808 7,150 35,753 42,903
5.6 Passenger car remodeling (145) 371 - 371 403 - 403 774 - 774 1,596 - 1,596
5.7 New freight cars (1,100) - 7,450 7,450 - 7,435 7,435 - 14,885 14,885 - 30,691 30,691
5.8 Freight car remodeling (1,262) 2,061 - 2,061 1,965 - 1,965 4,026 - 4,026 8,301 - 8,301
Subtotal Category 5 6.076 24,015 30.091 5,256 23,840 29.096 11,332 47,855 59,187 23.365 98,670 122,035
6 Rolling Stock Repair Facilities
6.1 New Daejeon repair shop - - - 2,000 - 2,000 2,000 - 2,000 4,123 - 4,123
6.2 Improvement of existing backshops 400 500 900 - - - 400 500 900 825 1,031 1,856
6.3 Improvement of existing sheds 472 140 612 335 70 405 807 210 1,017 1,664 433 2,097
Subtotal Category 6 872 640 1,512 2.335 70 2.405 3.207 710 3,917 6,612 1,464 8.076
7 Telecommunications, Power Facilities,
Buildings and Others
7.1 Telecommunications 284 - 284 212 - 212 496 - 496 1,023 - 1,023
7.2 Power facilities 200 5 205 200 5 205 400 10 410 825 21 846
7.3 Buildings - - - 685 - 685 685 - 685 1,413 - 1,413
7.4 Housing facilities 1,365 - 1,365 1,000 - 1,000 2,365 - 2,365 4,876 - 4,876
7.5 Miscellaneous 1,150 150 1,300 1,150 150 1,300 2,300 300 2,600 4,742 618 5,360
Subtotal Category 7 2.999 155 3.154 3,247 155 3,402 6,246 310 6,556 12.879 639 13,518
Total Categories 1-7 34,322 30,434 64.756 39,105 30.565 69.670 73.427 60,999 134,426 151.397 125.772 277,169
S Physical contingency (10% except for items
4.1-4.4 and Category 5) 2,602 350 2,951 3,135 390 3,525 5,736 740 6,476 11,828 1,525 13.353
9 Price contingency (for local currency items
-SR annually in 1977/78, 7.5% in 1979 and
7% in 1980/81; for foreign currency items
8% annually in 1977, 7% in 1978, 6.5% in
1979 and 6% in 1980/81) 10,999 8,253 19,252 16,423 10,654 27,077 27,422 18,907 46,329 56,541 38,984 95,525
GRAND TOTAL 47.922 39,037 86.959 58,663 41,609 100.272 106,585 80.646 187.231 219,766 166,281 386,047
Note: USS1.00 - 485 won.
Source: KYR and mission.
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Itbia 3. 4
1978 1979 M98 198L Totle-eI ioe 1978-81
lie Line Local Forite Total Local Foc-L, Total Lo-e Fo..eign Totl Lcl c g Toa cc-l F-riso Tota Loca Forign Total
S Motive Tower and Ro1i-to Stok
9.1 Motive oo-
5.1.1 e diO...l mole loe lono-oi-r (30) 10) 7.300 7,100 511 36502 3, 722 --0 150 10.950 11,182 329 22,078 22,887
5.1.3 llrool loconoclnoa, coando ing (591 1.022 6.828 7.000 170 2,810 3.325 - --. O-3- 1. 25 8,852" 12,325 3.201 18.248' 21,280
5.1.,4 Dielalea dln 11198 376 5714 - - - - - - 1961 378 524 424 779 1,1805.. _laig s.r_dring (48) 520 527 5211 - 520 1,048 - J.248 2,164 - 2,11445.1.6 lo-kdon trne, -ndeling 131 
- - - 15 39 56 --4 - 15 T9 514 31 81 112
S.cltIdo Cucegcy 5.1 .8_42 143782 16, 220 1.060 6.539 7,32 -59--9 - 2.90220,9,17 23,810 50893 43.129 49,112
5I2d No poilIr'socc (4 7 3.368 .1327 280 1,402 1,680 - - 52 4 ,7960 5,712 2,065 0,1 5 11,770
5.2.2 ten specini enpoess.dinin cae3 6)10 828 965 0 6 0 
- 192 960 1.152 3019 09 ,75.2.3 Nta p_ie1 enreP pae2cceco 5 16 1.288 1.296 54 275 324 - - - - -- 22 130 ,62 57 2,784 3, 361
5.4 a aa nos oce 15 1,610 8,2858 9, 663 4211 2.100 2.520 - - - - -- 2030 10,5 12,180 4,180 20,928 75,211452.5 O telond eceedcc coa(7) 92 458 560 36 190 211 12 6 65 756 260 ,29 1,5
5.2.6 Or ilo otc cr oo oo(9 1 ,42 7, 208 2016 1, 380 1,45 -6 
-- 144 3,222 ,0 130 603 ,65.2. Oceodelg, p--eg-c cec 130) 116 114 57 - 57 - - - - -- 171 - 11 353 - 535.2.8 Oeeodellng, baggage cute 62) ~~~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~~~~130 - 100 158 - 152 - --- - - 25 - 20 513 - 51
Icott2uccy5.2 3133315(,580 18910( 1,305 5,490 6,23 795- - 4,6O35 21,070 25,735 9.357 43.444 533.113
5.3 1cctahtc...
552 angondla U (8725 5.468 5,46 - 5,85 5.5 032 1,1 332 2,25.3.3 llaadeong, -ubco.... (2321 1950 195 1314 106 --4 290 208 57 15.54 Roadhlng,co-caocc- c - (130) 84 84 72 - 72 - 56 - 156 312l- 32113.5 Iapc,e- n , freIght -ut (1,000) 1,850 - 1,850 1,1150 - 1,852 3.700 - 3.7220 7.629 7,6029
Inboot,l Cucoy5. 2 01 29 9..25 11.274 2.1-2 10.200 02.21- -4 
- - 3155 19.295 2-3412 8 560 39, 764 10,331
Sabl-olCaocy5 7.121 39.843 46. 344 4.391 22.229 261.620 11,392 61,272 7 2.964 24,108 171.337 150.145
6.1 Sen Dueleon caoseoocc 050ah., Gycoog B. - 2,1000 - 2,2020 2,023 1,7700 3,730 2,110(1 022 2.950 t,222 2,532 0.5112 12.301 5, 155 (7.501
SoSt-o1 aCe-ocy 61. 
- - - 2.000 - 4000 4,300 1.700 3,702 2.071l 802 2, 807 26220 00 2_-m 5 )112 12,370 5, 135 17,526
11.2.j eo sogI 252 1,133 1.600 - - - - "- 25 1,3 1,622 575 2.571 2,0861.2.2 Oseeo Oscong Ia - - - 550 600 1,150 - - - - - - 550 682 1.152 1.034 1.2370 2,371 1 5 ,134 .237 2,3 7
11.2.3 lolro yco In 60 3000 360 - - - - - 60 30 362 124 819 74 3
SiSnon1 lacgory 1.2 (18 1.410 L32) 550 620 1.152 0 860 2,250 2_510 1,773 1,227 6,200
1 11.5 Ooonro of cuslohda
13.1 Lcnoisepn facllltl, 512 70 580 740 282 1,0220 1,252 551 1,110 2, 577 322 3.299
6.3.2 Elooncl rallca repa ,Ir arli.la 
- - - 280 - 200 - - - - -- 222 - 207 412 - 4126.3.3 a rC pair -l l-.Ic 320 200 302 453 030 750 752 500 1 2 52 1, 54 7 10,30 2, 577
Sobeoc1 Canasar 6.3 010 2730 ~ 2 1,0 -322 580 1.970 - - - - - - 2.2112 932 3.250 4,533 1.752 6.288
Sob-onl congory 0 1,120 0.220 2,842 3.945 1.192 5.120 2. 000 1.720 3.2700 2,000 802 2.807 9 ,060 5,400 14,4fi3 18,680 11a134 29,814
7.1 Telccolol
7.1.1 Tclrcoaotonlcor to lic 190 n'5 250 2 00 - 200 450 - 50O 920 9 28
7.0.2 tcolncedlncqnipceor ~~~~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~~ ~ ~~ ~~~312 - 32 106 - 191 50 -08 1,427 1,0477.1.3 -lnr-hlo -elph.... 03 - 63 60 - 3 1 - -- 226 - 26 260 - 260
SolntoIlCo-iesoc7,L 626 - 1125 4509 459 1 ,024 - 1,004 2.235 - 2.,235
7.2 Poe._ uIinc
7.2.1 nctecvofeciialno-llo
7
ecc, 0 -33W TO0 30 62 - 6 121 il027.2.2 Ilettics fanslttiss (30 plocc) 00 - 3 O - 3 
. - 63 124 2
7.2.43 Poc lIefracgoy 5 a ogAg 420 36 455 0 1 05 - - - - - .80 50 657 1,2 32 75 1 ,342
P.. ill- ..... .400 R.) 80 - 80 80 - 30 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~- 060 - 160 338 - 350
Sab--cl Catogo-y 0.0 560 35 595 3270 15 325 - - -30 181 13 1,1
7.0 OnlIdnoAn
7.3.1 Ralc-iceofoT-h--loaRoscechosIeunj- 130 - 132 00 -6 560 -Ill-- 
- 9 - 692 0421 1,423
2.3.2 Cancsiao,pply 22200 T3T0 380 - - - - - - - - - 30 - 38 78..20
Suttl cacono 7.3 510 - 512 560 - 560 - - -- - 1,0330 1.070 7.2061 2.206
7.4,1 Llonlo for -olyra60 
- 9 Ti - 30 ---
- - 0.2 1,026 2,11116 2,17.4.2 Lodgiog loo ncsioocoa, ~~~~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~~~1900 193 106 - 06 296 286 610- 82
S.b-oa1 sConor-y 7.4 80 - 880 662 - 442 -1 ,332 1.332 2. 726 2.726
7.5 Mtonollsco-
7..-cannadnalln elnna50 152 200 5o 130 200 0 2 2 0 1 2
7 .5........n...doooccc.t.. 1,070...1000 1,02 - 1,00 - - - - ,00 30 2,000 1,246 61 0,2
SuttlCst-e-Y 7.5 1.150 1520 1,300 1.150 100 1_300 - - - - - 2.300 300 2.1122 4. 742 610 5, 36 1
Scbnon1 to- -ot 7 3,725 15 3_810 2. 931 265 3,091 - - - 6. 656 3 50 7.006 13.724 72 14,446
localCtnolo - 29.214 45.254 74,460 3 5.887 28.3268 64 155 10 798 3,221 15,019 5,022 Boo 5,820 00.919 78.543 159, 46 2 166.847 1n.1948 328.295
8 Pyscalcailnroo 12 eeccp fon Ico- 4.1, 4.2, 2.10.
4. 14 o lcoy5 1.990 233 2,223 2,0932 276 3.208 1,282 422 1.502 502 00 582 0.504 1,221 7,516 13.411 2.084 15,495
11077/(0 7.50Ic 1919 -cd 7% to 1901/81 lad foI.,
--rno iens 85 annuall 1,in 1977, 70 lo 1070, 6.65% in
0979 and 60 in 1980/21( 3,004 53.38 9.211 8,100 5,523 13.043 3.538 1,225 4,703 0.067 303 2.450 17.689 12,038 30.127 36.173 25,646 62.009
GRAN2 2228L 35. 040 SO_O54 85,9802 4 6,97 9 3_4.26 7 00.048 15.416 5.408 21.30411,6.69 1.103 30.852 -123,ill 91.092 190.104 21i6 7 31 189.678 406.409
Note 71)1.30 - 105 wo

Table 3.5
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Loan Financed Items
Unit Quantity Unit Cost Total Cost
(US$) (US$ million)
Rails 50 kg/m tons 33,000 350 11.57
Track material workshop machinery 2.20
Track maintenance equipment 0.99
Breakdown cranes no 2 720,000 1.44
Passenger cars:
Special express coaches no 34 290,000 9.82
Special express dining cars no 6 380,000 1.98
Special express power source cars no 5 560,000 2.78
Limited express coaches no 145 145,000 20.93
Limited express dining cars no 7 185,000 1.30
Limited express power source cars no 14 475,000 6.64
Freight cars:
Box cars no 550 30,000 16.44
Gondolas no -870 27,000 23.32
Rolling stock workshop equipment 3.31
Training and technical assistance 0.62
Subtotal 103.34
Contingencies 16.16
Transport sector studies 0.50
Total 120.00
Table 3.6
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
KNR Rail Renewal Program, 1977-81
Total
Line 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1977-81
------------ Track km--------------------
Gyeong Bu 17 17 16 15 20 85
Jung Ang 25 30 25 30 /a - 110
Gyeong In - - 15 - - 15
Chung Bug 20 20 - - - 40
Gyeong Bug - - - 20 20 40
Dae Gu 25 - - - - 25
Gyeong Weon - - - 20 20 40
Gyeong Jeon 14 - - - 21 35
Ho Nam 10 - - - - 10
Jeon Ra 35 - - - - 35
Donghae Nambu - 20 25 - - 45
Tae Baeg 15 20 15 - - 50
Yeong Dong 39 28 29 25 19 140
Total 200 135 125 110 100 670
/a 60 kg rails.
Source: KNR and mission.
Table 3.7
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
KNR Track Renewal Program, 1977-81
Total
Line 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1977-81
------------------- Track km-------------------
Gyeong Bu - 10 20 20 30 80
Jung Ang - 10 20 30 /a 30 /a 90
Gyeong In 8 - - - - 8
Ho Nam 4 - - - - 4
Donghae Nambu 8 10 - - - 18
Total 20 30 40 50 60 200
/a 60 kg rails.
Source: KNR and mission.
Table 3.8
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
KNR Track Material Workshop: Machinery and Equipment Requirements
Item Quantity Estimated Cost (US$)
Rail Reprofiling Plant
Multipurpose loader 1 264,000
Fourway straightening press 1 130,000
Road reprofiling machine 1 520,000
Friction rail saw 5 10,000
Rotating brush 1 3,000
Ultrasonic testing machine 1 20,000
Gantry crane 1 100,000
Roller gangway 1 180,000
Subtotal 1,227,000
Switch Point Factory
Two-head planer 1 200,000
Rail bending machine 2 40,000
Heat treating machine 1 150,000
Friction rail saw 
- 2 4,000
Universal drilling machine 1 40,000
Subtotal 434,000
Sleeper Reconditioning Factory
Sleeper banding machine 1 200,000
Sleeper adzing and drilling machine 1 200,000
Gang trolley 1 20,000
Subtotal 420,000
Rail Welding Plant
Gas welding machine 1 50,000
Driving and pressing set 1 15,000
Grinding machine 1 10,000
Friction rail saw 2 4,000
Rail end brushing machine 1 25,000
Rail drill 1 20,000
Subtotal 124,000
Total 2,205,000
Source: KNR.
Table 3.9
KOREA
SITH RAILWAY PROJECT
Pinancimn of Forsiaa Currency Part of the Prol1ct
1978 1979 1980 1981 Total. IRRD OECF /a 50-Cycle /b U.S. EXIM Suppliers K.F.X./c
Group Bank credit
- ------
_____ U…S$ 000
2. Electrification 1,732 1,732 1,732
3.1.2 Double track Gongjeon-Bongyang
(rails, 1,120 tons) 391- 391 391
3.1.3 Double track Yongsan-Sosaeg
(a) Rails, 680 tons 237 237 237
(b) Electrification 1,897 1,897 1,897
3.1.4 Double track Seongbug-Euijeonbu
(a) Rails, 920 tons 324 324 324
(b) Electrification 2,674 2,674 2,674
3.2 By-pass lines (rails, 450 tons) 159 159 159
3.3 Additional crossing loops
(rails., 1,700 tons) 334 260 594 594
3.4 Marshalling yard extensions
(rails, 890 tons) 148 165 313 313
3.5 Station yard extensions
(rails, 820 tons) 169 118 287 287
3.7 Lengthening of crossing loops
(rails, 260 tons) 93 93 93
3.8.6 Automatic ticketing machines 227 227 227
3.10 Busan area isprovement
(rails, 190 tons) 66 66 66
4.1 Rail renewal, 260 km (26,000 tons) 4,732 4,381 9,113 9,113
4.2 Track renewal, 70 km (7,000 tons) 1,052 1,402 2,454 2,454
4.11 Track material workshop machinery 1,227 977 2,204 2,204
4.14 Track maintenance equipment 990 990 990
5.1.1 New diesel nain line locomotives (30) 15,052 7,526 22,578. 19,191 3,387
5.1.2 New breakdown cranes (2) 1,443 1,443 1,443
5.1.3 Diesel locomotives, remodeling (59) 12,372 5,876 18,248 15,511 2,737
5.1.4 Diesel railcars, remodeling (14) 779 779 779
5.1.6 Breakdown cranes, remodeling (3) 81 81 81
5.2 New passenger cars (211) 32,124 11,320 43,444 43,444
5.3 New freight cars (1,420) 18,732 21,032 39,764 39,764
6. Rolling stock repair facilities
(workshop equipment) 3,546 2,433 3,505 1,650 11,134 3,310 7,824
7.2.3 Power line for emergency 72 31 103 103
7.5.1 Training and technical assistance 310 309 619 619
Total 93,309 58,286 8.703 1,650 161.948 103,341 2,464 6.303 34.702 8,235 6.903
Physical contingencies 480 563 870 165 2,084 393 246 630 - 815
Price contingencies 11,066 11,388 2,567 625 25,646 15,766 523 1,717 4,953 1,720 967
Grand Total 104,855 70.243 12.140 2.440 189.678 119,500 3.233 8,650 39.655 10.770 7,870
/a Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Japan.
/b European Consortium (for electrification).
/c Korean Foreign Exchange - purchased by KNR (not debt).
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Table 3.11
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Procurement Schedule for Bank Financed Items
E v e n t s
I II III IV V VI VII
Rails (33,000 tons) 03/01/78 03/15/78 05/15/78 06/15/78 07/01/78 01/01/79 10/01/79
Permanent way workshop machinery 04/01/78 04/15/78 07/15/78 08/15/78 09/01/78 03/01/79 09/01/79
Track maintenance equipment 03/01/78 03/15/78 05/15/78 06/15/78 07/01/78 01/01/79 06/01/79
Breakdown cranes (2) 03/15/78 04/01/78 06/15/78 07/15/78 08/01/78 06/01/79 07/01/79
Passenger cars:
Special express cars (45) 03/15/78 04/01/78 06/15/78 07/15/78 08/01/78 08/01/79 02/01/80
Limited express cars (166) 03/15/78 04/01/78 06/15/78 07/15/78 08/01/78 08/01/79 02/01/80
Freight cars (1,420) 03/15/78 04/01/78 06/15/78 07/15/78 08/01/78 04/01/79 04/01/80
Rolling stock workshop equipment 01/15/79 02/01/79 05/15/79 06/15/79 07/01/79 01/01/80 01/01/81
Events I. Bank's comments on tender documents
II. Bid invitation
III. Bid opening
IV. Bank's agreement to award of contract
V. Contract date
VI. Start of delivery
VII. Completion of delivery
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Table 3.12
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Estimated Disbursement Schedule
US$ million
Quarter Cumulative
IBRD Fiscal Year and Quarter:
1978!79
To September 30, 1978 11.0 11.0
To December 31, 1978 5.0 16.0
To March 31, 1979 15.0 31.0
To June 30, 1979 16.0 47.0
1979/80
To September 30, 1979 18.0 65.0
To December 31, 1979 18.0 83.0
To March 31, 1980 17.0 100.0
To June 30, 1980 11.0 111.0
1980/81
To September 30, 1980 3.0 114.0
To December 31, 1980 3.0 117.0
To March 31, 1981 3.0 120.0
Principal assumptions:
1. Effective date of loan not later than June 15, 1978.
2. Bid invitation for rails and rolling stock not later than April 15, 1978.
Table 4.1
KOREA
SIXTII RAILWAY PROJECT
Grouping of Project Capital Costs for Economic Analysis
Million won Percent
Capacity increases /a
Lines 23,697 14.9
M4otive power 23,819 14.9
Rolling stock - passenger 25,705 16.1
"1 "1 freight 23,440 14.7
Telecommunications and power 2,014 1.3
Subtotal 98,675 61.9
Wlay and structures renewals 16,129 10.1
Seoul urban network (SKESRS) 10,276 6.5
Daejon passenger car shed 8,500 5.3
Miscellaneous
Safety related investments
(including rail/road crossings and
safety sidings) 8,550
Line relocation part of larger industrial
development projects 2,983
Workshop improvements 5,960
Iliscellaneous including right-of-way
improvements, buildings, housing etc. 8,389
Subtotal 25,882 16.2
Total /b 159,462 100.0
/a See detailed allocation to passenger and freight services on Table 4.2.
/b Excluding contingencies.
Table 4.2
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Allocation of Project Capital Costs of Capacity Increases
Between Passenger and Freight Services
(In million won)
Passenger Freight
1978 1979 1980-81 1978 1979 1980-81
1. Lines
By-pass lines 100 315 100 314
New loops 500 850 500 1,832
Marshalling yards - - 1,260 300 800
Station, yards etc. - - 590 310
Freight terminals - - 300 900 1,600
Length loops - 155 - 154
Station buildings 649 948 450 300 600 450
Signalling /a 390 1,600 1,770 596 2,414 2,650
Subtotal 1,639 3,868 2,220 3,646 6,824 5,500
2. Motive Power and
Rolling Stock /b
New locos 820 410 6,580 3,290
Remodelled locos 3,360 1,560 3,640 1,765
Remodelled rail cars
and heating cars 1,094 520 - -
Breakdown cranes 350 24 376 30
Cars (passenger and
freight 18,910 6,795 11,214 12,226
Subtotal 24,534 9,309 21,810 17,311
3. Telecommunications
and power /c 700 453 520 341
Totals by Year 28,873 13,630 2,220 25,976 24,476 5,500
Total Project 98,675 (from Table 4.1)
+ 10X physical
contingencies on
1 and 3 234 432 220 417 717 550
For rate of return
calculation (rounded) 27+100 14,100 2,400 26,400 25,200 6,100
/a Proportional to the number of trains/day for passenger and freight services.
/b According to the locos needed for passenger and freight services.
/c Proportional to train-km for passenger and freight services.
Table 4.3
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KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Comparative Freight Transport Costs by Alternative Modes
i) Revenues and Costs of Rail Transport
Revenues Costs Difference
1974 1975 1976 1974 1975 1976 1974 1975 1976
-------------------------- in won/ton-km -----------------------
Coal 2.02 2.76 3.87 2.89 3.48 5.12 -0.87 -0.72 -1.25
Cement 2.65 4.03 5.44 3.02 4.16 5.16 -0.37 -0.13 +0.28
All freight 2.31 3.34 4.64 4.72 5.64 5.76 -2.41 -2.30 -1.12
Costs include apportioned station, train operating, fixed facilities
maintenance, rolling stock maintenance, administration and management,
and depreciation costs.
Source: IMR
ii) Road Transport
Truck 6t Truck 12t
-------won/km ------ Won/ton-km /a
Operating costs:
(end 1976) economic 206 241 45.7 26.8
financial 221 272 49.1 30.2
Tariffs
one way (return empty) per ton-km 41.6
round trip " 26.7
/a Assumes operation at 75% of capacity
Source: H1OT
Table 4.
Page 2
iii) Coastal Shipping
Won per ton
Tariffs (1976)
Mukho-Incheon (1,000 km vs 300 km overland) 2,079-2,621
Busan-Incheon (700 km vs 450-km overland) 1,769-2,166
Source: MOT
iv) Modal Comparison
For the purpose of this analysis the modal comparison is for
bulk commodities such as coal, cement, ore and fertilizer since no
further capacity is provided by the project for general cargo or bulk
oil. The figures above show that the line haul cost of road transport
is much higher than that of either rail or coastal shipping. The
traffic forecasts given in Part II already reflect the share of
coastal shipping when it is competitive i.e. for cement plants, fertilizer
plants, oil refineries located on or near the coast. For the remaining
traffic for which rail capacity is provided by the project, coastal
shipping is no longer a valid alternative as it would require long
terminal transport at either end, which would require either rail
capacity or a very high cost road transport.
Rail Versus Road Costs. Assuming average rail transport distance
of 165 km; this is the average for cement. Average distances for coal
and ore are larger and would give even a further advantage to rail:
Rail cost Road cost
Line haul cost, 165 km @ W 5.2/t = W 858 @ W 26.8/t - W 4,422
Terminal costs /a W 1,000 -
Total W 1,858 W 4,422
Per ton-km 11.3 26.8
Difference W 15.5/ton-km
/a Estimated on the basis of 1970 cost analysis by consultants
Touche Ross. Including loading, unloading and transportation
costs from station within a 5 km radius, the terminal costs
were then estimated at W 434/ton. At the factory end, costs
are identical since all plants have sidings and direct loading
of either rail or road.
Table 4.4
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Economic Return on Capacity Increase for Freight Services
Traffic that would Economic cost
divert to other modes savings from
Capital costs /a without project /b alternative mode /c
(W million) (in million ton-km) (W million)
1978 26,400 500 7,500
1979 25,200 1,100 16,500
1980 4,000 1,100 16,500
1981 2,100 1,100 16,500
1982-2003 
- 1,100 16,500
Rate of return is 42%
/a Include investment in - freight wagons
- locomotives (on the basis of diesel loco-km for
freight trains)
- line capacity increases and telecommunications
equipment allocated to freight services (see detailed
allocation of costs in Table 4.2).
/b This is taken conservatively as the capacity generated by the box and gondola
cars acquired under the project, assuming improved utilization. The figures
above represent somewhat less than 2/3 of the freight traffic increase forecast
for 1978 and 1979, and only about 85% of the traffic increase in bulk commo-
dities except oil. The remaining traffic will be handled by improvement in use
of the existing stock, including remodelling. Remodelling costs are included
in /a above although no specific benefits have been quantified.
/c Difference between transport costs by rail and the least costly alternative.
This is generally trucking since coastal shipping is only competitive for
traffic with origin and destinations at or near ports and this has already been
taken into consideration when forecasting railway traffic. An average of
W 15/ton-km is assumed as the cost difference (Table 4.3).
Table 4.5
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Comparative Passenger Transport Costs by Alternative Modes
(i) Revenues and Costs of the Special and Limited Express Trains
Revenues Costs Difference
1976 1977 1976 1977 /a 1976 1977
---------- in won/pass-km -------------
Special express 8.70 9.55 4.17 5.00 4.53 4.55
Limited express:
nonair-conditioned 5.17 4.87 2.83 3.40 2.34 1.47
air-conditioned - 7.23 - 4.20 - 3.03
/a Estimates.
Costs include apportioned station, train operating, fixed
facilities maintenance, rolling stock maintenance, administration
and management, but exclude depreciation.
Source: KNR and mission estimates.
(ii) Expressway Bus
Per pass-km
With 40 pass. With 50 pass.
Operating costs (end 1976) economic W 145/km 3.63 2.90
financial W 178/km 4.45 3.56
Tariffs (end 1976) per pass-km 1-200 km 4.74
201-400 km 4.34
Source: MIOT
Table 4.6
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Financial Return on Capacity Increase for Passenger Services
Capacity Added
by the Project /b Operating Profits /c
Special Limited Special Limited
Capital costs /a Express Express Express Express Total
(W million) (million pass-km) (W million)
1978 27,100 170 1,050 780 3,150 3,930
1979 14,100 270 1,450 1,240 4,350 5,590
1980 1,500 290 1,590 1,330 4,770 6,100
1981 900 310 1,700 1,430 5,100 6,530
1982-2003 
- 310 1,700 1,430 5,100 6,530
Rate of return is 17%
/a Includes investment in - passenger coaches
- locomotives (on the basis of diesel loco-km for passenger
trains)
- line capacity increases and telecommunication equipment
allocated for passenger services (see detailed allocation
of costs in Table 4.2).
/b Capacity resulting from acquisition of new coaches, calculation includes improvement
in utilization of both existing and added stock.
/c Difference between operating costs excluding depreciation and revenues, i.e. W 4.6
per pass-km for Special Express and W 3.0 per pass-km for air-conditioned Limited
Express (see Table 4.5).
Table ._I
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Income Statements, 1971-81
(Won billion)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
----------------- Actual-/a----- -------- Tentative -------------- Forecast-----------------
Operating Revenues
Passenger revenue 17.3 20.7 22.8 29.7 41.5 52.5 66.7 70.2 74.1 79.1 81.9
Freight revenue 11.6 13.3 15.7 19.5 28.9 43.5 59.5 65.1 70.2 74.3 79.3
Other operating revenues 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.8 5.2 6.6 8.9 7.6 8.1 8.6 9.0
Subtotal Operating Revenues 31.2 36.5 41.6 53.0 75.6 102.6 135.1 142.9 152.4 162.0 170.2
Add: % Passenger fare increases (10) 5.3 (10%) 15.6 (10%) 26.2 (10%) 38.0
% Freight rate increases (15%) 7.4 (15%) 22.7 (15%) 38.7 (10%) 53.4
Passenger revenue increases
due to MRP lb - 3.2 5.9 8.8 11.6
Subtotal - - - - - - - 19.9 44.2 73.7 103.0
Re-stated operating revenues 31.2 36.5 41.6 53.0 75.6 102.6 135.1 158.8 196.6 235.7 273.2
Operating Expenses
Labor 13.2 13.8 14.3 17.7 26.4 44.6 60.7 72.3 81.4 91.5 102.2
Fuel 3.9 4.2 6.3 15.0 15.5 15.3 16.2 18.6 21.8 23.0 24.5
Maintenance /c 7.3 7.9 8.0 11.6 19.0 23.2 27.4 34.6 38.0 42.0 46.1
General 3.4 3.9 5.4 4.6 7.3 14.5 13.7 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.0
Subtotal 27.8 29.8 34.0 48.9 68.2 97.6 118.0 139.5 156.2 172.5 189.8
Less: Economies due to MRP - - - - - - - 4.6 5.4 7.8 9.1
Total cash expenses 27.8 29.8 34.0 48.9 68.2 97.6 118.0 134.9 150.8 164.7 180.7
Depreciation 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.2 6.5 15.0 17.4 20.9 23.8 28.2 33.1
Total operating expenses 31.8 34.3 38.9 54.1 74.7 112.6 135.4 155.8 174.6 192.9 213.8
Net operating revenue (loss) (0.6) 2.2 2.7 (1.1) 0.9 (10.0) (0.3) 3.0 22.0 42.8 59.4
Interest charges 3.3 5.5 6.5 7.4 10.4 15.1 20.3 22.0 28.5 33.5 37.7
Other revenues/expenses (net) /d (0.7) (7.6) (3.3) (23.2) 5.4 1.7 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
Net revenue (deficit) (4.6) (10.9) (7.1) (31.7) (4.1) t23.4) (20.1) (18.0) (5.2) 10.8 23.5
Subsidy from Government - 0.7 1.5 5.7 14.4 13.7 21.7 14.6 12.0 7.5
Net income (deficit) - adjusted (4.6) (10.2) (5.6) (26.0) 10.3 (9.7) 1.6 (3.4) 6.8 18.3 23.5
Ratios
Operating Ratio 102 94 93.5 102 99 110 100 98.0 89.5 82 78
Interest charge coverage - 0.3 0.4 - 0.1 - - 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.6
Debt service coverage 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.6
Return on net fixed assets - 0.9 1.1 - 0.1 - - 0.3 2.1 3.5 4.2
/a Actual - audited.
/b Management Rationalization Plan (revenue increase includes additional baggage revenues due to increase in charges).
/c Includes workshops labor costs.
/d Includes losses/gains on foreign exchange fluctuations.
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Table 5.2
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Operating Revenues and Costs - Effects of Inflation. 1970-76
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
(Currency Won)
1. Exchange rate (to US$) 310 350 394 398.5 406 484 484
2. Price index: Wholesale 100 108.6 123.8 132.4 189.6 238.2 267.0
3. Consumer 100 112.1 125.5 129.3 160.0 202.0 233.1
4. Wages 100 119.1 138.1 153.4 207.3 263.6 355
5. Wholesale
(Imports) 100 107.1 116.1 152.4 219.2 208.8 211.9
6. Average of 2,
3 and 5 /a 100 109.4 121.8 138.0 189.6 216.3 237.3
6(a) Weighted /b - 113.9 129.0 144.7 195.6 232.0 279.7
7. Traffic-pass-km (million) 9,818 8,750 10,062 10,720 11,077 12,926 14,305
8. Traffic-ton-km (million) 7,709 7,841 7,241 8,593 9,005 9,293 9.728
9. Total traffic units (million) 17,527 16,591 17,303 19,313 20,082 22,219 24,033
10. Revenues:/c Passenger 19.4 17.3 20.7 22.8 29.7 41.5 52.5
11. Freight 11.1 11.6 13.3 15.7 19.5 28.9 43.5
12. Other 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.8 5.2 6.6
13. Total revenues 33.0 31.2 36.5 41.6 53.0 75.6 102.6
Operating expenses /c
14. Staff costs 11.4 13.2 13.8 14.3 17.7 26.4 44.5
15. Other (excl. depreciation) 12.4 14.6 16.0 19.6 31.2 41.8 53.0
16. Total working expenses 23.8 27.8 29.8 34.0 48.9 68.2 97.6
17. Depreciation 3.9 3.9 4.5 4.9 5.2 6.5 15.0
18. Total operating expenses 27.7 31.7 34.3 38.9 54.1 74.7 112.6
19. Revenue per pass-km (10 + 7) (won) 1.976 1.977 2.057 2.127 2.681 3.210 3.673
20. Revenue per ton-km (11 4 8) (won) 1.440 1.479 1.837 1.827 2.165 3.110 4.636
21. Adjusted revenue per pass-km
(19 e 6(a) (won) 1.976 1.736 1.595 1.470 1.371 1.384 1.313
22. Adjusted revenue per ton-km
(20 + 6(a) (won) 1.440 1.299 1.424 1.263 1.107 1.341 1.657
Costs Adjusted for Inflation
23. Staff costs (14 t 4) 11.4 11.1 10.0 9.3 8.5 10.0 12.6
24. Other costs (15 t 6) 12.4 13.3 13.1 14.2 16.5 19.3 22.3
25. Total working expenses 23.8 24.4 23.1 23.5 25.0 29.3 34.9
Working Expenses per Traffic Unit (won)
26. Current (16 4 9) 1.358 1.676 1.722 1.760 2.435 3.069 4.061
27. Deflated (26 + 6a) 1.358 1.471 1.334 1.216 1.245 1.323 1.452
(25 t 9) 1.358 1.471 1.335 1.217 1.245 1.323 1.452
Staff Statistics
28. Total staff 43,800 43,600 44,300 41,200 39,900 39,500 39,300
29. Average cost per employee (14 + 28)
(won 000) 260 303 311 347 444 668 1,135
30. Average cost per employee (deflated)
(29 + 4) 260 255 227 227 214 255 321
31. Traffic units per employee (9 t 28)
(won 000) 400 380 350 469 503 562 611
Financial Ratios
32. Working ratio (16 + 13) Z 72 89 82 82 92 90 92
33. Operating ratio (18 + 13) Z 84 102 95 93 102 95 106
34. Debt service coverage 1.7 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.4
35. Return on net fixed assets in use 2.9 - 0.9 1.1 - 0.1 -
/a Arithmetic average.-
/b Line 16 x 100
line 25
/c Billions of won
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Table 5. 3
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Balance Sheets, 1971-81
(Won billions)
Fiscal December 31 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
…--------------- Actual |b -------------------- Tentative --------------- Forecast --------------
Current Assets
Cash 0.5 0.4 1.4 1.8 3.3 5.4 5.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Accounts receivable - 3.6 4.5 4.0 7.5 9.4 8.1 11.0 12.8 17.4 19.5
Total quick assets 0.5 4.0 5.9 5.8 10.8 14.8 14.0 14.1 15.9 20.5 22.6
Inventory 11.2 3.7 4.0 5.5 9.5 14.6 15.1 18.4 21.0 23.2 26.0
Total current assets 11.7 7.7 9.9 11.3 20.3 29.4 29.1 32.5 36.9 43.7 48.6
Current Liabilities
Current portion of long-term debit - 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.3 4.6 4.8 5.2 6.5 7.5 9.0
Accounts payable - 12.0 11.8 13.9 5.2 4.5 9.4 11.4 13.0 13.9 15.0
A11 other - 5.3 4.2 5.1 5.4 6.2 6.0 7.0 8.0 8.5 9.0
Total current liabilities 16.4 19.6 18.3 22.1 13.9 15.3 20.2 23.6 27.5 29.9 33.0
Net working capital (4.7) (11.9) (8.4) (10.8) 6.4 14.1 8.9 8.9 9.4 13.8 15.6
Fixed Assets
Fixed assets 173.1 197.4 207.1 232.0 274.5 736.9/c 799.6 920.0 1,091.6 1,274.3 1,467.9
Land 33.9 33.7 130.2 127.5 130.5 223.2 225.9 265.4 292.8 317.3 341.3
Cross book value 207.0 231.1 337.3 359.5 405.0 960.1 1,025.5 1,185.4 1,384.4 1,591.6 1,809.2
Less accumulated depreciation 17.0 25.8 25.8 31.0 37.6 193.3 216.2 235.4 256.9 282.8 313.7
Net book value 190.0 205.3 311.5 328.5 367.4 766.8 809.3 950.0 1,127.5 1,308.8 1.495.5
Add: Construction in progress 6.5 24.5 29.1 42.2 43.0 24.1 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.7
Total net fixed assets 196.5 229.8 340.6 370.7 410.4 790.9 842.0 982.7 1,160.2 1,341.5 1,528.2
Deferred assets /a 32.5 - - - - - - - - - -
Other Assets
Investments 2.2 4.4 6.4 5.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Prepaid and other 11.6 0.1 0.1 0.1. - - 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
Total other assets 13.8 4.5 6.5 6.0 0.1 0.1 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4
TOTAL ASSETS 238.1 222.4 338.7 365.9 416.9 805.1 858.3 999.0 1,177.0 1,362.7 1,551.2
Long-term debt 75.3 80.5 100.5 154.6 194.5 245.1 275.0 340.3 420.6 482.8 533.0
Provision for severance pay - 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.9 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Equity and/or Ownership /b
Revaluation of assets 72.9 77.6 177.1 175.3 175.2 521.0/c 504.3 586.3 681.1 784.9 904.3
Fixed capital (cash or in kind) 73.2 69.7 69.9 70.4 71.0 71.1 64.9 82.5 99.0 116.2 119.3
Accumulated surplus (deficit) 16.7 (6.4) (10.1) (36.1) (25.7) (35.4) 10.8 (13.4) (27.0) (24.5) (8.7)
Total equity and/or ownership 162.8 140.9 236.9 209.6 220.5 556.7 580.0 655.4 753.1 876.6 1,014.9
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 238.1 222.4 338.7 365.9 416.9 805.1 858.3 999.0 1_177.0 1,362.7 1,551.2
Ratios
Current ratio 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5
Liquid ratio - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Debt/equity ratio 32/68 36/64 30/70 42/58 47/53 29/71 32/68 35/65 36/64 36/64 35/65
/a Deferred loss on foreign exchange fluctuations.
/b 1972-76 figures adjusted according to audit reports.
/c Includes results of revaluation in 1976.
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Table 5.4
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Long-term Debt as of December 31, 1976
Amount Repayment (years)
outstanding Interest Grace Repayment
Year Original amount (Won million) rate % period period
USAID - First loan 1962 ($) 6,388,391 1,239 5.75 1 20
- Second loan 1965 ($) 10,711.923 2,578 5.75 1 20
- Third loan 1960 ($) 18,509,995 3,443 5.75 1 15
IDA - Cr. 25-KO 1962 Cs) 13,992,924 3,952 5.75 1 25
- Cr. 110-KO 1967 ($) 10,645,205 4,559 6.00 3 22
- Cr. 183-KO 1970 ($) 15,000,000 7,548 7.00 4 21
IBRD - Ln. 669-KO 1970 ($) 40,000,000 17,870 7.00 4 21
- Ln. 863-KO 1972 ($) 40,000,000 18,560 7.25 4 21
- Ln. 1101-KO 1975 ($) 100,000,000 25,914 8.50 5 20
OECF (Japan) - First loan 1966 (Y) 4,279,388,398 3,706 5.75 2 18
- Second loan 1967 (Y) 3,339,553,900 3,242 5.75 2 18
- Third loan 1972 (Y) 15,408,000,000 25,568 5.00 5 15
- Fourth loan 1976 (Y) 4,300,000,000 - 3.5 7 13
UK 1964 (i) 500,000 116 6.75/7.75 4 10
KFW - First loan 1970 (DM) 17,000,000 1,825 5.75 7 18
- Second loan 1973 (DM) 17,000,000 3,271 5.75 7 18
50 C/S Group - Loan 1 1969 
-20,169
Loan 3 1974 /a 1,57083 /b /c /c
Loan 4 1975 419
Exim Bank (US) - Loan 1 1968 (5) 5,999,000 17,036 6.00 - 7
- Loan 2 1975 ($) 3,780,000 ' 7.00 1 10
Suppliers credits ($) 2,218 5.25/6.20
KDB - Various 1966-76 (W) 66,662 6.00 5 15
Ministry of Communications 1976 (W) 10,000 6.00 5 15
Total outstanding /d 244,106
/a In various currencies.
/b Varying between 6% and 8%.
/c Varying between 2 and 3 years' grace and 7-13 years' repayment.
/d On the basis of US$1.00 = Won 485.
Source: KNR.
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KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Financial Forecasts - Methodology and Principal Assumptions
1. Traffic
Traffic will increase as forecast in Tables 2.5-2.10.
2. Revenues
(a) Basic
(i) Passenger revenues have been calculated on the basis of agreed
traffic forecasts, analyzed under: Intercity commuters and
noncommuters, (further subdivided under Saemul express, limited
express, ordinary express and ordinary trains), military and
Seoul Metropolitan Electric Suburban Railway Services (SMESRS),
converted to revenues by applying the average revenue per
passenger-km earned on each service during the first five months
of 1977.
(ii) Freight revenues have similarly been calculated on the basis
of agreed traffic forecasts analyzed under major commodities,
converted to revenues by applying-the average revenue per
ton-km earned by each such commodity (or group of commodities),
during the first five months of 1977.
(b) Increased Revenues
(i) Assuming tariff increases as discussed in para. 5.23 of the
report. Although, as discussed in para. 2.33, such increases
should be selective, the annual effect on revenues is treated
as though they would be across-the-board./a
(ii) KNR has calculated increased passenger revenues, due to (a)
upgrading of services on major trunk lines (additional sleeper
trains and airconditioned limited express trains) and (b)
tariff increases on baggage trains, due to service improvements.
3. Operating Expenses
(a) Labor Costs - KNR has calcuated the average number of staff needed
each year, both for workshop and nonworkshop functions, and has
calculated a basic annual cost on the current (1977) average annual
cost per employee (workshop employees cost about 6% higher than
/a In the Grey Cover report, the increases as agreed at negotiations will be
indicated.
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nonworkshop staff). Effect is then given to assumed annual cost
increases averaging 12% in the years 1978-80, and 11% in 1981.
Forecast savings due to staff reductions caused by the Management
Rationalization Plan (MRP) are shown separately.
(b) Fuel Costs - KNR has estimated the engine-km needed to carry the
forecast traffic, under engine types (diesel, electric and steam
locomotives and diesel and electric railcars), then applying the
current cost of fuel per engine-km (by type), and inflating the
annual costs by factors of 8% p.a. in 1978 and 1979, and 7.5% p.a.
in 1980 and 1981.
(c) Maintenance Costs - Costs are increased annually in line with
traffic increases. For maintenance of facilities, KNR has forecast
costs (excluding labor) increasing at 25% of the annual percentage
increase in traffic units, while for maintenance of rolling stock
50% is used. Workshop labor costs are as calculated in (a) above.
As in (b) above, annual costs (except labor) are inflated, using the
same percentages.
(d) Other Costs - (Administrative and General), are based on 1977
budgeted costs, inflated thereafter as in items (b) and (c) above.
(e) Cost Savings - As mentioned in item (ii) above, KNR has estimated
cost savings due to the MRP, for labor and other costs.
(f) Depreciation - KNR has based its calculations on the figures arrived
at in 1976, taking into account the asset revaluation of that year.
After eliminating land, the overall percentage of depreciation to
gross fixed assets was found to be 2.4%. This is applied to the
gross value excluding land as at the beginning of the year, to which
the estimated annual revaluation is added (8% in years 1977-79, 7.5%
in years 1980/81).
(g) Interest Charges - have been forecast on the basis of existing loans
plus an estimated rate of 8% p.a. for new foreign borrowings, and 6%
p.a. for new local borrowing. Grace periods for loans secured after
1977: Foreign, 4 years (except Eximbank, 1 year); Local, (KDB) 5
years.
4. Balance Sheet
(a) Receivables apply only to freight services, whereas passenger
service is currently on a cash basis. As such, receivables are
forecast on a 60-day basis, or 17% of total freight revenues.
(b) Inventories are forecast at about 12-13% of total operating costs.
(c) Accounts Payable were forecast on a basis of 6% of total cash
expenses.
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5. General
KNR's forecasts assume the Government's granting of cash subsidies
to KNR for operations and/or investment of W 22.2 billion in 1977,
W 11.0 billion in 1978, W 11.5 billion in 1979, W 9.7 billion in 1980 and
W 3.1 billion in 1981.
Table 5.6
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Cash Flow Statement 1972-81
(Won billion)
Totals
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1977-81
------- Actual --------- --------------- Forecast ----------------
Sources of Funds
Cash generated by KNR:
Net operating revenue (loss) 1.8 2.7 (1.4) 0.9 (10.0) (0.3) 3.0 22.0 42.8 59.4 126.9
Depreciation 4.5 4.9 5.2 6.5 15.0 17.4 20.9 23.8 28.2 33.1 123.4
Net nonoperating revenue (expense) 0.1 1.3 6.3 3.5 6.4 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8 6.1
Total cash generated 6.4 8.9 10.1 10.9 11.4 17.6 24.9 47.1 72.5 94.3 256.4
Increase in severance pay provisions - - 0.4 - 1.4 - - - - - -
Funds provided by Government:
Operating subsidy - 1.5 5.7 14.4 13.7 21.7 14.6 12.0 7.5 - 55.8
Investment - 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.9 - 3.0 4.5 9.7 3.1 20.3
Sale of assets - - - - - 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 4.3
Borrowing:
Proposed Bank loan - - - - - - 2.4 49.7 5.8 - 57.9
Other foreign borrowing - - - - - 30.8 25.8 11.2 42.8 42.8 153.4
Local - - - - - 33.3 51.5 35.0 33.0 30.0 182.8
Total borrowing 6.9 27.4 37.6 53.3 59.1 64.1 79.7 95.9 81.6 72.8 394.1
Decrease in "Other Assets" 22.9 - - - - - - - - - -
Ex/Railroad Fund - - - 6.0 - - - - - - -
Total sources of funds 36.2 38.6 54.3 85.2 86.5 104.1 123.0 160.4 172.2 171.2 730.9
Application of Funds
Capital investment
local currency - - - - - 45.7 58.4 54.9 66.3 66.3 291.6
Foreign exchange - - - - - 30.8 28.2 60.9 48.6 42.8 211.3
Total capital investment 24.9 10.5 41.4 44.1 52.9 76.5 86.6 115.8 114.9 109.1 502.9
Debt service
Interest charges 5.8 6.5 7.4 10.4 15.1 20.3 22.0 28.5 33.5 37.7 142.0
Repayment 10.7 8.0 9.8 11.1 14.6 15.9 14.4 15.6 19.4 22.6 87.9
Total debt service 16.5 14.5 17.2 21.5 29.7 36.2 36.4 44.1 52.9 60.3 229.9
Increase in "Other Assets" - 10.3 - 2.7 - - - - - - -
Unexplained charges to earned surplus 0.4 2.0 - - - - - - - - -
Net change in working capital (5.6) 1.3 (4.3) 16.9 3.9 (8.6) - 0.5 4.4 1.8 (1.9)
Total application of funds 36.2 38.6 54.3 85.2 86.5 104.1 123.0 160.4 172.2 171.2 730.9
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KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Comparison of Traffic Forecasts and Actuals
A. Freight
Tons (million) Ton-km (million)
------- 863-KO -------- ----- Actual ------- ------- 863-KO --------- ------ Actual --------
Coal Other Total Coal Other Total Coal Other Total Coal Other Total
1972 11.66 18.92 30.58 11.3 20.3 31.6 2,682 4,688 7,370 2,620 4,621 7,241
1973 12.79 20.72 33.51 13.6 24.0 37.6 3,019 5,128 8,147 3,201 5,390 8,591
1974 12.82 22.20 35.02 15.1 24.3 39.4 3,026 5,423 8,449 3,408 5,597 9,005
1975 13.40 24.17 37.57 16.7 26.0 42.7 3,163 5,872 9,035 3,688 5,605 9,293
1976 13.76 25,91 39.67 16.1 27.7 43.8 3,248 6,263 9,511 3,662 6,066 9,728
-------- 1101-KO ------ ------- Actual ------- -------- 1101-KO ------- Actual --------
1974 14.7 25.9 40.6 15.1 24.3 39.4 3,375 5,699 9,074 3,408 5,597 9,005
1975 16.6 26.8 43.4 16.7 26.0 42.7 3,802 6,245 10,047 3,688 5,605 9,293
-1976 17.6 30.1 47.7 16.1 27.7 43.8 4,105 6,768 10,873 3,662 6,066 9,723
B. Passengers
Passengers (million) Pass-km (million)
--------- 863-KO -------- ------- Actual -------- --------- 863-KO --------- -------- Actual --------
LD /a C /a M /a Total LD C M Total LD C M Total LD C M Total
1972 95.4 42.0 1.7 139.1 109.2 26.3 1.6 137.1 8,590 953 510 10,053 8,914 629 519 10,062
1973 97.9 42.5 1.7 142.1 118.9 22.5 1.6 143.0 8,815 965 510 10,290 9,681 552 487 10,720
1974 97.6 75.0 1.7 174.3 140.4 26.6 1.5 168.5 8,784 1,206 510 10,500 10,011 596 471 11,078
1975 99.8 110.0 1.7 211.5 187.3 32.2 1.4 220.9 8,984 1,407 510 10,901 11,837 655 434 12,926
1976 101.0 150.0 1.7 252.7 210.5 36.9 1.3 248.7 9,090 1,650 510 11, 10 13,160 750 395 14,305
------- 1101-KO -------- ----- Actual -------- ------- 1101-KO -------- ------ Actual --------
1974 120.5 27.8 1.5 149.8 140.4 26.6 1.5 168.5 10,387 604 450 11,441 10,011 596 471 11,078
1975 165.9 88.4 1.5 255.8 187.3 32.2 1.4 220.9 11,740 1,544 450 13,734 11,837 655 434 12,926 H
1976 194.1 112.1 1.5 307.7 210.5 36.9 1.3 248.7 12,876 1,937 450 15,263 13,160 750 395 14,305
/a LD = Long Distance, C = Commuters, M = Military.
December 1977
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Sensitivity Analysis - Assuming Traffic Increases at 50% of Forecast Rate
With Tariff Increases as Proposed by the Government
(Won billion)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Operating Revenues (before tariff increases)
Passengers 66.7 67.8 68.7 73.4 75.1
Freight 59.5 62.4 65.0 66.9 69.4
Other 8.9 7.6 8.1 8.6 9.0
Subtotal 135.1 137.8 141.8 148.9 153.5
MRP-increased revenues - 3.2 5.9 8.8 11.6
Tariff increases - Passengers - (10%) 5.1 (10%) 14.4 (10%) 24.3 (10%) 34.9
- Freight - (15%) 7.1 (15%) 21.0 (15%) 34.8 (10%) 46.7
Total operating revenues 135.1 153.2 183.1 216.8 246.7
Operating Expenses 135.4 155.0 172.6 189.7 210.0
Net Operating Revenue. (0.3) (1.8) 10.5 27.1 36.7
Interest (20.3) (22.0) (28.5) (33.5) (37.7)
Other revenue 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
Net revenue (20.1) (23.8) (16.7) (4.9) .8)
Debt Service 36.2 36.6 44.4 53.1 60.5
Cash Generation
Net operating revenue (0.3) (1.8) 10.5 27.1 36.7
Other revenue 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
Depreciation 17.4 20.9 23.8 28.2 33.1
Total 17.6 20.1 35.6 56.8 71.6
Cash Surplus (deficit) (18.6) (16.5) (8.8) 3.7 11.1
Net operating revenue (before traffic adjustment)/a (0.3) 3.0 22.0 42.8 59.4
Net operating revenue (after traffic adjustment) (0.3) (1.8) 10.5 27.1 36.7
Reduction in net operating revenue - 4.8 11.5 15.9 22.7
% of operating revenues - 3.1 6.3 7.3 9.2
/a Table 5.1.
Note: Project Plan
Cash generation period period
(Won billions)
Net cash surplus (original) (7.5) 26.5
Net cash surplus (revised) (25.3) (29.1)
Reduction in cash generation 17.8 55.6
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Sensitivitv Analysis - Assuming Traffic Increases at 100% of Forecast Rate
With 50% of Tariff Increases as Proposed by Government /a
(Won billion)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Operating Revenues (before tariff increases)
Passengers 66.7 70.2 74.1 79.1 81.9
Freight 59.5 65.1 70.2 74.3 79.3
Other 8.9 7.6 8.1 8.6 9.0
Subtotal 135.1 142.9 152.4 162.0 170.2
MRP-increased revenues - 3.2 5.9 8.8 11.6
Tariff increases - Passengers - (10%) 5.3 (5%) 7.8 (5%) 13.1 (5%) 19.0
- Freight - (15%) 7.4 (7.5%) 11.3 (7.5%) 19.4 (5%) 26.7
Total operating revenues 135.1 158.8 177.4 203.3 227.5
Operating Expenses (as on Table 5.1) 135.4 155.8 174.6 192.9 213.8
Net Operating Revenue (0.3) 3.0 2.8 10.4 13.7
Interest (20.3) (23.0) (28.1) (34.7) (41.4)
Other revenue 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
Net revenue (loss) (20.1) (19.0) (24.0) (22.8) (25.9)
Debt Service 36.2 37.5 43.7 54.1 64.0
Cash Generation
Net operating revenue (0.3) 3.0 2.8 10.4 13.7
Other revenue 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
Depreciation 17.4 20.9 23.8 28.2 33.1
Total 17.6 24.9 27.9 40.1 48.6
Cash Surplus (deficit) (18.6) (12.6) (15.8) (14.0) (15.4)
Net operating revenue (before tariff adjustment)/b (0.3) 3.0 22.0 42.8 59.4
Net operating revenue (after tariff adjustment) (0.3) 3.0 2.8 10.4 13.7
Reduction in net operating revenue - - (19.2) (32.4) (45.7)
% of operating revenues - - 10.8 15.9 20.1
/a After 1978 (1978 tariff increases are firm).
/b Table 5.1.
Note: Project Plan
Cash generation period period
(Won billions)
Net cash surplus (original) 7.5 26.5
Net cash surplus (deficit)
revised (28.4) (76.7)
Reduction in cash generation (35.9) (103.2)
March 1978
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Sensitivity Analysis - Assuming Traffic Increases at 50% of Forecast Rate
With 50% of Tariff Increases as Proposed by Government /a
(Won billion)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Operating Revenues (before tariff increases)
Passengers 66.7 67.8 68.7 73.4 75.1
Freight 59.5 62.4 65.0 66.9 69.4
Other 8.9 7.6 8.1 8.6 9.0
Subtotal 135.1 137.8 141.8 148.9 153.5
MRP-increased revenues - 3.2 5.9 8.8 11.6
Tariff increases - Passengers - (10%) 5.1 (5%) 10.6 (5%) 15.6 (5%) 20.5
- Freight - (15%) 7.1 (7.5%) 15.3 (7.5%) 22.0 (5%) 27.5
Total operating revenues 135.1 153.2 173.6 195.3 213.1
Operating Expenses (as on page 1) 135.4 155.0 172.6 189.7 210.0
Net Operating Revenue (loss) (0.3) (1.8) 1.0 5.6 3.1
Interest (20.3) (22.8) (28.4) (35.3) (42.6)
Other revenue 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
Net revenue (loss) (20.1) (23.6) (26.1) (28.2) (37.7)
Debt Service 36.2 38.2 44.0 54.7 65.2
Cash Generation
Net operating revenue (loss) (0.3) (1.8) 1.0 5.6 3.1
Other revenue 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
Depreciation 17.4 20.9 23.8 28.2 33.1
Total 17.6 20.1 26.1 35.3 38.0
Cash Surplus (deficit) (18.6) (18.1) (17.9) (19.4) (27.2)
Net operating revenue (before traffic & tariff
adjustment) /b (0.3) 3.0 22.0 42.8 59.4
Net operating revenue (after traffic & tariff
adjustment) (0.3) (1.8) 1.0 5.6 3.1
Reduction in net operating revenue - (4.8) (21.0) (37,2) (56.3)
% of operating revenues 
- 3.1 12.1 19.2 26.4
/a After 1978 only.
/b Table 5.1.
Note- Project Plan
Cash generation period period
(Won billions)
Net cash surplus (original) 7.5 26.5
Net cash surplus (deficit) (32.4) (97.6)
Reduction in cash generation (39.9) (124.1)
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KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
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